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1 | General Introduction
Program evaluation often adopts a positive rather than a normative perspective. “Impact”
as understood in the evaluation literature, refers to the change of an outcome that can be
attributed exclusively to the effect of the policy. The evaluation problem thus resides in
extracting the causal effect of the program (Ravallion (2013)). However, such interpretation
can be identified with a positive rather than a normative perspective, since the later, calls
for value judgements of an ethical, political, or aesthetic nature (Ziliak, 2008). That is,
an evaluation from a normative perspective looks at what should be instead of what it is.
The purpose of my dissertation is to present an evaluation of a Conditional Cash Transfer
program in Mexico from the perspective of children’s opportunities. Therefore, it provides an
impact evaluation which is ultimately concerned with interpreting the results of the analysis
on an ethical basis. To construct the bridge between purely impact evaluation and the broad
concept of opportunity, I use methods from to the literature on evaluation in a framework
where ethical principles from the literature of equality of opportunity need to be satisfied.
Opportunity sensitive impact evaluations, above all, must consider justice the priority for
the policy under scrutiny. Not long ago, the role of policies to enhance social justice was
ignored, today however, most countries and multilateral organizations recognize the central
role of public interventions to enhance opportunities for all human beings. For example, the
United Nations Development Goals expressively incorporates access to opportunities in dif-
ferent domains as a universal goal (United Nations, 2008). Similarly, the World Development
Report 2006 promotes the provision of opportunities for all, and the role of public policy as
a key tool to “leveling the playing field” (The World Bank, 2005).
The development of the study of equality of opportunity began with contributions from
political philosophers. John Rawls for example, associated the idea of justice with the equal-
ization of opportunities in society (Rawls, 1971). The novelty of his proposal rested on the
idea that opportunities, rather than outcomes, were the relevant space to judge social fair-
ness. Further, his work opened up the modern study of equality of opportunity and was the
foundation for many influential works that came later. Other contributions that paved the
way on equality of opportunity soon followed that of Rawls. Sen (1980) for example, argued
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that social policy should promote equality of capabilities. For Sen, individual achievement
should not rely on people’s capacities but only on the choices made by individuals. Sen refers
to the set of such capacities as "functionings", which among others, include education and
health. A bit later, Dworkin (1981a,b) claimed for equalization of resources, and according
to him, the role of social policies rests on the equalization of resources in society. Finally, two
influential works by Cohen (1989) and Arneson (1989) defend the idea of placing choice and
responsibility at the center of the evaluation of equal-opportunity policies.
Among economists, the incorporation of normative principles to the analysis of policies,
particularly from an equal-opportunity perspective is more recent. Such interest, has mainly
led to a large number of contributions on methods and approaches to measure inequality of
opportunity. However, the diversity of approaches often complicates the empirical analysis,
and only recently, proposals to unify the literature on methodological aspects and their re-
lation with normative principles start to appear in the literature. For example, Ramos and
Van de gaer (2015) provides a thoroughly overview on normative principles on the one hand,
and measures on the other. Further, they discuss how principles accommodate in empirical
analysis available in the literature. Another contribution which organizes the existent lit-
erature according to equal-opportunity principles is provided by Ferreira H.G. and Peragine
(2015). They provide a "canonical" model which embodies the main concepts and methodolog-
ical theoretical aspects. Finally, Roemer and Trannoy’s Chapter in the Handbook of Income
Distributions extensively discusses philosophical, methodological, and empirical aspects of the
theory of equality opportunity (Roemer and Trannoy, 2014).
In what follows I discuss the main principles found in the literature of equality of oppor-
tunity and at the same time, I explain how these principles are framed and used in each the
three Chapters presented in the dissertation.
1.1 Normative principles
To incorporate opportunity principles into impact evaluation analysis one needs, first of all, to
consider the process that generates individual outcomes. Impact evaluation methods rely on
comparisons between outcomes in different states (usually between treated and non-treated
states), without placing too much emphasis on the role that individuals play in generating
these outcomes. That is, the main point of impact evaluation analysis is the effect of the policy
or program under study, and less how individuals with different characteristics react to the
policy. Equal-opportunity analysis, in contrast, requires to discriminate between effects that
are morally acceptable, because individuals are somehow responsible for them, and effects that
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are not. The reason is that at the core of the equality of opportunity principle rest the idea
that some inequalities are not offensive because individuals are up to some degree responsible,
and as such, not all inequalities need to be eliminated. Two fundamental principles postulated
in the literature of equality of opportunity formally recover the latter idea as follows:
The reward principle states that effort should be adequately rewarded. If individuals exert
effort according to their own preferences, from an ethical viewpoint, they are entitled to enjoy
the by-product of such effort. As a consequence, inequalities resulting from some individuals
being more diligent than others should be respected. To invoke the reward principle two
assumptions are due: first, individuals freely and consciously choose to exert their preferred
level of effort; and second, individual effort is independent of characteristics beyond personal
control 1. As an example of the former, consider the argument that beyond disadvantageous
conditions in life, individuals choose how much time and effort to spend studying or doing
homework (providing of course that they had the opportunity to attend school). The second
principle on the other hand, the compensation principle, says that inequalities arising from
differences in circumstances (i.e., non-responsibility factors) are unjust, and therefore, they
need to be eliminated. Compensation is due in situations where equally diligent individuals do
not achieve the same outcomes. Both, reward and compensation principles, rest on the idea
that responsibility is important when judging differences between individuals, which finally
implies that equality of opportunity arises when inequalities among individuals are only due
to differences in individual effort.
1.2 Empirical analysis of equality of opportunity
Operating these principles empirically requires to deal with a number of issues. As exposed
above, equality of opportunity entails ignoring morally irrelevant sources of inequalities to
focus exclusively on those beyond personal control. In empirical analyses, this calls for a clear
classification between non-responsibility factors, referred in the literature as circumstances,
and responsibility factors, or efforts. Most characteristics that can be considered as circum-
stances refer to parental background, and as such, are incorporated in the different chapters
of the dissertation. Information on parental education, for example, is taking into account in
the three analyses presented below because of the importance for children’s future well-being
(see, e.g., Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Menéndez (2007)). Similarly, other characteristics, like
race or gender, have been consistently used in the literature as non-responsibility factors,
1The majority view accepts independence of effort and non-responsibility characteristics, however, respon-
sibility for preferences might lead to different conclusions if preferences are not fully endorsed by individuals,
in which case one should take some of these preferences as circumstances.
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and as such, are also part of the set of circumstances used in the thesis. In the case of
gender, the evidence suggests that in Mexico, girls and indigenous are relegated in terms of
education, labor, and in general, in terms of development opportunities (Busso, Cicowiez,
and Gasparini (2005), Lewis and Lockheed (2008)). Other characteristics, such as place of
residence and availability of services in the locality are also considered and discussed in turn
in each chapter.
Less clear however, is how to classify and identify factors that involve some degree of
personal control since one could argue that some preferences are partly determined by cir-
cumstances. For example, some might consider smoking as a circumstance if growing in less
educated families is associated with smoking preferences, and therefore, they might support
the idea of compensating inequalities resulting from such unhealthy preferences. Others, in
contrast, might consider this unacceptable and justify disadvantages that smokers could suf-
fer. In the analysis presented here the only possible responsibility attached to children is
the responsibility of their parents. In Chapter 1, this point is particularly important because
unobserved factors affecting children’s health, like genetic luck, are treated as compensation
factors depending on interpretations arising with dominance criteria. For instance, first-order
dominance in favor of the program implies that the role of parental responsibility is respected
(only compensation due to circumstances are relevant), whereas second-order can be obtained
by within-type transfers which implies not respecting parental effort. Finally, an assumption
made in the analysis is that program participation is beyond children’s control, and as such,
is considered a circumstance. This assumption is crucial because from the perspective of chil-
dren’s opportunities, the program may compensate or not participant children, and from the
evaluation viewpoint is important that participation is completely exogenous. As explained
below, program participation was voluntary, but the program was offered to families, not to
individuals. It results very unlikely that children living in these households could have decided
by themselves to participate, therefore, one can plausibly assume that participation is indeed
beyond children’s control.
Another issue in empirical applications refers to data constraints since a complete list of
circumstances is rarely available, whereas efforts, are usually not observable. The former is
problematic when the functional relation between outcomes and circumstances is modeled
through a parametric approach. Ferreira and Gignoux (2011) find that the effect of taking
into account a subset of circumstances leads to a lower-bound estimation of the true level
of inequality of opportunity. Niehues and Peichl (2014) find similar results by computing
upper-bound estimates. The conclusions from both studies suggest the effect of unobserved
circumstances, such as ability or talent, account for a large part of the inequality of oppor-
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tunity. In the literature, solutions to overcome the lack of information on individual effort
have been suggested. For instance, it is possible to adopt an ex-ante approach and only
look at individual prospects, since an ex-ante perspective only takes into account the effect
of circumstances. Alternatively, one could follow an ex-post approach and rely on Roemer’s
Identification Axiom (Roemer, 1993) to infer individual effort from distributions of types. I
elaborate on this point next.
Broadly, taking an ex-ante or an ex-post approach depends on the possibility of extracting
information about individual effort. An ex-ante perspective is compatible with the compen-
sation principle exposed above, because it consists in observing individuals before they exert
effort. From an ex-ante point of view, it is sufficient to observe individual circumstances,
and for some authors, only ex-ante inequalities should be compensated by public intervention
(see, e.g., Pignataro (2012)). Because of that, much of the contributions in the literature on
measurement of inequality of opportunity have adopted an ex-ante rather than an ex-post
approach. In Chapter 3 for example, the analysis departs from an ex-ante perspective since
only children’s circumstances are taking into account.
Carrying out an ex-post analysis in contrast, demands observing information about in-
dividual effort. Because effort is hard to observe, doing ex-post analysis requires solutions
to infer it. An elegant solution by John Roemer, the so-called Romer’s Identification Axiom
(RIA), proposes to recover information on individual responsibility by comparing individuals
sharing the same set of circumstances (i.e., have the same type). Under RIA, two individuals
are equally responsible if they are located at the same quantile of their type’s distribution.
In other words, if two individuals share the same non-responsibility characteristics (circum-
stances), and one of them is located in a better position in the distribution of, say income, that
comes only by differences in effort. The first two chapters depart from an ex-post perspective,
but RIA is only explicitly applied in Chapter 1. Importantly, for the analysis in Chapter 1 as
explained before, parental effort is the normatively relevant responsibility characteristic since
children, by definition, are not accountable for their actions yet.
Last point, but not less relevant, is the methodological strategy. In the literature, two
approaches dominate. On the one hand, one can model parametrically the relation of out-
comes and individual characteristics by assuming a functional form. This approach has the
advantage of allowing the use of multiple variables in the right hand side of the equation
which means that more types can be used in the analysis. This is also the approach followed
in Chapter 3. However, using a functional form requires doing assumptions about the rela-
tionship between outcomes and circumstances, which could mislead the true nature of the
relationship. In Chapter 3 a logistic model is used to estimate the probability of school re-
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enrollment, but other specifications might be adequate as well.2 In contrast, a non-parametric
approach does not require to make assumptions about functional relations, but its implemen-
tation requires a sufficiently large sample size. Also, to carry out non-parametric methods,
like stochastic dominance as presented in Chapters 1 and 2, one needs to make pairwise com-
parisons between types, which restrict the number of types that can be taken into account in
the analysis. For example, to construct types based on gender, race, and parental education
(assuming education a dummy) one obtains 8 possible type-combinations. Adding one extra
dummy characteristic like access to school, translates into 16 types, and so forth. Therefore,
this kind of analysis does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the effect of circum-
stances on opportunities but only which types gain on a one-to-one basis. In that sense, the
analysis presented in Chapter 3 results much more complete as it takes on board a large list
of individual characteristics.
1.3 Description of the evaluation sample
Oportunidades, formerly named Progresa, and only recently re-named as Prospera in 2014, is
one of the largest Conditional Cash Transfer programs in the world. Originally implemented
in rural communities, the program covers more than 5.8 million families in Mexico. As the
backbone of the anti-poverty agenda of the Mexican government, the program aims at breaking
the intergenerational cycle of poverty by promoting human capital accumulation, especially
for children, and by providing in-kind and monetary transfers to alleviate current poverty.
Investments by the program are mainly done in three areas: health, education, and nutrition
of all family members, but special attention is given to infants, lactating and pregnant women.
Additionally, the program grants scholarships for each child attending school, which represents
around one fifth of consumption of an average poor family in rural areas in Mexico (Levy,
2007) 3.
Since the onset of the program, counting with a rigorous evaluation has been a priority
for the Mexican government. Before the implementation of Oportunidades, very few evidence
about the effect of public programs to eradicate poverty was available. Stemmed from the need
to generate reliable evidence for policy makers, the original design of the program contem-
plated a comprehensive evaluation based on an experimental design. During the experimental
phase of the program, information on families which were randomly selected for participation
2Although not reported in the text, I performed a test to check the linearity of the index function by
including higher-order terms in the specification of the logit model in Chapter 3. The null that the model is
correctly specified was not rejected at conventional levels of statistical significance. See Wooldridge (2010), pp.
570.
3This information refers only to the average rural household in 1998
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was collected. The analysis of Chapter 3 refers to a group of children that belongs to the
original evaluation sample collected during the initial phase. The experimental nature of the
evaluation consisted in randomly offering the program to families; therefore, only families that
decided to participate are observed in the data. This also implies that comparisons between
treated and non-treated families provide an intend-to-treatment analysis.4. Collection of data
during the experimental phase followed the next steps:
First, 506 localities with high concentration of poor households were selected to be included
in the program. All selected localities were situated in rural areas and had less than 2,500
and more than 500 inhabitants. Then, 320 out the 506 localities were randomly assigned
to treatment and the remaining 186 to control. Within localities, households that according
to criteria from the Mexican Statistics Office (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía,
INEGI) were classified as poor, were eligible to enter the program and eventually were offered
to participate (INSP, 2005). Eligible households from control localities, on the other hand,
were left out of the program and served as comparison group. These two groups comprise the
original experimental sample, and are referred to in the different chapters as the “immediate”
and “delayed” treatment groups respectively.
In contrast, the samples of Chapter 1 and 2 come from the non-experimental phase of
the program that came after the original control (delayed treatment) was incorporated. After
two years of operations, in the year 2000, the original control group (delayed treatment) was
incorporated to the program, and with this incorporation, the original experimental design
was lost. 5. Therefore, for subsequent evaluations it was necessary to have a new control
group. The new control group was constructed by a Propensity Score Matching procedure
at locality level, and it resulted in the selection of 151 new localities that were similar to
the original 506 original localities of the experimental phase (INSP, 2005). The new control
however, only served as the basis for selecting the comparison groups in Chapter 1 and 2.
There were a number of reasons for that. First, the analysis presented in these chapters
requires to construct types of children (groups of children sharing the same non-responsibility
characteristics) and the Propensity Score Matching to construct the control was done at
locality instead of individual level. Second, the Propensity Score was based on characteristics
in 2000, when the delayed treatment group was already enrolled to the program. Because the
Propensity Score should reflect the propensity of participation based on characteristics that
are not influenced by program, a “second-layer” Propensity Score Matching was implemented
4However, as documented by Gertler (2004), program take-up was practically universal: as much as 97%
of the families who were eligible decided to participate. Therefore, intend-to-treatment and treatment-on-the-
treated analysis are very close in this case.
5Political reasons forced the Government to offer the program in the original control communities sooner
that it was originally planned
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at individual level between types. In Chapter 1 this translates into 4 matchings between
treated and non-treated types (IL, IP, NL, NP types), and in Chapter 2 into 5 matchings
(Complete sample, girls, boys, indigenous, and non-indigenous).6 Finally, only children from
households, that according to administrative records, received monetary transfers at the time
of the evaluation were considered for the analyses of Chapters 1 and 2. Such restriction avoids
the inclusion of children from the treatment group that in reality, were never treated, and
thus it leads to a treatment-on-the-treated analysis.
1.4 Outline and main findings
The 3 chapters presented here revolve around the same question, namely, what is the effect of
the Oportunidades program on children’s opportunities in different domains and at the same
time, which methods should be used in this context . I focus on children’s outcomes because
this group is of special interest for the program, and because opportunities early in life (or
the lack of them) determine what children can achieve, be, or enjoy in adulthood.
Chapter 1 presents the analysis of health outcomes for children aged 2-6 years. To establish
the effect of the program, conditional cumulative distribution functions (CDF’s) for children
in and out the program are compared according to stochastic dominance criteria. As argued in
this Chapter, from an opportunity perspective, comparisons between CDF’s should be based
on first and second-order dominance, which requires invoking Roemer’s Identification Axiom
explained above. This, as an alternative to Perfect Positive Quantile Dependence (Heckman,
Jeffrey, and Clements, 1997) which is normally required in impact evaluation analysis using
CDF’s. Also, to operationalize RIA in this context, it is necessary to compare children
whose parents share the same non-responsibility characteristics (given that children are not
responsible individuals).
On the other hand, the use of stochastic dominance methods, allows identifying where in
the distribution the program is effective for children whose parents have certain characteristics
or types, as is referred to in the literature of equality of opportunity. The proposed method-
ology thus contributes to both, the literature on equality of opportunity and the literature on
impact evaluation. The results on this Chapter suggest that the treatment has substantial
positive effects on the health opportunities for children from indigenous parents. Also, some
effects are found on non-indigenous children, although these are weaker.
Chapter 2 offers an evaluation on cognitive and non-cognitive early child development.
The focus of this chapter is to emphasize the distributional effects of the program. Although
6preprogram information for the control group came from recollection questions in 2003 about 1997. For
more details refer to Section 2 in Chapter 1 and Section 2.2 if Chapter 2
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less attention is paid here to normative principles, the methodology, as in the previous chapter
is inspired in normative principles of equality of opportunity. In contrast with Chapter 1, the
analysis does not rely on the use of types, but rather on comparisons between children with
different characteristics. The relatively small number of observations in the sample impedes
the construction of types (remember that sufficiently large number of observations are needed
for non-parametric methods).
Four indicators of cognitive and one of non-cognitive ability are analyzed. The results
suggest the program positively influences children’s non-cognitive abilities: children enrolled
in the program manifest fewer behavioral problems compared to those not enrolled. Effects
for boys and girls, and for indigenous and non-indigenous children are substantial and cover
a large part of the outcome’s distribution. With regard to cognitive development, results
are less outspoken: only short-term memory ability shows positive effects. Nonetheless, the
results demonstrate that children with low values of cognitive development benefit from the
program, whereas children with high values do not. From an equal opportunity perspective,
these results can be interpreted as positive.
Chapter 3 presents the analysis of opportunities for school re-enrollment for children aged
6-16. The main contribution of this chapter is to offer a systematic, more comprehensive,
assessment of the effect of the program on children’s opportunities. Opposed to the nonpara-
mentric methods of Chapter 1 and 2 which do not allow the inclusion of a large number of
circumstances, the parametric approach followed here permits including a large set of circum-
stances which brings a much more complete assessment for different types. Another point of
contrast with the previous two chapters is the use of counterfactual distributions. The pecu-
liarity in the use of counterfactuals relies on the fact that only differences due to circumstances
are reflected, and therefore, only differences due to unequal opportunities are contained in
these distributions. Further, to evaluate the effect of the program, two counterfactuals are
constructed: one in case children are treated, and one in case they are not. To construct the
counterfactuals, it is necessary to obtain a measure that reflects the level of opportunities
faced by the children. In this case, the measure is the probability of school re-enrollment,
which, as explained before, is calculated using a logistic model. A main assumption of the
Chapter, as exposed in the methodological section, is that these probabilities give the values
of children’s opportunities for school re-enrollment.
The evaluation of the effect of the program on children’s opportunities in Chapter 3 is
done in two ways. First, I use functions to map the probability of school re-enrollment
of each child into a real number, and impose desirable properties to this function. These
properties (anonymity, non-decreasingness, the weak transfer principle and relativity) are
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standard in the axiomatic literature of equality of opportunity and are discussed in detailed
in the methodology section of the chapter. Providing that these properties are fulfilled, higher
aggregate opportunities will arise due to the program if the distribution of treated children
Generalized Lorenz dominates the one of non-treated, and similarly, one can claim that there
is less inequality due to the program if the distribution of treated Lorenz dominates that of
non-treated. Second, in order to decompose the improvement and the inequality effects of the
Generalized Lorenz and Lorenz dominance results, two abbreviated opportunity functions are
proposed: Human Opportunity Index (de Barros, Vega, and Saavedra, 2008) and the Gini
Index. Both show how much of the effect is due to an average gain (level effect) and how
much is due to a redistribution effect (Lambert, 2001).
The results of Chapter 3 are the following: 1) Progresa increases aggregate school re-
enrollment opportunities since the distribution conditional on circumstances under treatment
Generalized Lorenz dominates that when non-treated. 2) Progresa decreases inequality of
re-enrollment opportunities, since the distribution in case of treatment, Lorenz dominates
the distribution in case of not being treated. This results holds for any measure of relative
inequality. And 3), the effect of the reduction of inequality of opportunity due to program par-
ticipation is between 15 and 40% when looking at the Human Opportunity Index or the Gini
Index. Finally, the results suggest children in the transition between primary and secondary
education are particularly prone to benefit from the program. Also, for these children, the
decrease in inequality of opportunity is markedly large. Given that many children abandon
school after completing primary education in Mexico, interventions like Oportunidades not
only decrease average dropout but have strong distributive effects for those most disadvan-
taged. However, these results apply only to the 25% of the population in Mexico incorporated
to the program, which limits the reach of the conclusions for the entire population. In that
sense, future studies that incorporate, for example, general equilibrium effects could inform
about the effect of Conditional Cash Transfer programs on inequality of opportunity for the
entire population.
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Project Evaluation: Mexico’s Oportu-
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Abstract: We propose a methodology to evaluate social projects from the perspective of
children’s opportunities on the basis of the effects of these projects on the distribution of
outcomes. We condition our evaluation on characteristics for which individuals are not re-
sponsible; in this case, we use parental education level and indigenous background. The
methodology is applied to evaluate the effects on children’s health opportunities of Mexico’s
Oportunidades program, one of the largest conditional cash transfer programs for poor house-
holds in the world. The evidence from this program shows that gains in health opportunities
for children from indigenous backgrounds are substantial and are situated in crucial parts of
the distribution, whereas gains for children from nonindigenous backgrounds are more limited.
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2.1 Introduction
This paper evaluates the change in health opportunities for children aged two to six years
who participate in the Mexican Oportunidades program. Oportunidades is a large-scale, con-
ditional cash transfer program initiated in 1998 through which poor rural households receive
cash in exchange for their compliance with preventive health care requirements, nutrition
supplementation, education, and monitoring. In 2010, approximately 5.8 million families par-
ticipated in the program, and cash transfers to the participants totaled $4.8 billion. The
average treatment effects of the program on the health of young children have been shown
to be positive (see the literature surveyed in Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel (2008)). We
propose a methodology that focuses on the conditional cumulative distribution functions of
health outcomes to identify whether and where in the distribution the program is effective for
children whose parents have certain characteristics. Our methodology evaluates the program
from the perspective of children’s opportunities rather than average treatment effects.
Fiszbein, Schady, and Ferreira (2009) report that in 1997, only three developing countries
(Mexico, Brazil, and Bangladesh) had conditional cash transfer programs in place; by 2008,
this number had increased to 29, with many more countries planning to implement such
programs. It is important to develop techniques to evaluate the effects of these programs
on children’s opportunities, because these programs are increasingly popular in developing
countries, they are sometimes conducted on a large scale, and their focus is on breaking
the intergenerational poverty cycle. Despite the recent emergence of substantial empirical
literature measuring inequality of opportunity (e.g., 2009 de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega,
and Chanduvi (2009) and the references below), no such techniques currently exist.
In the recent literature on equality of opportunity (e.g., Bossert (1995); Fleurbaey (1995),
Fleurbaey (2008); Roemer (1993)), a distinction is generally drawn between two types of
factors that influence the outcome under consideration. On the one hand, there are cir-
cumstances, characteristics for which an individual is not responsible, such as race, sex, and
parental background; these are the characteristics upon which we condition the cumulative
distribution function. On the other hand, there are other characteristics for which individuals
are considered responsible, such as having a good work ethic. The idea is that public poli-
cies, including conditional cash transfer programs, should compensate for the former while
respecting the influence of the latter.1
We apply the framework to health outcomes of children aged two to six years. We con-
1Recently Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) extend this framework with a third factor, random factors
that are legitimate sources of inequality “as long as they affect individual outcomes and circumstances in a
neutral way” (p. 1192)
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sider the following circumstances for which parents are not responsible: race, in particular,
whether either parent is indigenous; educational level, determined by whether either parent
had primary education; and participation in the program. Each possible combination of cir-
cumstances corresponds to a “type,” in Roemer’s terminology (Roemer, 1993). Therefore,
we have eight types. To evaluate the program, we take the health outcomes of children who
belong to families enrolled in the program for each of the four types, which are defined on the
basis of the parents’ race and education level, and we compare those outcomes with the health
outcomes of children whose parents belong to the corresponding type that was not enrolled
in the program. Within each type, outcomes can (and will) differ because of factors that
are unobserved and ascribed to parental responsibility, such as parental health investments in
children. In section 2.2, we argue that an opportunity perspective implies that the comparison
of treatment and control types must be based on first- or second-order stochastic dominance.
The idea of using first- or second-order stochastic dominance to investigate equality of
opportunity for a particular outcome is not novel. However, until now, this method has been
applied only to study whether opportunities are equal within a particular population (see
O’Neill, Sweetman, and Van de gaer (2000) and Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009) for
studies in which the outcome is income; see Rosa Dias (2009) and Trannoy, Sandy, Jusot,
and Devaux (2010) for adults’ self-assessed health studies; for comparisons between different
countries, see Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2008) for income-based outcomes; for com-
parisons between regions, see Peragine and Serlenga (2008) for education-based outcomes).
Our paper makes three primary contributions to this literature. First, and most important,
we conduct our evaluation by establishing the effect of Oportunidades on children’s health
opportunities. Second, we consider opportunity in the health of young children because their
health is crucial for their adult outcomes (see, e.g., Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2007) and
Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2006)) and because it is important in its own right. Third,
in contrast to previous literature that tested for stochastic dominance in the context of equal-
ity of opportunity, our test procedure is based on Davidson and Duclos (2009) and Davidson
(2009). Thus, we test the null of nondominance against the alternative of dominance so that
rejection of the null logically entails dominance.
Most of the literature on program evaluation focuses on estimating average treatment ef-
fects. However, we are interested in establishing or rejecting stochastic dominance between
the distributions of health outcomes of children when their parents are either in or out of
the program. This exercise is not trivial because we cannot observe the same child both in
and out of the program; in other words, we cannot simply resort to a comparison of the cu-
mulative distributions of treatment and control types without making additional assumptions
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(Heckman, 1992). One such assumption is perfect positive quantile dependence (see Heckman,
Jeffrey, and Clements (1997)), which stipulates that those who are at the qth quantile in the
distribution with treatment would have been at the qth quantile in the distribution without
treatment. Roemer’s identification axiom (Roemer, 1993) is usually invoked in empirical ap-
plications of equality of opportunity when responsibility characteristics are unobserved. This
axiom posits that the parents of children who are at the same percentile of their type dis-
tribution have exercised comparable responsibility. We argue below that this axiom provides
a normatively inspired alternative to perfect positive quantile dependence by reducing the
problem to a comparison of the cumulative distribution functions of the corresponding treat-
ment and control types. The literature on average treatment effects stresses that treatment
and control samples must be comparable in terms of preprogram characteristics. We show
that this is also imperative when testing for stochastic dominance. Following the literature
on average treatment effects, we propose a propensity score matching technique on the ba-
sis of preprogram characteristics to better compare treatment and control types. Finally, it
is noteworthy that two authors recently suggested incorporating stochastic dominance into
project evaluation: Verme (2010) proposed a stochastic dominance approach to determine
the effect of a perfectly randomized experiment based on the measures establishing poverty
line dominance (i.e., dominance for a range of poverty lines) developed by Foster, Greer, and
Thorbeke (1984). Our approach, based on equality of opportunity, stresses that we should
focus on the distributions that are conditional on circumstances instead of comparing the
distributions of all treatment and control samples. Therefore, we compare the distributions
of corresponding treatment and control types. Moreover, our propensity score matching tech-
nique makes this approach effective for imperfectly randomized experiments. Naschold and
Barrett (2010) allow for nonrandomized treatment by focusing on stochastic dominance be-
tween treatment and control samples of the distribution of the difference in outcome, both
before and after treatment. They do not focus on types, and the results are difficult to in-
terpret because dominance in terms of differences does not imply that treatment leads to a
dominating distribution, which fundamentally depends on who gains and who loses.
Our main findings are that the treatment has substantial positive effects on the health
opportunities of children from indigenous families. The effects on children growing up in
nonindigenous families are weaker, although we still find significant positive treatment effects
for that group.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2.2 provides definitions and explains the
methodology. The data are described in section 2.3. Section 2.4 presents the empirical results,
including a discussion of the relationship with previous studies. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2.2 Definitions and methodology
Let a child’s health outcome be represented by the variable h ∈ H =
[
h, h
]
⊆ R and let higher
values of h mean better health. A child’s health is the result of two types of variables. The first
variable, c ∈ C, represents circumstances and characteristics for which the child’s parents are
not responsible, such as race, educational background, and whether the family participates
in the program2) The second variable, r ∈ R, represents characteristics for which parents
are responsible, such as health investments in children. Each combination of circumstances
corresponds to a type. Social programs should improve children’s opportunities, and from
the perspective of the equality of opportunity literature, they should compensate for health
differences that are caused by circumstances. Moreover, they should respect the influence of
parental responsibility, at least to some extent (see, e.g., Swift (2005) for a defense of this
position).
In many empirical applications, responsibility is unobserved, as it is here. In such cases,
the equality of opportunity framework is usually operationalized using the identification ax-
iom proposed by Roemer (1993), which states that the parents of two children who are at the
same percentile of their type distribution of health have exercised identical responsibility.3.
Thus, if the cumulative distribution function of health for a type whose family participated in
the program lies below the cumulative distribution function of health for the corresponding
type who did not participate in the program, the type in the program needs less parental effort
to obtain a particular level of child health than the type not in the program. If this holds
for all levels of health, program participation unambiguously improves the opportunities for
this type. Consequently, if the distribution of a type with treatment first-order stochastically
dominates the distribution of the corresponding type that did not receive treatment, the pro-
gram improves this type’s opportunities. Similar reasoning applies to second-order stochastic
dominance, with the caveat that second-order stochastic dominance can also be obtained by
within-type, inequality-reducing transfers of health that do not fully respect the influence of
parental responsibility.4 Roemer’s identification axiom does not necessarily imply that we
would find children with and without treatment at exactly the same qth quantile (which is
2Race and educational background are circumstances because they should not influence the health opportu-
nities parents can obtain for their children. Whether the family participates in the program largely determined
by the by the locality in which they lived at the time the program began; therefore, this is outside of parental
control.
3See Roemer (1993) and Roemer (1998)for a defense of this principle and Fleurbaey (1998)
4Fully respecting the influence of responsibility means that the health differences caused by parental re-
sponsibility are fully preserved by the program. Alternative notions of responsibility are weaker and require,
for instance, that the program does not change the rank order of children’s health. This weaker requirement
is compatible with second order stochastic dominance.
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the perfect positive quantile dependence found in Heckman, Jeffrey, and Clements (1997));
instead, it merely states that the comparison of the quantiles of the treated and corresponding
untreated type is normatively relevant because it compares the health outcomes of children
of parents who behaved equally responsibly.
Let FC (h | c) denote the conditional distribution of children’s health for parents with
circumstances c in the control sample, and let F T (h | c) denote the same distribution in
the treatment sample. We say that the project improves the opportunities for the health
of children with parental circumstances c if the conditional distribution F T (h | c) first-order
stochastically dominates the conditional distribution FC (h | c), and we test whether first-
order stochastic dominance occurs. Thus, the issue of statistical inference arises. We follow
Davidson and Duclos (2009), starting from nondominance as the null hypothesis. To illustrate
the procedure for testing first order dominance and to describe the test more formally, let
U ⊆ H be the union of the supports of FC (h | c) and F T (h | c). We test the null hypothesis
of nondominance of FC (h | c) by F T (h | c) :
max
z∈U
(
F T (z | c) − FC (z | c)
)
≥ 0,
against the alternative hypothesis that F T (h | c) first order stochastically dominates
FC (h | c) :
max
z∈U
(
F T (z | c) − FC (z | c)
)
< 0.
This approach has the advantage of allowing us to draw the conclusion of dominance if
we succeed in rejecting the null hypothesis; in other words, when the null is rejected, the only
other possibility is dominance. By contrast, if dominance is the null hypothesis, as is the
case in most empirical work to date, failure to reject dominance does not allow us to accept
dominance. As Davidson and Duclos (2009) point out , taking nondominance as the null with
continuous distributions comes at the cost that it is not possible to reject nondominance in
favor of dominance over the entire support of the distribution.5 Rejecting nondominance is
normally possible only over restricted ranges of the observed variable. Thus, another merit
of this approach is that it allows us to identify the maximal range over the supports of the
distribution for which we are able to reject the null of nondominance and, therefore, to accept
dominance in favor of the project. In this way, we can check whether we have dominance over
ranges of the observed variable that are of special importance, such as the range below –2 for
5Let h be the lower bound of U . Evidently, F T (h | c)−F C (h | c) = 0, and so the maximum over U is never
less than 0. Moreover, close to the boundaries of the support there may be too little information to reject
non-dominance.
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standardized height, which indicates stunting.
Of course, we must use the identical procedure to test the null of nondominance of
F T (h | c) by FC (h | c) against the alternative hypothesis that FC (h | c) dominates F T (h | c).
If rejection occurs, we identify the maximal range over the support of the distribution for which
we are able to reject the null of nondominance and to accept dominance against the project.6
These issues are incorporated in the following weak version of improvements in opportunities
which suffices for most of what we do in this paper.
First Order Improvements: The project leads to a first-order improvement of the
opportunities of children with parental circumstances c if (i) there exists U0 ⊆ U such that
we can reject the null of nondominance of FC (h | c) by F T (h | c) against the alternative
that F T (h | c) dominates FC (h | c) over U0, and (ii) there exists no U1 ⊆ U such that we
can reject the null of nondominance of F T (h | c) by FC (h | c) against the alternative that
FC (h | c) dominates F T (h | c) over U1.
Assuming that the influence of parental responsibility on children’s health need not be fully
respected and that health is cardinally measurable, equalizing health outcomes within type
becomes desirable such that, in case the project does not lead to a first order improvement,
it becomes meaningful to ask whether the conditional distribution F T (h | c) second order
stochastically dominates the conditional distribution FC (h | c). Similar statistical issues as
for first order stochastic dominance arise (see Davidson (2009)), leading to the following
definition.
Second Order Improvements: The project leads to a second-order improvement of the
opportunities of children with parental circumstances c if (i) the project does not lead to a
first-order improvement, (ii) there exists U0 ⊆ U such that we can reject the null of absence
of second-order dominance of FC (h | c) by F T (h | c) against the alternative that F T (h | c)
second- order stochastically dominates FC (h | c) over U0, and (iii) there exists no U1 ⊆ U
such that we can reject the null of absence of second-order stochastic dominance of F T (h | c)
by FC (h | c) against the alternative that FC (h | c) second-order stochastically dominates
F T (h | c) over U1.
Finally, when comparing conditional distribution functions to evaluate a program, it is
important to note that inaccurate conclusions may be drawn when preprogram characteris-
tics are not accounted for and when they differ for the treatment types in comparison with
the control types (including compensation characteristics). Suppose we have two sets of char-
acteristics, preprogram characteristics x ∈ X, which are not accounted for, and observable
circumstances c. For the type with observed circumstances c1, we then have
6Appendix 2.D contains more details about the stochastic dominance tests.
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F (h | c1) =
∫ h
h f
(
h˜, c1
)
dh˜
f (c1)
=
∫
X
∫ h
h f
(
h˜, c1, x
)
dh˜dx
f (c1)
=
∫
X
∫ h
h
f
(
h˜ | c1, x
) f (c1, x)
f (c1)
dh˜dc˜2 =
∫
X
F (h | c1, x) f (x | c1) dx.
This equation clearly shows that the composition of the c1 type in terms of x matters.
Indeed, suppose the treatment has no effect (FC (h | c1, x) = F T (h | c1, x)), but the composi-
tion of those with circumstances c1 differes between the control and treatment types. Suppose
that fC (x | c1) is higher than fT (x | c1) for favorable preprogram characteristics x, or char-
acteristics for which FC (h | c1, x) is lower, and that fC (x | c1) is lower than fT (x | c1) for
unfavorable preprogram characteristics. As a result, FC (h | c1) is smaller than F T (h | c1),
and we might erroneously infer that the treatment had an adverse effect on the opportunities
of those with circumstances c1.
2.3 Data description
In this section, we describe the Oportunidades program and the construction of treatment
and control samples. We describe the selection of circumstances and outcomes and examine
the data used to evaluate the program.
2.3.1 The Oportunidades program
The Oportunidades program is a conditional cash transfer program in which bimonthly cash
transfers are provided to households in extreme poverty. The cash transfers are conditioned
on the attendance of children in school, health care visits for all members of the household,
and attendance at information sessions on primary health care and nutrition. Money for
schooling constitutes the largest part of the conditional cash transfer. The total amount
that a household receives depends on the number, age, and sex of its children. On average,
households receive approximately 20 percent of their household consumption from such cash
transfers.
Interventions for young children and their mothers are particularly emphasized. Prenatal
and postpartum care visits, growth monitoring, immunization, and management of diarrhea
and antiparasitic treatments are provided to mothers and young children. Children between
the ages of 4 months and 23 months must have nine periodic medical check ups. From the
age of 23 months until the child turns 19 years old, household members must have at least
two check ups per year. Children between the ages of 6 and 23 months, lactating women and
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low-weight children between the ages of 2 and 4 years receive milk-based and micronutrient
fortified foods containing the daily recommended intake of zinc, iron, and essential vitamins.7
2.3.2 Sample Design
The selection of immediate and delayed treatment samples was undertaken in several steps
(see, e.g., INSP (2005)). Highly deprived localities were identified by using a deprivation index
computed on the basis of relevant sociodemographic data available from national censuses.
Localities with at least 500 and not more than 2,500 inhabitants, that were categorized as
having high or very high deprivation and that had access to an elementary school, a middle
school and a health clinic were eligible for treatment. Localities were identified, and a random
sample was constructed that was stratified by locality size. Within each state, localities
were randomly assigned into treatment and control groups. A sample of 506 localities was
finally selected for the study. A random procedure assigned 320 of these localities to receive
immediate treatment; the remaining 186 began receiving treatment approximately 18 months
later. In the selected localities, the poverty conditions of all households were evaluated, and
households categorized as experiencing extreme poverty were included in the program. This
categorization was based on household income, characteristics of the head of household, and
variables related to dwelling conditions. Comments by a community assembly on the inclusion
and exclusion of households were considered if they met certain criteria to identify beneficiary
families. The randomized design enabled us to use the immediate treatment sample as the
treatment group and the delayed treatment sample as the control group.8.However, when we
consider the effect of the program on the health outcomes of children between the ages of two
and six years in 2003, most of these children grew up in families that were in the program for
their entire lives. For children born before the delayed treatment began, this comparison can
only show the effect of the difference in exposure when the children were young.9. Therefore,
and because we want to limit our study to an analysis of households that actually received cash
transfers (this information is not available for the initial treatment sample), our treatment
7These supplements may also be given to children in households that are not receiving treatment (including
children in the control sample) if signs of malnutrition are detected. This may lead to a downward bias of the
estimated impact of Oportunidades (see also Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009b), footnote 8).
8Most studies focus indeed on a comparison of the immediate and delayed treatment samples and thus
evaluate the effect of differences in duration of program participation, see, e.g., Schultz (2004), Behrman,
Sengupta, and Todd (2005) or Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009a).
9In Appendix 2.G.3, we repeat the analysis for the children born after April 1998 (when the original treat-
ment started) and before October 1999 (when delayed treatment started) taking the original treatment sample
as treatment sample and the delayed treatment sample as control. The program effects are less outspoken, but
some positive treatment effects remain - see also footnote 21.
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sample is a subset of the delayed treatment sample.10. Once the delayed treatment sample
began receiving treatment, one had to construct a new control sample, with the intention of
making it as similar as possible to the treatment samples (see, e.g., Todd (2004) and Behrman,
Todd, Hernández, Urquieta, Attanasio, Angelucci, and Hernández (2006)). First, localities
that did not meet the criteria for access to an elementary school, a middle school, and a health
clinic were excluded. Next, a propensity score method was used that was based on data at
the local level as a function of observed characteristics from the 2000 Census that permitted
comparison with the localities of the original sample. This procedure led to a selection of 151
localities in which households that met the criteria for program eligibility were included in
the control sample. We compare this control sample to the subset of the delayed treatment
sample, as described above.
As we explained at the end of section 2.2, the households in the treatment and control
samples must be comparable in terms of preprogram characteristics. There are important
problems with the way the control sample was selected.11. Matching at the local level was
performed on the basis of a comparison with observable characteristics in 2000. By this time,
the treatment sample had already received treatment. However, matching should have been
performed on the basis of characteristics before treatment began. In addition, matching at
the local level does not imply matching at the household level (see also Behrman and Todd
(1999)). Moreover, we do not have data on all children of the households that were in the
delayed treatment sample for three reasons (see table Appendix 2.A). First, some households
dropped out of the sample because of sample attrition. Second, health data were only collected
for a subsample of children. Third, because of problems with household identifiers, it was
impossible to match all of the children for whom health data were available with only one
household each. We only included unique matches in our samples (accounting for more than
80 percent of the children, fortunately). The second and third problems were also present in
the control sample. As a result, the treatment and control samples may have differences in
terms of preprogram characteristics.
For our empirical strategy in section 2.4, we first use a logistic regression approach to
test whether there are statistically significant differences in composition between the treat-
ment and control samples in 1997 for the households with children that were observed in
10Sensitivity analysis (reported in appendix 2.G.1) shows that the results are very similar when we compare
the entire delayed treatment (including those for which no positive transfers were reported) and the control
sample.
11This may explain why the control sample has rarely been used in academic papers. Recently, however,
matched sampling was used to compare schooling (Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009b) and Behrman and
Parker (2010)) and work outcomes (Behrman and Parker (2010)) of the immediate treatment, delayed treatment
and control samples.
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2003.12 We use a propensity score matching technique to match the four treatment types
with the corresponding control types to correct for possible under- and overrepresentation of
households with certain preprogram characteristics. This technique entails weighted sampling
(see appendix 2.C). We compare the resulting weighted distributions at crucial points (such
as standardized height smaller than –2, indicating stunting) to establish whether the treat-
ment led to first- or second-order improvements of opportunities for each type by performing
stochastic dominance tests on the weighted distribution functions.
2.3.3 Circumstances and outcomes
Ideally, normative theory requires us to obtain a full description of parental circumstances.
In reality, an exhaustive description is not available from surveys, and the inclusion of an
extensive set of circumstances is statistically unworkable for nonparametric procedures such
as ours because of the limited number of observations. For these reasons, we limit ourselves
to program participation and two additional circumstances.
The first circumstance refers to parental educational background. In the literature on
equality of opportunity, this variable is used most frequently, is always statistically significant
and has been shown to be the most important circumstance in Latin American countries (see,
e.g., Bourguignon, Ferreira, and Menéndez (2007) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011)). We
measure educational background with a dichotomous variable indicating whether at least one
parent completed primary education.13. The second circumstance variable refers to parents’
indigenous background. There is substantial literature indicating that indigenous people
remain disadvantaged in Mexico (Olaiz, Rivera, Shamah, Rojas, Villalpando, and Hernández
(2006); Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1994); Rivera and Sepúlveda (2003); SEDESOL (2008)).
We consider parents to have an indigenous background if at least one of them can speak or
understand an indigenous language.
Combining these two binary characteristics with a binary characteristic indicating pro-
gram participation yields eight types in Roemer’s terminology. We partition the samples on
the basis of parental indigenous origin (indigenous or nonindigenous) and parental level of
education (primary or less than primary) to form the following types: indigenous, less than
primary education (IL); indigenous, primary education (IP); nonindigenous, less than pri-
mary education (NL); nonindigenous, primary education (NP). Table 2.1 shows that there
12In 2003, in addition to the regular household data, an additional questionnaire with recall data was
collected. The purpose of these retrospective questions was to compare the preprogram characteristics for the
treatment samples with the new control sample.
13Appendix 2.G.2 reports the results when parental background is measured on the basis of mother’s edu-
cation only. The results are very similar to the ones we present here.
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Table 2.1: Composition of the samples.
Control sample Treatment sample
# % # %
All 1859 100 1125 100
IP 173 9.3 209 18.6
IL 241 13.0 274 24.4
NP 824 44.3 321 28.5
NL 621 33.4 321 28.5
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous,
Primary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower education;
NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-
indigenous, Lower education.
are remarkable differences in the composition of the control sample and the treatment sample
among these groups. Clearly, the control sample contains fewer indigenous children and more
nonindigenous children with at least one parent who completed primary education than the
treatment sample. Because we are comparing cumulative distribution functions of types in the
control sample with the corresponding types in the treatment sample, this creates no problem
for our analysis. However, as shown in section 2.2, problems arise when there are important
differences in terms of preprogram characteristics between the treatment and control types
that are compared.
We focus on several health outcomes. Two important measures of malnutrition for chil-
dren are anemia, which is defined as hemoglobin levels lower than 11 grams per deciliter,
and stunting, which covers a wider range of nutritional deficiencies and is defined as height
for age below –2 standard deviations of the WHO International Growth Reference. The lat-
ter implies that in a reference population, approximately 2.3 percent of the population is
stunted. As reviewed by Grantham-McGregor and Ani (2001), anemia (iron deficiency) in
infancy has been associated with poorer cognition, school achievement, and behavioral prob-
lems into middle childhood. Branca and Ferrari (2002) point out that stunting is associated
with developmental delay, delayed achievement of developmental milestones (such as walking),
later deficiencies in cognitive ability, reduced school performance, increased child morbidity
and mortality, higher risk of developing chronic diseases, impaired fat oxidation (stimulat-
ing the development of obesity), small stature later in life, and reduced productivity and
chronic poverty in adulthood. In addition to actual stunting, height has a positive effect on
completed years of schooling, earnings (see, e.g., Alderman, Hoddinott, and Kinsey (2006)),
and cognitive and noncognitive abilities (see, e.g., Case and Paxson (2008) and Schick and
Steckel (2010)) throughout the distribution. Therefore, we treat our two measures of malnu-
trition as dichotomous and continuous variables, focusing on the fraction of anemic (stunted)
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Table 2.2: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003.
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.24 0.58 0.17
IP 0.36 11.6 0.50 -1.99 0.23 0.57 0.19
IL 0.30 11.9 0.64 -2.40 0.30 0.64 0.13
NP 0.18 12.2 0.20 -1.13 0.22 0.56 0.18
NL 0.25 12.0 0.32 -1.47 0.25 0.58 0.18
(b) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.23 12.1 0.34 -1.58 0.20 0.67 0.12
IP 0.27 12.0 0.35 -1.63 0.14 0.64 0.14
IL 0.29 11.7 0.43 -1.82 0.16 0.72 0.11
NP 0.13 12.5 0.26 -1.32 0.24 0.68 0.10
NL 0.24 12.2 0.33 -1.58 0.22 0.63 0.16
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
children and on the entire distribution of hemoglobin levels (standardized height). Another
health outcome is based on the standardized Body Mass Index (BMI); children are at risk
of being overweight if their standardized BMI is larger than 1.15.14. In a reference popula-
tion, this cutoff value indicates that 15 percent of children are at risk of being overweight.
Overweight children have delayed skill acquisition at young ages (Cawley and Spiess, 2008),
are more likely to have psychological or psychiatric problems, have increased cardiovascular
risk factors, have increased incidence of asthma and diabetes ((Reilly, Metheven, McDowell,
Hacking, Alexander, Stewart, and Kelnar, 2003)), are more likely to be obese as adults ((Ser-
dula, Ivery, Coates, Freedman, Williamson, and Byers, 1993)), and may earn lower wages
((Cawley, 2004)). A final health outcome is based on the number of days parents reported
that the child was sick during the previous four-week period. We consider the percentage of
children reporting zero days and more than three days. Table 2.2 provides information on the
outcome variables of the control and treatment samples.
Considering all households, it is striking that the different entries are similar for all health
outcomes in the control and treatment samples, with the exception of the number of days
sick; fewer sick days were reported for children in the treatment sample than in the control
sample. Approximately one child in four is anemic, and one in three is stunted. Compared
14The incidence of underweightedness is lower than in a reference population.
26 2. Children’s Health Opportunities and Project Evaluation
with the reference population, our sample contains far too many stunted children and too
many children at risk of being overweight.
Interesting but predictable patterns emerge when considering the distribution of health
outcomes over the types.15. Comparing the IL type with the NL type and the IP type with the
NP type, indigenous children have worse health outcomes than nonindigenous children, except
for the risk of being overweight in the treatment sample. The differences are substantial,
particularly for hemoglobin concentration and standardized height in the control sample.
Comparing the IL type with the IP type and the NL type with the NP type, the differences
between children who had at least one parent who completed primary education and children
whose parents had less than primary education are less obvious. The largest differences
occur for standardized height; here having a parent who completed primary education is
a clear advantage. Overall, these results are in line with the previous literature (see, e.g.,
Backstrand, Allen, Pelto, and Chávez (1997); Fernald and Neufeld (2006); González de Cossío,
Rivera, González-Castell, and Monterrubio (2009); Rivera and Sepúlveda (2003); Rivera,
Monterrubio, González-Cossío, García-Feregrino, García-Guerra, and Sepúlveda (2003)).
2.4 Empirical Results
We now use the data described in the previous section to evaluate the Oportunidades program.
We show that the treatment and control samples are not comparable in terms of preprogram
characteristics, and we apply a propensity score matching technique to make them comparable.
We apply the methodology presented in section 2.2 on the resulting samples to evaluate the
program. We then compare the results to previous studies.
2.4.1 Comparison of weighted treatment and control types
As stated at the end of section 2.2, a crucial assumption in the identification of treatment
effects on the basis of a simple comparison of the outcomes of treatment and control samples
is that fC (x | c1) = fT (x | c1), implying that the two samples must be similar in terms of
preprogram characteristics. If that is the case, after conditioning on c1, observing x does not
provide any information about whether an observation belongs to the treatment or control
sample. We test this hypothesis as described below.
We construct a sample containing members of both the control and treatment samples.
Next, we perform a logistic regression in which the dependent variable takes the value one if
15The types might differ in terms of characteristics that do not enter the definition of type and in terms of
preprogram characteristics.
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the observation belongs to the control sample and the value zero if it belongs to the treatment
sample.
Explanatory variables are characteristics of the family, characteristics of the family’s
dwelling, family assets, and state of residence (see appendix 2.B for more details). These
characteristics were measured in 1997, before the program started.16. The results are re-
ported in table 2.B.1 in appendix 2.B. We find that many of the characteristics significantly
affect the probability that the observation comes from the control sample, indicating that the
hypothesis that treatment and control samples are comparable in terms of the composition
of their preprogram characteristics must be rejected.
In the identification of average treatment effects, a standard way to address differences
in the composition of the treatment and control samples is to use propensity score match-
ing techniques. The goal is to make the treatment and control samples more comparable by
weighting different observations based on the estimated probability that the observation be-
longs to the control sample, as determined by the logistic regression discussed in the previous
paragraph. Appendix 2.C explains this procedure and how the weighting is used to obtain
estimates of the relevant distribution functions. The weighting procedure has a substantial
effect on the Roemer motivation for considering cumulative distribution functions (Roemer’s
identification axiom), as we discuss in appendix 2.E.17. Appendix 2.F provides the equivalent
of table 2.2 for the weighted (matched) samples.
In table 2.3, we use the weighted samples to consider the effect of the treatments on the
fraction of children who are anemic, stunted, or at risk of being overweight. We use the same
samples to examine the fraction of children for whom zero sick days or more than three sick
days during the previous four weeks were reported. Effects that are statistically significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level of significance are indicated by “**,” and effects
that are statistically significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level of significance are
indicated by one “*” Each entry provides the effect of the treatment. From an opportunity
perspective, a desirable effect on these fractions indicates that less responsibility allows parents
to prevent their children from being anemic, stunted, at risk of being overweight, sick, or more
than three days sick in the previous four-week period.
We see that the treatment effects reported in table 2.3 are substantial, and all significant
effects of the program are in a desirable direction. For each health indicator, we find at
16For the control sample this is based on recall data -see also footnote 12.
17Because health is also influenced by preprogram characteristics, we can no longer infer from the percentile
in the distribution of health for each type the corresponding responsibility; the same percentile will be obtained
by people with different combinations of responsibility and preprogram characteristics. In the appendix we
show that, under certain assumptions, the weighting procedure guarantees that those that are at the same
percentile in the weighted treatment and the control sample have the same expected responsibility.
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Table 2.3: Difference between control and treatment in fraction of anemic,
stunted, at risk of being overweight and days sick. Weighted sam-
ples.
Anemic Stunted Risk Overweight 0 Days Sick > 3 Days Sick
All -0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.09** -0.06**
IP -0.17** -0.17** -0.08 0.09 -0.06
IL -0.05 -0.18* -0.11** 0.10* -0.05*
NP -0.08** 0.05 0.03 0.07 -0.09**
NL 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 0.06 -0.02
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower
education;NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education. One
(two) “*” indicates that the effect is statistically significant from zero at the ten (five) percent level.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at locality level.
least one significant desirable treatment effect for one of the types. The table suggests that
the program works well, particularly for children of indigenous origin without a parent who
completed primary education. This type is likely to be the most disadvantaged, as table 2.2
suggests.
Children of indigenous origin with a parent who completed primary education have an
improvement in all indicators, although the effects are only significant for the fraction of
anemic and stunted children. For nonindigenous children, the results are less obvious. The
fraction of nonindigenous children who are anemic decreases because of the program, but the
results presented in table 2.3 identify no other significant treatment effects for nonindigenous
children.
Figure 2.1 presents the results of the stochastic dominance tests, using the procedure
explained in section 2.3.18. The horizontal axis denotes the numerical value of the variable
of interest (hemoglobin concentration, standardized height, standardized BMI, and reported
days sick).
The black (grey) boxes depict the maximal range over the support of the distributions for
which the null of nondominance is rejected at the 5 percent level of significance in favor of
a desirable (undesirable) effect of the treatment. Hatched (white) boxes indicate the same
at a significance level of 10 percent. When hatched (white) boxes are adjacent to a black
(grey) box, they show how far the rejection range of the null can be extended for the 10
percent level of significance. Each row contains an acronym “XYi” of which the first two
characters,“XY”, indicate the name of the types that are compared (XY = IL, IP, NL, or
18Because of many zero observations, this test procedure cannot be used for the number of days sick. Here, the
stochastic dominance test is based on a standard test for the difference between the cumulative distribution
functions at the natural numbers between 0 and 30. The intervals shown for this health outcome connect
the points in the support where the difference between the cumulative distribution functions is statistically
significant.
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NP), and the character “i” indicates whether the test refers to first- (i = 1) or second- (i
= 2) order stochastic dominance. The numbers in parentheses behind the boxes show the
percentage of observations of the treated type within the black or grey (hatched or white)
box.
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For example, in the top left panel of Figure 2.1, the hatched box labeled “IL” shows that,
using a 10 percent level of significance, the null hypothesis that the cumulative distribution of
the treatment type does not first-order stochastically dominate the distribution of the control
type must be rejected against the alternative, that the distribution of the treatment type
first-order stochastically dominates the distribution of the control type over the range [7.5,
11.2], which contains 35.5 percent of the treated type. The hypothesis of nondominance can
only be rejected at the 10 percent level of significance. Thus, we tested the null hypothesis
of the absence of second-order stochastic dominance in favor of the treatment against the
alternative, that the distribution of the treatment type second-order stochastically dominates
the distribution of the control type at the 5 percent level of significance. We failed to reject
the null, such that no box “IL” is drawn. For IP types, the black box labeled “IP1” indicates
that the null hypothesis of nondominance can be rejected at the 5 percent level of significance
over the range [8.1, 14.5], which contains 97 percent of the treated IP type. When we increase
the level of significance to 10 percent, the hatched box shows that the rejection interval
enlarges only marginally, to [8.0, 14.5]. For NL types, when testing for first-order stochastic
dominance, we find a white box over the small range of [9.7, 9.9] with very few observations
of the treatment type and a solid black box further up in the distribution. When testing
NL types for second-order stochastic dominance, we find a small white box. On balance, the
evidence for this type against treatment is not strong. Finally, for NP types, we have first
a solid black and then a white box. The latter is only significant at the 10 percent level of
significance and occurs at a less important part of the distribution (above 11, when children
are no longer anemic). When testing for second-order stochastic dominance, we see a solid
black box labeled “NP2,” indicating that the project leads to second-order improvement,19.
and this type is also positively affected by the program.
The other panels in Figure 2.1 can be similarly interpreted. In the top right panel, we
see that the treatment leads to first-order improvements in the standardized height for IL
and IP types over large and crucial parts of the support (standardized height below –2). For
NL types, we find a first-order stochastic dominance effect in favor of the treatment in an
important part of the distribution (standardized height below –2) and an adverse effect higher
19Observe that the “NP1” interval is not a subset of the “NP2” interval. This is because the test procedure
for first (second) order stochastic dominance identifies the point in the support where the difference between
the (cumulated) cumulative distribution functions is most significant, and then constructs the interval around
this point. There is no reason why the point (and hence the intervals) identified should be the same, or why the
intervals should be related by set inclusion. Moreover, first order stochastic dominance over a particular interval
does not imply second order stochastic dominance over that same interval since for second order dominance
the values of the cumulative distribution functions to the left of the first interval are also relevant. Hence it
can even occur that we find an interval over which we reject non first order stochastic dominance but cannot
find an interval over which we reject non second order stochastic dominance.
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up in the distribution. There is evidence of a marginal perverse first-order treatment effect
at a significance level of 10 percent on standardized height for NP types over a small range
of [–2.11, –2.00], which contains only 3 percent of the observations of the treated type, and
a positive effect higher up in the distribution. No second-order stochastic dominance effects
can be established for the nonindigenous types. In the bottom left panel, we concentrate on
what occurs at the right of the dotted vertical line, which represents children at risk of being
overweight. We see positive, first-order stochastic dominance effects at the 5 percent level of
significance for IL types and some evidence of marginally significant perverse treatment effects
for IP and NP types. The bottom right panel shows first-order improvements for IL, NL, and
NP types. The intervals reported here, except for IL, contain few observations, because of
the high frequency of zero reported sick days (see table 2.2).
The results reported in table 2.3 and figure 2.1 are consistent. The stochastic dominance
results provide more detail and identify effects in important parts of the distribution that
would otherwise go unnoticed, such as the positive first-order stochastic dominance effect on
standardized height for NL children. If first-order improvements cannot be found and the
influence of parental responsibility is not to be fully respected, then second-order stochastic
dominance provides a way to determine whether the program has positive effects. Second-
order improvements occur only once in our application, for the hemoglobin concentration of
NP types. In summary, we find strong evidence of positive treatment effects for children of
indigenous origin, particularly for those without a parent who completed primary education.
The evidence for children from nonindigenous origin is not as strong, but enrollment in the
program also seems to have positive effects on health opportunities for these children, on
balance.
2.4.2 Comparison to previous studies
Diaz and Handa (2006) use propensity score matching techniques to construct alternative con-
trol samples from the Mexican national household survey. They compute average treatment
effects by comparing the immediate treatment sample after eight months of receiving program
benefits with the delayed treatment sample (who had not yet received benefits), on the one
hand, and their newly constructed control samples, on the other. They conclude, “The PSM
[propensity score matching] technique requires an extremely rich set of covariates, detailed
knowledge of the beneficiary selection process, and the outcomes of interest need to be mea-
sured as comparably as possible in order to produce viable estimates of impact” (p.341). In
our case, the outcomes are measured in identical ways in the delayed treatment and control
samples, and the control sample is constructed following the beneficiary selection process as
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closely as possible. Our selection of covariates for the propensity score matching closely fol-
lows Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009b), who use almost identical covariates in comparing
the effects on schooling outcomes of the short-run differential exposure (between the imme-
diate and delayed treatment samples) with the long-run differential exposure (between the
immediate treatment and control samples). They find that longer exposure produces larger
effects, and the differences between the order of magnitude of the short- and long-run effects
are reasonable. This finding suggests that the propensity score matching technique we use
can produce reliable estimates of average treatment effects.
The interpretation of the difference between the distributions of the weighted treatment
and control samples as a treatment effect depends on the extent to which the weighting pro-
cedure manages to correct for possibly unobserved heterogeneity caused by the imperfect
randomness of the assignment to treatment and control groups. Of course, it is not pos-
sible to test this directly, but we can compare our results to the findings in the literature
that consider differences in children’s health outcomes between immediate and delayed treat-
ment samples. Rivera, Sotres-Alvarez, Habicht, Shamah, and Villalpando (2004) compare the
health outcomes of children younger than 12 months old in 1997. They find that in 1999
after 12 months of treatment, children in the immediate treatment sample had higher mean
hemoglobin values than the children from the delayed treatment sample, who were untreated
up to that point. After the immediate treatment sample had received 24 months of treat-
ment and the delayed treatment sample had received approximately six months of treatment,
children from the immediate treatment sample had grown more than children in the delayed
treatment sample, and the differences in height were significantly larger for households with
low socioeconomic status (a score based on dwelling characteristics, possession of durable
goods, and access to water and sanitation). Gertler (2004) finds similar results for children
aged 0 to 35 months in 1997, stating that “treatment children were 25.3 percent less likely to
be anemic and grew about 1 centimeter more during the first year of the program” (p. 340).
Both of these differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Unfortunately,
Gertler does not report whether the effect differs for different subgroups, such as our types.
Hemoglobin levels, unlike height, were not observed before the program started. Therefore,
the results for hemoglobin levels do not control for child fixed effects as opposed to growth
effects, as noted by Behrman and Hoddinott (2005). They investigate the effect on the height
of children who were between 4 and 48 months of age when treatment began in August 1998.
They find that when child fixed effects are not included, treatment has a significant negative
effect on child height for children between 4 and 36 months of age. However, if child fixed
effects are controlled (by considering the difference between 1999 and 1998), the treatment
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effect becomes significantly positive at approximately one centimeter, as in Gertler (2004).20.
Notably, program effects are larger for children in households in which the head of the house-
hold speaks an indigenous language and the mother is more educated.21
Finally, Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008) use a different approach. They combine the
data of both the immediate and delayed treatment samples to estimate the effect of the size
of the conditional cash transfer received on children between 24 and 68 months of age in 2003,
when the children’s height was measured. Increasing the size of the transfer leads to higher
height-for-age scores, a lower prevalence of stunting and a lower prevalence of obesity. Parental
level of education and whether the head of the household spoke an indigenous language were
not significant controls in their model.
Overall, these findings are in line with ours. The program has significant positive effects
on children’s height and hemoglobin concentration levels. Larger effects tend to be found
for households in which an indigenous language is spoken. This finding is compatible with
Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld (2008) because, in general, indigenous families receive larger
cash transfers than nonindigenous families based on the finding that they tend to have more
children. Our results visualize where in the distribution the program is most effective for
different types, and we can see that the program is most powerful for the most disadvantaged
types, children of indigenous origin.
2.5 Conclusion
There is a growing body of literature on the measurement of inequality of opportunity (for
an overview, see, e.g., Ramos and Van de gaer (2015)). Thus far, the ideas in the literature
have not been applied to evaluate social programs. We propose a methodology to do so.
We bring together insights from the literature on equality of opportunity, the literature on
program evaluation, and the literature on testing for stochastic dominance. Roemer (1993)’s
normative approach to equality of opportunity indicates that we should focus on types and
that, if responsibility characteristics are unobserved, individuals at the same percentile of the
20Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) obtain the same pattern when considering standardized height-for-age
scores.
21We compare the health outcomes of immediate and delayed treatment in the appendix 2.G.3 of the paper
for children born between the beginning of the initial and the beginning of the delayed treatment. This
substantially limits the size of the sample. Moreover, because all of these children received at least three years
of treatment by the time their health outcomes were measured, few significant effects can be found, particularly
for hemoglobin concentration and reported days sick. This indicates that theses variables are more sensitive
to nutritional status in the immediate past than in the more distant past. We find significant positive effect
on standardized height for indigenous children without parental primary education over a large range of the
support of the distribution and for nonindigenous children with parental primary education over a limited
support of the distribution. Again, the evidence is in favor of the program.
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distribution of the outcome within their type have exercised a comparable degree of respon-
sibility. This approach provides a normative foundation for the comparison of cumulative
distribution functions of corresponding treatment and control types. The literature on pro-
gram evaluation stresses that care should be taken to ensure that the treatment and control
samples are comparable in terms of preprogram characteristics. If they are not, propensity
score matching techniques can be used to make the samples more comparable. Hence, we test
whether the treatment and control samples are comparable in terms of preprogram charac-
teristics and since the test fails, we propose a weighted sampling method based on standard
propensity score matching techniques to make treatment and control types comparable. Fi-
nally, Davidson and Duclos (2009) and Davidson (2009) propose a new technique to test for
stochastic dominance, taking nondominance as the null so that rejection of the null implies
dominance. Their test procedure is particularly suited to our study because it allows us to
see where dominance can be established along the distribution.
We applied our procedure to study the effect of the Mexican Oportunidades program on
children’s health opportunities. We can draw two conclusions about the proposed method-
ology. First, in our application (as in the applications by Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy
(2008), Lefranc, Pistolesi, and Trannoy (2009), Peragine and Serlenga (2008), and Rosa Dias
(2009)), looking for second-order stochastic dominance does not significantly add to the con-
clusions drawn from first-order stochastic dominance. Thus, whether the influence of parental
responsibility is to be fully respected does not substantially affect the conclusions. Second, the
treatment and control samples differed substantially in terms of preprogram characteristics.
Therefore, it is important to use weighted sampling based on techniques such as propensity
score matching to make the samples (more) comparable. Concerning the actual effects of the
program, our results indicate that the Oportunidades program has a substantially favorable
effect on the health opportunities of the most disadvantaged children, that is, those with
parents of indigenous origin and without a parent who completed primary education. Ad-
ditionally, the effects on children of indigenous origin with a parent who completed primary
education are sizable and important. The effects on nonindigenous children are less obvious,
but the overall evidence in this paper indicates that the program also results in better health
opportunities for these children.
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Appendices
2.A Sampling procedure
Table 2.A.1: Sampling process.
Original number matched children 1997 data available
of children (a) number (b) % of (a) number % of (b)
C 2247 1871 83 1871 100
T 2615 2200 84 1128 51
Total 4862 4071 84 2999 73
Note: the acronyms refer to samples : C = Control sample; T = Treatment sample.
Comparing the sample sizes in the column “1997 data available” with those in table 1 in the
main text, one observes that 12 (3) observations dropped out in the final control (treatment)
sample. This is due to missing observations on circumstance characteristics.
2.B Results of the logistic regression
Our specification for the logistic regression is close to the specification used for propensity
score matching by Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009b) and Behrman and Parker (2010). The
dependent variable equals 1 if the observation comes from the control sample and 0 otherwise.
Explanatory variables are based on pre-program characteristics of the treatment sample and
recalled 1997 characteristics of the control sample. We have five kinds of explanatory variables.
(1) Household characteristics: the ages of the household head and spouse (in years), sex
of household head, whether the household head and spouse speak an indigenous language,
whether they completed primary education, whether they worked, and composition of the
household (number of children, women and men of different ages).
(2) Dwelling conditions of the household: number of rooms in the house and a list of dummy
variables indicating the presence of electrical light, running water on the property, running
water in the house (which implies of course presence of running water on the property), a dirt
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floor and whether the roof and wall were of poor quality.
(3) Asset information: dummy variables indicating whether the family owned animals or land
and whether the family possessed a blender, fridge, fan, gas stove, gas heater, radio, hifi, TV,
video, washing machine, car or truck.
(4) State of residence: a list of dummy variables indicating the state where the family lived.
The reference state (all state of residence dummies equal to zero) is Veracruz.
(5) Following Behrman, Parker, and Todd (2009b) and Behrman and Parker (2010), we include
dummy variables for missing characteristics, provided they could be meaningfully estimated.
The variable “Miss Asset” takes the value of one if any of the assets listed in the table between
“Animals” and “Truck” is missing.
Table 2.B.1 gives the estimated coefficients.
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Table 2.B.1: Logistic regression results.
Variable Coef. St.Er. z Variable Coef. St.Er. z
Age Hh head -0.013 0.007 -1.96 Blender -0.169 0.132 -1.27
Age spouse -0.012 0.007 -0.61 Fridge 0.054 0.200 0.27
Sex Hh head -2.197 0.351 -6.25 Fan 0.142 0.120 0.71
IndigHhHead -0.718 0.272 -2.64 Gas stove 0.377 0.145 2.60
IndigSpouse 0.249 0.278 0.90 Gas heater 0.709 0.360 1.97
EducHhHead -0.229 0.114 -2.01 Radio -0.600 0.100 -5.96
EducSpouse -0.386 0.116 -3.32 Hifi -0.361 0.251 -1.44
Work Hh head 1.124 0.262 4.29 Tv -0.635 0.118 -5.53
Work spouse 0.623 0.161 3.86 Video 0.498 0.345 1.44
# Children 0-5 -0.090 0.048 -1.89 Wash machine -0.35 0.330 -0.11
# Children 6-12 -0.211 0.042 -5.06 Car 1.229 0.465 2.64
# Children 13-15 -0.160 0.084 -1.91 Truck 0.243 0.282 0.86
# Children 16-20 -0.016 0.073 -0.22 Guerrero -0.548 0.190 -2.88
# Women 20-39 -0.014 0.119 -0.12 Hidalgo -0.937 0.209 -4.48
# Women 40-59 0.040 0.155 0.26 Michoacan -0.582 0.176 -3.30
# Women 60+ 0.040 0.185 0.22 Puebla -1.097 0.150 -7.33
# Men 20-39 -0.162 0.106 -1.54 Queretaro 0.119 0.219 0.54
# Men 40-59 0.366 0.161 2.28 San Luis -0.462 0.153 -3.02
# Men 60+ 0.698 0.234 2.99 Miss Age Sp -4.297 0.713 -6.03
# Rooms -0.006 0.010 -0.58 Miss Indig HH 0.799 1.959 0.41
Electrical light 0.036 0.115 0.32 Miss Indig Sp -2.102 1.894 -1.11
Running water land 0.879 0.115 7.67 Miss Work HH 3.461 1.871 1.85
Running water house -0.435 0.208 -2.10 Miss Work Sp 3.817 1.844 2.07
Dirtfloor 0.096 0.118 0.81 Miss Water land 0.871 1.640 0.53
Poor quality roof -0.026 0.108 -0.24 Miss Water house 0.699 0.827 0.84
Poor quality wall -0.483 0.126 -3.82 Miss Assets -4.121 2.398 -1.72
Animals -0.168 0.113 -1.48 Constant 3.860 0.4223 9.13
Land -0.545 0.105 -5.17
Number of Obs 2741
LR Chi2 (54) 730.0 Pseudo R2 0.198
Prob>Chi2 0.000 Log Likelihood -1478.75
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2.C Matching estimator and construction of the correspond-
ing distribution function.
Table 2.C.1: Propensity score matching: common sup-
port and number of observations in the com-
mon support.
Common Control Treatment Band-
support # # width
IP [0.158,0.957] 155 193 0.074
IL [0.106,0.868] 228 260 0.074
NP [0.063,0.949] 668 318 0.071
NL [0.017,0.952] 586 318 0.071
Total 1637 1089
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL
= Indigenous, Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education;
NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education.
STEP 1 : Propensity score matching.
The estimated logistic regressions allow us to compute for each observation the propensity
score Pi, the probability that the observation is in the control sample, given its pre-program
characteristics xi. Figure 2.C.1 depicts the estimated propensity scores. As we matched for
each of the 4 combinations of race and parental level of education the treatment into the
control sample, we determined the common support for each of these four comparisons as the
overlap of the supports of the control and treatment sample. Table 2.C.1 gives the common
support and the number of observations in the common support for each of the types.
We tested the balancing property score using Stata. The optimal number of blocks was 11
and we had 54 explanatory variables, resulting in 594 test. In 14 cases the balancing property
was rejected. As an additional test, we rerun the logistic equation from table 2.B.1 using the
weighted sample. Only four coefficients out of 54 turned out to be significant. These results
are quite encouraging.
STEP 2: Construction of the cumulative distribution function.
Let I1 denote the set of individuals in the treatment sample, I0 the set of individuals in
the control sample and SP the region of common support. The number n0 gives the number of
individuals in the set I0∩SP . The outcome of individual j in the control sample is Y0j and the
outcome of individual i in the treatment sample is Y1i. Let D = 1 for program participants
and D = 0 for those who don’t participate in the program.
The purpose is to match each individual in the control sample with a weighted average
of individuals in the treatment sample. The usual estimator of the average treatment effect
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then becomes
T = 1
n0
∑
j∈I0∩SP
[E (Y1j | D = 1, Pj) − Y0j ] ,
with E (Y1j | D = 1, Pj) =
∑
i∈I1
W (i, j)Y1i.
The construct E (Y1j | D = 1, Pj) is the outcome of the hypothetical individual matched
to individual j. The average treatment effect can be written as
T = 1
n0
∑
j∈I0∩SP
∑
i∈I1
W (i, j)Y1i − 1
n0
∑
j∈I0∩SP
Y0j .
The first term is the average of the matched observations, which attaches to each of the
original observations Y1i a weight
ωi =
1
n0
∑
j∈I0∩SP
W (i, j) .
It is therefore natural (and consistent with the standard model of the estimation of average
treatment effects) to use for each observation Y1i the weight ωi to construct the cumulative
distribution function.
There exist many possible ways to determine the weights W (i, j). We use a Kernel
estimator, such that
W (i, j) =
G
(
Pi−Pj
α
)
∑
k∈I1 G
(
Pk−Pj
α
) ,
where G (.) is the Epanechnikov kernel function and α is a bandwidth parameter. The band-
width parameter was chosen in an optimal way, using the formula in Silverman (1986), page
45-47:
α = 1.06min
(
σ,
ρ
1.34
)
,
where σ is the standard deviation and ρ the interquartile range of the distribution of propensity
scores. The resulting bandwidths for each of the types are given in the last column of table
2.C.1.
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Figure 2.C.1: Estimated propensity scores.
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2.D Testing stochastic dominance
We explain the approach by focusing on tests for first order stochastic dominance of F T over
FC . Davidson (2009) shows how the approach must be generalized to test for stochastic
dominance of arbitrary order.
It is assumed that samples of the control and treatment types that are compared are
independent, and their weighted empirical distribution functions FˆC and Fˆ T are defined in
the usual way. If for the empirical distribution functions FˆC and Fˆ T , there exists a y ∈ Y
such that Fˆ T (y) ≥ FˆC(y), there is non-dominance in the sample and we do not wish to reject
the null.
Davidson and Duclos (2009) restrict the test to a test of the frontier of the null hypoth-
esis against the alternative hypothesis of dominance of T over C. The frontier of the null
hypothesis is the case where FˆC(y) > Fˆ T (y) for all y ∈ Y except for one point y∗ where
FˆC(y∗) = Fˆ T (y∗). They show that, for configurations of non-dominance that are not on the
frontier, the rejection probabilities of their test are no greater than they are for configurations
on the frontier.
For each point in R, we calculate an unconstrained empirical likelihood ratio statistic
and a constrained empirical likelihood ratio statistic, the statistic under the frontier of the
null (i.e. imposing the null of non-dominance). The square root of the double difference
between these two statistic is the test statistic.22 Denote this value by LR. Next, determine
the value for which LR is minimal, as this is the most likely point at which non-dominance
cannot be rejected and compute the probabilities pXt associated with each point in sample
X (x = C, T ) that maximizes the empirical likelihood function subject to FˆC(y∗) = Fˆ T (y∗).
These probabilities are estimates of the population probabilities under the assumption of
non-dominance and are used to set up the following bootstrap data-generating process on the
frontier of the null of non-dominance.
We compute 3000 bootstrap samples from the two distributions pCt and pTt , following
the original sample design, as suggested by Chen and Duclos (2008). Our samples contain
CX1 , . . . , C
X
c , . . . , C
X
nX
clusters (villages), X = C, T . Each cluster in the sample contains nXc
children (c = 1, . . . , nX). We mimic this sample design as follows. First, define for each cluster
πXc =
∑
t∈CXc p
X
t∑
t∈∪
c=1...nX C
X
c
pXt
,
22For first order stochastic dominance, this statistic can be analytically obtained. For second order dominance
the statistic has to be numerically determined using the Newton method to solve a set of non-linear equations
-see Davidson (2009).
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which gives the probability that an observation is drawn from cluster c. Now, draw the
identity of the first cluster from the nX clusters, such that each cluster has a probability πXc
of being drawn. This gives, say cluster k. Next, draw nX1 observations from cluster k with
replacement, where each observation has a probability pkt /
∑
t∈CX
k
pXt of being drawn. Do the
same for all the other nX − 1 clusters. This gives the first bootstrap sample. Repeat the
procedure 3000 times. For each bootstrap sample, we calculate the minimal LR statistic to
get an idea of the distribution of the minimal LR under the frontier of the null hypothesis.
The p-value of the sample statistic is then the fraction of bootstrap-statistics greater than the
sample statistic.
When there is dominance in the sample, we report the results by giving the longest interval
[r̂−, r̂+] for which the hypothesis
max
z∈[r̂−,r̂+]
(
F T (z) − FC (z)
)
≥ 0,
can be rejected. For a given level of significance α, r̂− (r̂+) is the smallest (greatest) value
of r− (r+) for which the hypothesis
max
z∈[r−,r+]
(
F T (z) − FC (z)
)
≥ 0
can be rejected at level α. The larger is this interval, given α, the more powerful our
rejection of non-dominance. We ignore the stochastic nature of the sampling weights.
2.E Roemer’s identification axiom and matching estimator (weighted
treatment distribution)
(1) The standard Roemer model and its assumptions
In the standard model health, h, is determined only by parental circumstances, c, and a
scalar representing parental responsibility, p:
h (c, p) .
Define, for each type ĥi as the level of health such that a fraction R of type i has a health
not better than R: ∫
P
I
(
h (ci, p) ≤ ĥi
)
f ip (p) dp = R, (2.1)
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where I (.) is the indicator function. The first assumption typically made to derive Roemer’s
identification axiom is
A1: h (c, p) is strictly increasing in p.
As a result of this assumption, there exists for each type a value pi such that
I
(
h (ci, p) ≤ ĥi
)
= 1 ⇔ p ≤ pi,
and we get from (2.1),
R =
∫ pi
p
f ip (p) dp.
Imposing the second assumption,
A2: For all i, f ip (p) = fp (p),
which says that responsibility is distributed independently from circumstances, we get
RIA: For all i, pi = p∗,
which is Roemer’s identification axiom: those that are at the same percentile in the
distribution of health within their type, have the same responsibility.
(2) Weighted treatment observations and a variant of RIA
Suppose children’s health is influenced by parental circumstances, c, pre-program charac-
teristics, x, and a scalar representing parental responsibility, p:
h (c, x, p) .
Define for the treatment sample after weighting the observations the value ĥT and for the
control sample the value ĥC such that the same fraction in both samples has a health smaller
than or equal to these critical values.
∫
P
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cT , x, p
)
≤ ĥT
)
f̂Tx,p (x, p) dxdp =
∫
P
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cC , x, p
)
≤ ĥC
)
fCx,p (x, p) dxdp, (2.2)
where
f̂Tx,p (x, p) = fTp|x (p|x) fCx (x) ,
the joint distribution of x and p after weighting the observations in the treatment sample,
which ensures that the marginal distribution of x is the same in the control and treatment
sample. A first assumption that can be made is
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A3: fTp|x (p|x) = fCp|x (p|x).
This says that the distribution of responsibility conditional on x is the same in the treat-
ment and control group. It implies that
f̂Tx,p (x, p) = fCx,p (x, p) . (2.3)
As a result, (2.2) reduces to
∫
P
∫
X
[
I
(
h
(
cT , x, p
)
≤ ĥT
)
− I
(
h
(
cC , x, p
)
≤ ĥC
)]
fCx,p (x, p) dxdp = 0. (2.4)
A second assumption that can be made is that the function h (c, x, p) is additively separable
between c and (x, p).
A4: There exist functions v (c) and w (x, p) such that h (c, x, p) = v (c) + w (x, p).
This allows us to write (2.4) as
∫
P
∫
X
[
I
(
w (x, p) ≤ ĥT − v
(
cT
))
− I
(
w (x, p) ≤ ĥC − v
(
cC
))]
fCx,p (x, p) dxdp = 0.
As this equation must hold for arbitrary distribution functions fCx,p (x, p), it follows that
ĥT − v
(
cT
)
= ĥC − v
(
cC
)
.
As a result,
h
(
cT , x, p
)
= ĥT ⇔ v
(
cT
)
+ w (x, p) = ĥT ⇔ w (x, p) = ĥT − v
(
cT
)
⇔ w (x, p) = ĥC − v
(
cC
)
⇔ h
(
cC , x, p
)
= ĥC .
Now consider the expected value of p in the weighted treated and control sample, given
that health is at the same percentile.
E
(
p|h = ĥT
)
= 1
f̂Th (h)
∫
P
p
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cT , x, p
)
= ĥT
)
f̂Tp,x (p, x) dxdp, (2.5)
E
(
p|h = ĥC
)
= 1
fCh (h)
∫
P
p
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cC , x, p
)
= ĥC
)
fCp,x (p, x) dxdp. (2.6)
We have shown that weighting the treatment sample and A3 implies (2.3) and that A3 together
with A4 imply h
(
cT , x, p
)
= ĥT ⇔ h
(
cC , x, p
)
= ĥC , such that the expressions behind the
first integral sign in (2.5) and (2.6) are equal. What needs to be shown is that the marginal
distributions f̂Th (h) and fCh (h) are equal. This follows directly from the previous reasoning,
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upon observing that
f̂Th (h) =
∫
P
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cT , x, p
)
= ĥT
)
f̂Tp,x (p, x) dxdp and
fCh (h) =
∫
P
∫
X
I
(
h
(
cC , x, p
)
= ĥC
)
fCp,x (p, x) dxdp.
Conclusion: if both assumptions A3 and A4 hold true, then the weighting procedure
guarantees that those that are at the same percentile in the distribution of health in the
weighted treatment and control sample have the same expected value for responsibility.
2.F Treatment and control effects in matched samples
Table 2.F.1: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003.
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.47 0.24 0.58 0.17
IP 0.36 11.5 0.46 -1.91 0.23 0.54 0.19
IL 0.30 11.9 0.63 -2.36 0.30 0.63 0.13
NP 0.18 12.2 0.19 -1.12 0.21 0.57 0.18
NL 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.47 0.26 0.58 0.17
(a) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.20 12.1 0.32 -1.47 0.19 0.67 0.11
IP 0.19 12.0 0.30 -1.52 0.14 0.66 0.12
IL 0.25 11.7 0.45 -1.86 0.18 0.71 0.07
NP 0.10 12.4 0.24 -1.10 0.25 0.68 0.09
NL 0.25 12.3 0.30 -1.41 0.21 0.64 0.15
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
As expected since we match the treatment sample to the control samples, the character-
istics of the matched control sample are very similar to those of the original control sample
in table 2.2. The differences between the matched and original treatment sample are larger.
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2.G Sensitivity Analysis
In addition to the results discussed at length in the main part of the paper, we present three
sensitivity analyses by modifying inclusion criteria to the program and by modifying the
definition of parental education. In the analysis presented in sections 2.3 and 2.4, our base
case, two conditions were necessary for inclusion to the treatment group: (i) the household
should be part of a treatment community (communities were the program was operating)
and (ii) information on monetary transfers received by the household should be available.
Children’s types were defined on the basis of indigenous origin and whether at least one
parent completed primary education or not.
The analysis in appendix 2.G.1 that follows incorporates all children living in treatment
communities independently of whether information on transfers received by the household
were available or not. As a result, the treatment sample for this analysis contains 219 addi-
tional observations, as can be seen upon simple comparison of tables 2.1 (in the main text)
and 2.G.1.1 (in appendix 2.G.1).
Comparing the results in tables 2.3 and 2.G.1.4, it is striking that all estimated program
effects have the same sign. Most significantly estimated effects in table 2.1 also turn up
significant in table 2.G.1.4 and the other way around, with few exceptions. All significantly
estimated effects in both tables 2.3 and 2.G.1.4 are in favor of the program. Looking at the
stochastic dominance results in figure 2.G.1.1 we find very similar arrangements as in the base
case in figure 2.1. Indigenous children seem to benefit most from receiving Oportunidades,
although the effect now is somewhat weaker for indigenous children without parental primary
education background (IL group) and stronger for indigenous children with parental primary
education background (IP group). Except for the negative effect observed on standardized
BMI for non-indigenous children with parental primary education, the effect on non-indigenous
is similar to the base case. Overall, the effects are very close to the effects in the base case
and very much in favor of the program.
The analysis in appendix 2.G.2 changes the definition of type. Although the contribution
of parental education to child health is generally recognized, education effects of both parents
separately are still disputed (Breierova and Duflo (2003), Aslam and Kingdon (2010)). In
particular, it has been suggested that education of the mother could have a major influence
on child well-being (Desai and Alva (1998)). Based on this hypothesis, appendix 2.G.2 defines
types on the basis of indigenous background (as before) and on whether the mother has
completed primary education or not. Table 2.G.2.1 shows that this diminishes the sizes of
both control and treatment samples compared to the base case (table 2.1). This is due to the
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fact that in the base case, some observations for which mother’s educational level was not but
father’s educational level was observed, could be classified as having at least one parent that
completed primary education.
The comparison of tables 2.3 and 2.G.2.4 reveals that all estimated program effects have
the same sign (except the effect on the fraction of anemic children for the NL group, which
changes from being marginally positive to -0.02). Most significantly estimated effects in table
2.1 also turn up significant in table 2.G.2.4 and the other way around, with only few exceptions.
All significantly estimated effects in table 2.G.2.4 are in favor of the program. The stochastic
dominance tests in figure 2.G.2.1 show the same pattern as in figure 2.1. The most noteworthy
difference is that the positive effects on hemoglobin concentration and standardized height of
the IL group become less pronounced. From this sensitivity analysis, we conclude again that,
overall, the effects are very close to the effects in the base case and very much in favor of the
program.
The analysis in appendix 2.G.3 compares the effect of Oportunidades between the imme-
diate and delayed treatment groups. As mentioned in section 2.3.2, the original sample design
followed a random procedure to allocate the treatment to two comparable groups. One group
received the program immediately (original treatment) while the other was phased-out 18
months in order to operate as control (delay treatment). Lack of information on the amount
of transfers for the original treatment motivated the use of the latter for the main analy-
sis. Here we aim at assessing the effect of having been exposed longer to the program, by
comparing the health outcomes of children in the original and delayed treatment. The main
advantage is the randomization of households over these two groups. In order to make the
comparison meaningful, we limit the sample to children that were born after April 1998 (when
the original treatment started) and before October 1999 (when delayed treatment started).
As can be seen in table 2.G.3.1, this decreases the number of observations that can be used
drastically.
The logistic regression in table 2.G.3.5 reports much fewer significant coefficients than the
regressions in tables 2.B.1, 2.G.1.5 and 2.G.2.5. This is due to the much better randomization
of households between initial and delayed treatment and the smaller sample size. Table
2.G.3.4 shows the limitation of the exercise: it shows only one positive treatment effect: for
indigenous children with a mother that completed primary education, the fraction of children
reporting zero sick days increased by 18 percent. Also the stochastic dominance tests find fewer
significant effects, especially on hemoglobin concentration and days sick. The reason for this
is probably that both the children in the initial and delayed treatment samples received the
program during the three years preceding the collection of the health data in 2003, and these
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Table 2.G.1.1: Composition of the samples
(delay vs control).
Control sample Treatment sample
# % # %
All 1859 100 1344 100
IP 173 9.3 227 16.9
IL 241 13.0 329 24.5
NP 824 44.3 395 29.4
NL 621 33.4 393 29.2
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous,
Primary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower education;
NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-
indigenous, Lower education.
two health indicators are more influenced by what happens during the period immediately
before they are measured. What is quite remarkable, however is the substantial impact on
standardized height of longer exposure to the program, exposure in womb and during the first
months of life. Here we do find significant effects for children from indigenous origin without a
parent that completed primary education and for non-indigenous children with a parent that
completed primary education. Hence, we conclude that program exposure at a very young
age can have significant positive effects on standardized health three years later.
2.G.1 Entire delayed treatment group versus Control
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Table 2.G.1.2: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(delay vs control).
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.24 0.58 0.17
IP 0.36 11.6 0.50 -1.99 0.23 0.57 0.19
IL 0.30 11.9 0.64 -2.40 0.30 0.64 0.13
NP 0.18 12.2 0.20 -1.13 0.22 0.56 0.18
NL 0.25 12.0 0.32 -1.47 0.25 0.58 0.18
(b) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.23 12.1 0.33 -1.53 0.20 0.66 0.12
IP 0.27 12.0 0.36 -1.70 0.14 0.62 0.13
IL 0.29 11.7 0.45 -1.87 0.18 0.70 0.10
NP 0.14 12.5 0.24 -1.17 0.25 0.67 0.11
NL 0.26 12.2 0.30 -1.47 0.22 0.64 0.14
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
Table 2.G.1.3: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(delay vs control): Matched samples.
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.24 0.58 0.18
IP 0.37 11.6 0.49 -1.99 0.23 0.57 0.19
IL 0.30 11.9 0.64 -2.37 0.30 0.64 0.13
NP 0.18 12.2 0.19 -1.13 0.22 0.56 0.18
NL 0.25 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.25 0.58 0.18
(a) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.22 12.0 0.33 -1.51 0.19 0.67 0.11
IP 0.20 12.0 0.29 -1.54 0.13 0.67 0.10
IL 0.29 11.7 0.48 -1.90 0.18 0.72 0.09
NP 0.11 12.4 0.24 -1.12 0.25 0.62 0.11
NL 0.28 12.2 0.32 -1.45 0.20 0.65 0.15
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
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Table 2.G.1.4: Difference between control and treatment in fraction of ane-
mic, stunted at risk of being overweight and days sick,
weighted samples (delay vs control).
Anemic Stunted Risk Overweight 0 Days Sick > 3 Days Sick
All -0.02 0.01 -0.05* 0.09** -0.06**
IP -0.16** -0.21** -0.10 0.10 -0.08*
IL -0.01 -0.16* -0.12** 0.08 -0.05
NP -0.07* 0.05 0.04 0.06 -0.07**
NL 0.03 -0.00 -0.05* 0.07 -0.03
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower
education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education. One
(two) “*” indicates that the effect is statistically significant from zero at the ten (five) percent level.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at locality level.
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Table 2.G.1.5: Logistic regression results (delay vs control).
Variable Coef. St.Er. z Variable Coef. St.Er. z
Age Hh head -0.016 0.006 -2.44 Blender -0.186 0.126 -1.48
Age spouse -0.014 0.007 -2.12 Fridge -0.032 0.184 -0.17
Sex Hh head -2.32 0.335 -6.94 Fan 0.167 0.185 0.90
IndigHhHead -0.600 0.255 -2.34 Gas stove 0.276 0.136 2.03
IndigSpouse 0.109 0.260 0.42 Gas heater 0.707 0.310 2.28
EducHhHead -0.234 0.110 -2.13 Radio -0.546 0.096 -5.67
EducSpouse -0.487 0.110 -4.39 Hifi -0.360 0.230 -1.56
Work Hh head 1.024 0.244 4.20 Tv -0.646 0.114 -5.67
Work spouse 0.490 0.147 3.32 Video 0.412 0.293 1.41
# Children 0-5 -0.077 0.045 -1.71 Wash machine -0.200 0.290 -0.69
# Children 6-12 -0.182 0.040 -4.58 Car 0.877 0.358 2.45
# Children 13-15 -0.156 0.080 -1.98 Truck -0.243 0.236 -1.03
# Children 16-20 -0.085 0.067 -1.27 Guerrero -0.841 0.171 -4.91
# Women 20-39 -0.126 0.105 -1.20 Hidalgo -0.863 0.196 -4.40
# Women 40-59 -0.083 0.142 -0.59 Michoacan -0.422 0.167 -2.52
# Women 60+ 0.016 0.171 0.09 Puebla -1.061 0.142 -7.43
# Men 20-39 -0.200 0.096 -2.07 Queretaro 0.290 0.207 1.40
# Men 40-59 0.420 0.152 2.76 San Luis -0.460 0.144 -3.18
# Men 60+ 0.757 0.221 3.42 Miss Age Sp -4.65 0.712 -6.54
# Rooms -0.006 0.010 -0.68 Miss Indig HH 0.911 2.08 0.44
Electrical light 0.083 0.110 0.75 Miss Indig Sp -2.30 2.030 -1.13
Running water land 0.812 0.108 7.51 Miss Work HH 3.65 2.004 1.82
Running water house -0.350 0.191 -1.84 Miss Work Sp 3.990 1.984 2.01
Dirtfloor 0.060 0.112 0.54 Miss Water land 1.090 1.601 0.68
Poor quality roof -0.002 0.104 -0.02 Miss Water house 0.354 0.643 0.55
Poor quality wall -0.380 0.123 -3.09 Miss Assets -3.912 2.070 -1.89
Animals -0.191 0.107 -1.78 Constant 4.232 0.406 10.42
Land -0.505 0.100 -5.06
Number of Obs 2959
LR Chi2 (54) 815.6 Pseudo R2 0.201
Prob>Chi2 0.000 Log Likelihood -1624.23
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Figure 2.G.1.1: Estimated propensity scores (delay vs control).
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Figure 2.G.1.2: Stochastic dominance results (delay vs control).
Table 2.G.1.6: Propensity score matching: common sup-
port and number of observations in the
common support (delay vs control).
Common Control Treatment Band-
support # # width
IP [0.145,0.959] 148 209 0.072
IL [0.099,0.850] 191 312 0.069
NP [0.027,0.950] 596 392 0.068
NL [0.011,0.950] 551 390 0.069
Total 1486 1303
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL
= Indigenous, Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education;
NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education.
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2.G.2 Mother’s education as circumstance criterion
Table 2.G.2.1: Composition of the samples
(Mother’s education case).
Control sample Treatment sample
# % # %
All 1808 100 1079 100
IP 121 6.7 150 13.9
IL 278 15.4 310 28.7
NP 680 37.6 255 23.6
NL 729 40.3 364 33.8
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous,
Mother’s primary education; IL = Indigenous, Mother’s
lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Mother’s primary
education; NL = Non-indigenous, Mother’s lower educa-
tion.
Table 2.G.2.2: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(Mother’s education case).
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.24 0.58 0.17
IP 0.38 11.9 0.48 -1.88 0.24 0.56 0.18
IL 0.30 11.8 0.63 -2.36 0.28 0.63 0.14
NP 0.17 12.3 0.17 -1.04 0.23 0.57 0.17
NL 0.25 12.0 0.33 -1.52 0.23 0.58 0.18
(b) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.22 12.1 0.33 -1.58 0.20 0.67 0.12
IP 0.31 11.9 0.34 -1.64 0.12 0.66 0.14
IL 0.27 11.8 0.43 -1.83 0.17 0.72 0.10
NP 0.10 12.6 0.23 -1.25 0.22 0.68 0.11
NL 0.23 12.2 0.32 -1.58 0.24 0.64 0.14
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Mother’s primary education; IL =
Indigenous, Mother’s lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Mother’s primary education;
NL = Non-indigenous, Mother’s lower education.
2.G.3 Original versus Delay treatment
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Table 2.G.2.3: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(Mother’s education case): Matched samples.
(a) Control sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.24 12.0 0.32 -1.46 0.24 0.58 0.17
IP 0.38 11.9 0.48 -2.00 0.24 0.56 0.18
IL 0.30 11.8 0.63 -2.36 0.28 0.63 0.14
NP 0.17 12.3 0.17 -1.04 0.23 0.57 0.17
NL 0.25 12.0 0.33 -1.51 0.23 0.58 0.18
(a) Treatment sample
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.20 12.1 0.32 -1.47 0.19 0.67 0.11
IP 0.25 12.0 0.26 -1.46 0.12 0.66 0.17
IL 0.25 11.9 0.50 -1.97 0.17 0.74 0.07
NP 0.07 12.4 0.21 -1.09 0.23 0.61 0.11
NL 0.23 12.3 0.32 -1.46 0.22 0.66 0.12
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Mother’s primary education; IL =
Indigenous, Mother’s lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Mother’s primary education;
NL = Non-indigenous, Mother’s lower education.
Table 2.G.2.4: Difference between control and treatment in fraction of ane-
mic, stunted at risk of being overweight and days sick,
weighted samples (Mother’s education case).
Anemic Stunted Risk Overweight 0 Days Sick > 3 Days Sick
All -0.04 0.00 -0.05* 0.09** -0.06**
IP -0.12 -0.21** -0.12* 0.10 -0.02
IL -0.05 -0.13 -0.12** 0.11** -0.08**
NP -0.10** 0.05 0.00 0.04 -0.06**
NL -0.02 -0.00 -0.01 0.08 -0.07**
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Mother’s primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Mother’s lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Mother’s primary education; NL = Non-indigenous,
Mother’s lower education. One (two) “*” indicates that the effect is statistically significant from zero
at the ten (five) percent level. Standard errors corrected for clustering at locality level.
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Table 2.G.2.5: Logistic regression results (Mother’s education case).
Variable Coef. St.Er. z Variable Coef. St.Er. z
Age Hh head -0.017 0.007 -2.40 Blender -0.180 0.134 -1.34
Age spouse -0.005 0.007 -0.63 Fridge 0.073 0.204 0.36
Sex Hh head -2.354 0.380 -6.19 Fan 0.125 0.202 0.62
IndigHhHead -0.691 0.288 -2.40 Gas stove 0.364 0.147 2.48
IndigSpouse 0.213 0.292 0.73 Gas heater 0.609 0.365 1.67
EducHhHead -0.222 0.115 -1.92 Radio -0.590 0.101 -5.79
EducSpouse -0.398 0.117 -3.39 Hifi -0.357 0.254 -1.41
Work Hh head 1.199 0.280 4.27 Tv -0.626 0.120 -5.22
Work spouse 0.575 0.164 3.50 Video 0.572 0.354 1.62
# Children 0-5 -0.090 0.048 -1.84 Wash machine -0.139 0.337 -0.41
# Children 6-12 -0.218 0.042 -5.13 Car 1.214 0.468 2.59
# Children 13-15 -0.144 0.085 -1.70 Truck 0.262 0.287 0.91
# Children 16-20 -0.218 0.042 -5.13 Guerrero -0.535 0.191 -2.80
# Women 20-39 -0.008 0.121 -0.70 Hidalgo -0.864 0.218 -3.96
# Women 40-59 0.036 0.157 0.23 Michoacan -0.576 0.178 -3.23
# Women 60+ -0.000 0.189 -0.00 Puebla -1.103 0.151 -7.29
# Men 20-39 -0.178 0.107 -1.65 Queretaro 0.108 0.222 0.49
# Men 40-59 0.036 0.157 0.23 San Luis -0.441 0.155 -2.83
# Men 60+ 0.682 0.241 2.83 Miss Age Sp -3.85 0.723 -5.33
# Rooms -0.005 0.010 -0.55 Miss Indig HH 0.649 1.919 0.34
Electrical light 0.059 0.116 0.51 Miss Indig Sp -2.015 1.850 -1.09
Running water land 0.844 0.116 7.26 Miss Work HH 3.510 1.827 1.92
Running water house -0.412 0.209 -1.97 Miss Work Sp 3.733 1.795 2.08
Dirtfloor 0.097 0.120 0.81 Miss Water land 0.794 1.627 0.49
Poor quality roof -0.002 0.109 -0.02 Miss Water house 0.707 0.828 0.85
Poor quality wall -0.506 0.127 -3.95 Miss Assets -3.990 2.289 -1.74
Animals -0.177 0.114 -1.55 Constant 3.900 0.442 8.80
Land -0.549 0.107 -5.12
Number of Obs 2635
LR Chi2 (54) 671.61 Pseudo R2 0.190
Prob>Chi2 0.000 Log Likelihood -1434.70
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Figure 2.G.2.1: Estimated propensity scores (Mother’s education case).
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Figure 2.G.2.2: Stochastic dominance results (Mother’s education case).
Table 2.G.2.6: Propensity score matching: common sup-
port and number of observations in
the common support (Mother’s education
case).
Common Control Treatment Band-
support # # width
IP [0.169,0.955] 104 139 0.073
IL [0.106,0.872] 264 290 0.073
NP [0.023,0.945] 552 250 0.070
NL [0.071,0.951] 668 363 0.071
Total 1588 1042
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Mother’s primary ed-
ucation; IL = Indigenous, Mother’s lower education; NP = Non-indigenous,
Mother’s primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Mother’s lower education.
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Table 2.G.3.1: Composition of the samples
(delay vs original treatment).
Initial treatment Delayed treatment
# % # %
All 730 100 527 100
IP 110 15.1 69 13.2
IL 227 31.1 156 29.5
NP 186 25.5 156 29.5
NL 207 28.3 146 27.7
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Pri-
mary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower education; NP =
Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous,
Lower education.
Table 2.G.3.2: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(delay vs original treatment).
(a) Initial treatment
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.17 12.4 0.35 -1.51 0.17 0.68 0.11
IP 0.27 12.0 0.41 -1.62 0.14 0.72 0.12
IL 0.19 12.4 0.50 -2.00 0.19 0.71 0.11
NP 0.14 12.5 0.24 -1.23 0.18 0.60 0.12
NL 0.13 12.5 0.26 -1.42 0.17 0.71 0.11
(b) Delayed treatment
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.18 12.3 0.33 -1.53 0.17 0.67 0.13
IP 0.31 11.9 0.34 -1.67 0.13 0.61 0.09
IL 0.25 12.0 0.41 -1.81 0.15 0.71 0.09
NP 0.10 12.5 0.23 -1.13 0.21 0.67 0.14
NL 0.14 12.7 0.35 -1.57 0.16 0.64 0.16
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
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Table 2.G.3.3: Health outcomes of 2-6 year old children in 2003
(delay vs original treatment): Matched samples.
(a) Initial treatment
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.17 12.4 0.35 -1.51 0.17 0.68 0.11
IP 0.27 12.0 0.40 -1.60 0.14 0.72 0.12
IL 0.19 12.4 0.50 -1.99 0.19 0.71 0.11
NP 0.13 12.5 0.24 -1.23 0.18 0.60 0.12
NL 0.12 12.6 0.26 -1.41 0.17 0.71 0.11
(a) Delayed treatment
Hemoglobin zheight zBMI Days Sick
Anemic Median Stunted Median ROW 0 > 3
All 0.19 12.4 0.37 -1.65 0.17 0.63 0.14
IP 0.29 12.3 0.42 -1.71 0.16 0.54 0.08
IL 0.25 12.0 0.51 -2.03 0.14 0.71 0.10
NP 0.12 12.5 0.23 -1.14 0.20 0.60 0.22
NL 0.11 12.8 0.34 -1.57 0.17 0.65 0.15
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous,
Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower
education.
Table 2.G.3.4: Difference between initial and delayed treatment in fraction
of anemic, stunted at risk of being overweight and days sick,
weighted samples (delay vs original treatment).
Anemic Stunted Risk Overweight 0 Days Sick > 3 Days Sick
All -0.02 -0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.03
IP -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.18** 0.03
IL -0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.01
NP 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.00 -0.10
NL 0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.07 -0.05
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary education; IL = Indigenous, Lower
education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education. One
(two) “*” indicates that the effect is statistically significant from zero at the ten (five) percent level.
Standard errors corrected for clustering at locality level.
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Table 2.G.3.5: Logistic regression results (delay vs original treatment).
Variable Coef. St.Er. z Variable Coef. St.Er. z
Age Hh head 0.015 0.010 1.43 Blender -0.165 0.180 -0.92
Age spouse -0.002 0.011 -0.18 Fridge 0.523 0.244 2.15
Sex Hh head -0.561 0.500 -1.12 Fan -0.400 0.280 -1.39
IndigHhHead -0.004 0.314 -0.01 Gas stove -0.074 0.190 -0.39
IndigSpouse 0.332 0.323 1.03 Gas heater 0.360 0.412 0.87
EducHhHead -0.085 0.158 -0.54 Radio -0.040 0.145 -0.28
EducSpouse -0.136 0.165 -0.82 Hifi 0.044 0.337 0.13
Work Hh head 0.823 0.300 2.74 Tv -0.110 0.157 -0.70
Work spouse 0.222 0.205 1.08 Video 0.401 0.395 1.02
# Children 0-5 -0.007 0.064 -0.11 Wash machine -0.236 0.426 -0.55
# Children 6-12 -0.050 0.060 -0.86 Car 0.513 0.589 0.87
# Children 13-15 -0.106 0.119 -0.88 Truck -0.165 0.296 -0.56
# Children 16-20 -0.025 0.094 -0.27 Guerrero 1.024 0.226 4.52
# Women 20-39 -0.074 0.151 -0.49 Hidalgo 1.596 0.245 6.50
# Women 40-59 -0.347 0.219 -1.58 Michoacan 0.385 0.267 1.44
# Women 60+ -0.208 0.240 -0.87 Puebla 0.630 0.199 3.16
# Men 20-39 -0.099 0.142 -0.70 Queretaro -0.281 0.349 -0.81
# Men 40-59 -0.150 0.223 -0.65 San Luis 0.506 0.212 2.38
# Men 60+ -0.400 0.315 -1.27 Miss Age Sp -0.516 1.811 -0.29
# Rooms -0.018 0.013 -0.42 Miss Indig HH -0.557 1.792 -0.31
Electrical light 0.066 0.165 0.40 Miss Indig Sp 0.230 2.079 0.11
Running water land 0.356 0.155 2.30 Miss Age Sp -0.516 1.811 -0.29
Running water house -0.654 0.292 -2.24 Miss Work Sp -0.049 1.771 -0.03
Dirtfloor -0.092 0.161 -0.58 Miss Water land 0.278 1.461 0.19
Poor quality roof -0.184 0.146 -1.26 Miss Assets 0.822 0.956 0.86
Poor quality wall -0.175 0.172 -1.02
Animals 0.100 0.150 0.67 Constant -0.464 0.650 -0.71
Land 0.407 0.142 0.29
Number of Obs 1252
LR Chi2 (56) 148.97 Pseudo R2 0.087
Prob>Chi2 0.000 Log Likelihood -776.97
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Figure 2.G.3.1: Estimated propensity scores (delay vs original treatment).
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Figure 2.G.3.2: Stochastic dominance results (delay vs original treatment).
Table 2.G.3.6: Propensity score matching: common
support and number of observations
in the common support (delay vs orig-
inal treatment).
Common Initial Delayed Band-
support # # width
IP [0.341,0.785] 110 69 0.057
IL [0.218,0.918] 226 152 0.066
NP [0.191,0.859] 185 155 0.056
NL [0.161,0.870] 206 145 0.060
Total 727 521
Note: the acronyms refer to types : IP = Indigenous, Primary educa-
tion; IL = Indigenous, Lower education; NP = Non-indigenous, Primary
education; NL = Non-indigenous, Lower education.
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Abstract:The Mexican Oportunidades program is designed to increase human capital through
investments in education, health, and nutrition for children in extreme poverty. Although the
program is not expressly designed to promote a child’s cognitive and non-cognitive develop-
ment, the set of actions carried out by the program could eventually facilitate improvements
in these domains. Previous studies on the Oportunidades program have found little impact
on children’s cognition but have found positive effects on their non-cognitive development.
However, the majority of these studies use the average outcome to measure the impact of the
program and thus overlook other “non-average” effects. This paper uses stochastic dominance
methods to investigate results beyond the mean by comparing cumulative distributions for
both children who are and children who are not aided by the program. Four indicators of
cognitive development and one indicator of non-cognitive development are analyzed using a
sample of 2,595 children aged two to six years. The sample was collected in rural commu-
nities in Mexico in 2003 as part of the program evaluation. Similar to previous studies, the
program is found to positively influence children’s non-cognitive abilities: children enrolled
in the program manifest fewer behavioral problems compared with children who are not en-
rolled. In addition, different program effects are found for girls and boys and for indigenous
and non-indigenous children. The ranges where the effect is measured cover a large part of
the outcome’s distribution, and these ranges include a large proportion of the children in
the sample. With respect to cognitive development, only one indicator (short-term memory)
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shows positive effects. Nevertheless, the results for this indicator demonstrate that children
with low values of cognitive development benefit from the program, whereas children with
high values do not. Overall, the program has positive effects on child development, especially
for the most vulnerable, who are at the bottom of the distribution.
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3.1 Introduction
Insufficient investments in human capital that are typically found among the poor seriously
compromise children’s present and future well-being. Children with poor health, nutrition,
and education are less likely to develop the necessary skills for functioning in the economic
and social realms in adulthood. Unhealthy conditions early in life, for example, have detri-
mental effects on the immunological system and development of the brain, and as a conse-
quence, lead to poor cognition, problems with conduct, and difficulties in developing social
relations at school (Walker, Wachs, Gardner, Lozoff, Wasserman, Pollitt, Carter, Group, et al.
(2007), Walker, Chang, Powell, and Grantham-McGregor (2005), Chang, Walker, Grantham-
McGregor, and Powell (2002)). Additionally, these conditions lead to low educational attain-
ment and wage earnings (Duc, 2011; Case and Paxson, 2010; Schick and Steckel, 2010). The
Mexican Oportunidades program aims to improve early life conditions by providing monetary
transfers to disadvantaged families conditioned on regular investments in health, nutrition,
and education. The program also provides scholarships to school-aged children (Fernald,
Gertler, and Neufeld, 2008; Levy, 2006; Skoufias, 2005). Altogether, these investments are
expected to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty.
Previous evaluations of Oportunidades and of similar interventions in other countries,
generally show positive effects on the participants (Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel, 2008;
Ranganathan and Lagarde, 2012; Lagarde, Haines, and Palmer, 2009, 2007). For example,
Oportunidades has been associated with greater height-for-age (Gertler, 2004; Behrman and
Hoddinott, 2005; Farfán, Genoni, Rubalcava, Teruel, and Thomas, 2011), lower prevalence of
anemia, and fewer episodes of illness (Gertler, 2004; Rivera, Sotres-Alvarez, Habicht, Shamah,
and Villalpando, 2004). Additionally, positive effects on school enrollment and performance
have been documented, both for primary and junior high school (Schultz, 2004; Behrman
and Hoddinott, 2005). However, recent studies have drawn attention to the heterogeneity
in these effects among participants: Todd and Winters (2011), who found that the program
increases the probability of on-time school enrolment, report greater impacts for children
with literate mothers, whereas Behrman and Hoddinott (2005) show better progression rates
for girls throughout primary school. Heterogeneous effects of the program on health care
utilization have also been detected between indigenous and non-indigenous participants (?),
and evidence provided in ? points to greater impacts on the poorest in regard to the use of
contraceptive methods.
Bearing in mind such heterogeneity, I investigate the effect of Oportunidades on children’s
cognitive and non-cognitive development using stochastic dominance methods which entail
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the analysis of cumulative distributions. The procedure has the advantage of showing how
the effects are distributed across children; thus, it addresses the possibility of disregarding
important information for the analysis of the program. Most studies in the impact evaluation
literature rely on some sort of average measure to assess the effect of an intervention. In fact,
the analysis of the mean has become the standard rule in most impact evaluation studies. The
mean effect, however, leads to skewed results when the program affects individuals in different
ways. For example, a positive mean effect could be the result of few participants obtaining
very large benefits, whereas many are hurt, as suggested by Deaton (2009). Looking at how
effects are distributed could also address concerns about efficiency if the program brings fewer
benefits to subgroups in greater need (Gakidou, Oza, Fuertes, Li, Lee, Sousa, Hogan, Van-
der Hoorn, and Ezzati, 2007; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). Few impact evaluation studies
have employed distributions to assess the effect of interventions similar to Oportunidades, one
study by Djebbari and Smith (2008) evaluates consumption patterns among Oportunidades’
participants, finding evidence of systematic variation by subgroups. This suggests the varying
effects could also exist in other domains where the program expects results. To my knowledge,
this is the first paper that evaluates developmental outcomes for children in Oportunidades
using non-average methods. Moreover, only few studies have used stochastic dominance cri-
teria in the context of impact evaluation –Some examples are Verme (2010); Naschold and
Barrett (2010), and more recently, ?. This latter study concentrates on health outcomes for
children in Oportunidades and detects greater effects for the most deprived subgroups.
To illustrate the convenience of the analysis of distributions, I take as a point of departure
the results of the three studies so far that have investigated the impact of Oportunidades on
child development. The first two studies, by Gertler (2004) and by Fernald, Gertler, and
Neufeld (2009), show a positive average effect on behavioral but not cognitive development
after 3-6 and 10 years of exposure, respectively. The third study, by Ozner, Fernald, Manley,
and Gertler (2009), concentrates on behavioral problems and shows how children exposed to
the program for 3.5-5 years experience a reduction in aggressive/oppositional symptoms (but
not anxiety/depressive symptoms). The results presented here suggest that some effects of
the program on early child development have indeed been overlooked. In particular, cognitive
effects not previously detected for boys and for children with non-indigenous background
are now found. Overall, the results indicate that children with lower values of cognitive
development benefit from the program, whereas those with higher values do not. Additionally,
the majority of the children in the sample are consistently better off in terms of non-cognitive
abilities.
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3.2 Methods
I use stochastic dominance criteria to assess the effect of the program on five indicators of
early child development. The procedure consists of comparing the cumulative distributions of
each indicator for children in both a control group and a treatment group. A positive effect
of the program occurs whenever the distribution of treated children dominates that of the
control. Given the difference in composition between the treatment and control samples, I
carry out a Propensity Score Matching procedure (PSM) to address the possible bias. The
analysis is performed for the entire sample and for the sample split in two on the bases of
gender and indigenous background of the children.
3.2.1 Data and Sample
The data were collected in 2003 by the Oportunidades staff in rural communities in Mexico
as part of the external evaluation of the program. A subsample of children aged two to six
years was selected for the purpose of assessing their cognitive and non-cognitive development.
The sample contains information for two groups: children from families incorporated into the
program in 2000 (treatment), and those from households not incorporated into the program
(INSP, 2005).
The selection of the treatment sample proceeded as follows. In the first stage in 1997,
highly deprived communities were identified and randomly assigned for program participa-
tion by Oportunidades’ authorities. As a result, 186 localities with at least 500 inhabitants,
and at most 2500, were selected during this stage. In the second stage, socioeconomic and de-
mographic conditions were assessed to identify which households within the selected localities
were eligible for the program. A marginality index based on income, demographic composi-
tion, and dwelling conditions of the household indicated whether a family was eligible for the
program or not (Todd, 2004). Finally, a sample of children from eligible families was selected.
Given that eligibility does not necessarily imply that these families agreed to participate, I
only take into account those children for whom administrative records indicate their families
received at some point monetary transfers from the program.
The selection of the control group, on the other hand, was conducted by a PSM procedure.
This PSM is independent of the procedure followed in this article and it was conducted by
the Oportunidades’ authorities with the objective of selecting localities and not children, as
in our case. Deprived localities where the program did not operate in 2003 were matched
to treatment localities with similar observable characteristics (Todd, 2004). However, as
explained by ?, this exercise has two problems. First, information on the set of characteristics
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used to categorize deprived localities in 2003 comes from the National Census in 2000, when
the treatment group had already entered the program. Second, localities instead of individuals
were matched during this phase. Therefore, differences in terms of pre-program characteristics
between treated and non-treated children might still exist.
To check if the comparability of the sample was compromised, I performed a logistic re-
gression using as a dependent variable participation in the program (one indicating a child
being enrolled in the program, zero otherwise) and as covariates a set of observable charac-
teristics as shown in table 3.2 in appendix 3.A. As observed in the table, the head of the
household in the treatment group was more likely to be older, male, and from an indigenous
background, but less likely to be educated and to have a job in comparison with the control
group. Additionally, differences in terms of the demographic composition, dwelling conditions,
and the type and quality of the assets available in the household were detected. These results
indicate that children in the control and treatment samples were not similar; thus, differences
in child development might be due in part to environmental or socioeconomic conditions and
not the result of Oportunidades. For instance, one could erroneously infer a positive effect if
the treated children initially had higher developmental levels thanks to the higher education
levels of their parents.
3.2.2 Propensity Score Matching
To overcome this problem, I performed a matching procedure at the individual level. The
procedure consisted of weighting observations according to the probability that a child in the
sample belongs to a household in the treatment group, i.e., according to the propensity of
being enrolled in the Oportunidades program. The effectiveness of the PSM has been analyzed
by Diaz and Handa (2006), who contrast the PSM with a perfect randomized experiment.
They show that the PSM is reliable as long as a sufficiently large set of covariates is taken
into account to generate the propensity score and the outcomes are measured in the same way
for both the controls and treatments. The outcomes analyzed in this paper were collected
using the same instrument for treatments and controls, and the set of covariates is very close
to the specification used in other studies that analyze the Oportunidades program (Van de
gaer, Vandenbossche, and Figueroa, 2014; Behrman, Parker, and Todd, 2009, 2011). All this
suggests that the PSM can be used in this context to address the bias induced by unobserved
factors.
The propensity score was calculated on the basis of the children’s characteristics in 1997,
when the program was not yet in place. For the treatment group, this information was
obtained from baseline data collected in 1997 by the Oportunidades’ authorities, and for the
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control, the data were extracted from a set of retrospective questions on the 1997 households’
characteristics collected in 2003 (INSP, 2005). The balance of the resulting weighted sample
was once again tested by a logistic regression using the same set of covariates previously
mentioned. The results, presented in table 3.4 in appendix 3.B, indicate that the resulting
weighted sample is balanced in terms of observable characteristics.
After calculating the propensity score, the sample was split in two according to the chil-
dren’s genders and ethnicities. Previous studies have identified heterogeneous effects among
these demographic groups. The division of the sample thus has the purpose of detecting pos-
sible differential effects across these groups. The final step consisted of matching observations
between children in the treatment group and control group based on the propensity score.
The matching was conducted for the complete sample and for each one of the demographic
groups, i.e., boys in the control group were matched with boys in treatment, indigenous chil-
dren in the control group were matched with indigenous children in treatment, and so forth.
The stochastic dominance analysis was then performed for each of the five matched groups.
Appendix 3.B provides a detailed explanation of the matching procedure. For additional in-
formation on the weighting procedure, see appendix 3 in ?. For more information on the PSM
method, see Blundell and Dias (2009). The number of children in the original sample and
after the PSM is provided in table 3.1. As can be observed, there are fewer children in each
of the groups after the matching procedure because observations with very high or very low
propensity scores could not be matched and, therefore, were not taken into account during
the final analysis. The final sample for the analysis, then, is the matched sample, which is
provided in the third and fourth columns in the table.
Table 3.1: Observations before and after PSM
Original sample Matched sample
Treatment Control Treatment Control
Entire sample 1,087 1,625 1,086 1,509
Boys 541 813 541 752
Girls 546 812 539 756
Indigenous 450 374 405 361
Non-indigenous 635 1,241 634 1,144
3.2.3 Stochastic Dominance
I follow Van de gaer, Vandenbossche, and Figueroa (2014), who use the same test of stochas-
tic dominance to assess the effect of an intervention. Imagine that θ represents a random
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variable that measures a child’s development such that a larger value of θ represents a higher
level of development. The level of development is measured through outcomes that can be
of a cognitive or non-cognitive nature. Consider two groups of children that, before being
incorporated into the program, are similar in terms of a set of observable socioeconomic,
demographic, and environmental characteristics, X. Except for their status in the program
(treatment or control), children are assumed to be comparable according to these characteris-
tics. The characteristics composing X are assumed to be determinants of child development.
Additionally, define the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of θ for children in the pro-
gram as F T (θ|X) and for children out of the program as FC(θ|X). If FC(θ|X) ≥ F T (θ|X) for
all θ and FC(θ|X) > F T (θ|X) for some θ, then F T (θ|X) first-order stochastically dominates
FC(θ|X), and a positive effect of the program can be established. In other words, first-order
dominance implies that at each percentile in the distribution, children in the program achieve
higher developmental levels than children in the control.
To establish dominance, the following test, proposed by Davidson and Duclos (2013), was
performed: Let U ⊆ Θ be the union of the supports of the cumulative distributions of children
not enrolled in the program (control) and children in the program (treatment), respectively
FC(θ|X) and F T (θ|X). We test the null hypothesis of nondominance of FC(θ|X) by F T (θ|X),
max
θ∈U
(
F T (θ|X) − FC(θ|X)
)
≥ 0,
against the alternative hypothesis that F T (θ|X) first-order stochastically dominates FC(θ|X),
max
θ∈U
(
F T (θ|X) − FC(θ|X)
)
< 0.
The test identifies the maximum range over the distribution where dominance exists by
first detecting the point where the difference between both curves is greatest and is statistically
significant (Point “M” in figure 3.1). The test reports the largest range around this point
where the null can be rejected at a certain level of significance. The procedure thus gives the
maximum interval where dominance exists, that is, an interval where one group of children
has higher levels of development in comparison to children in the other group. If the effect is
in favor of the program, the group that has higher levels is the treatment group.
In summary, given the differences observed between the treatment and control groups in
terms of pre-program characteristics, a propensity score matching was implemented. The
PSM procedure consists of weighting observations based on the probability of being treated,
which balances the sample in terms of observable characteristics. The balanced sample was
then divided into two demographic groups according to gender and ethnicity, and the weighted
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Figure 3.1: Test of first-order stochastic dominance
observations in the treatment group and the corresponding non-weighted observations in the
control group were used to construct the cumulative distributions needed for the stochastic
dominance test. The effect of the program is eventually obtained by comparing the distri-
bution of cognitive and non-cognitive outcomes for treated and non-treated children using
stochastic dominance criteria.
3.3 Outcomes
I analyze four indicators of cognitive development. The first indicator was constructed using
the results of the Spanish version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT) –a test
for measuring vocabulary recognition that has been used extensively as a proxy of language
development among pre-schooled children aged 3-6 years (See the study of Paxson and Schady
(2007) in Ecuadorian children and the study of Gertler and Fernald (2004) for children in
Oportunidades). Children selected for the study were exposed to cards each containing four
images. Next, the interviewer said a word that the children were asked to identify among the
set of images in front of them. If the answer was correct, another set of images corresponding
to a more difficult word was presented. This procedure continued until the child made six
mistakes in eight consecutive questions or until the set of images was completed. Given that
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no norms for children with similar characteristics and age ranges are available, I use raw
scores to construct the cumulative distribution functions. Possible bias due to differences
in age among the children was also taken into account by including age in months in the
calculation of the propensity score.
The second measure of cognitive development is the Spanish version of the MacArthur
Communicative Development Inventories (CDI). The test evaluates communication skills of
children aged 24-35 months and is designed to assess early language milestones in young
Spanish-speaking children. The test asks parents to identify words and phrases that their
children know (understand and pronounce) from a list. The total number of words selected
by the parents is then summed and used as an index of language ability. In comparison with
similar tests, the CDI has been found to be more effective in assessing early language de-
velopment (Jackson-Maldonado and Bárcenas Acosta, 2006). The fact that previous studies
have documented higher scores in the CDI test for children receiving supplemental nutrition
reinforces the hypothesis that the children in the program could also score higher in compari-
son with children in the control group (Gertler and Fernald, 2004; O’Connor, Hall, Adamkin,
Auestad, Castillo, Connor, Connor, Fitzgerald, Groh-Wargo, Hartmann, et al., 2001).
Finally, non-cognitive development was assessed through the Achenbach Child Behavior
Checklist (Achenbach Index). The test evaluates early behavioral and socio-emotional devel-
opment among children aged 24-72 months. Based on parental responses, a child’s problems,
such as hyperactivity, bullying, bad conduct, violence at home, and responsiveness were di-
rectly rated by the parents according to a list where these problems were exposed to parental
scrutiny. As in the CDI case, the index is constructed by summing the number of positive
answers given by the parents, but in contrast with the other four indicators, larger values are
indicative of poor development. The test has previously been used to assess the effects of
parental background and environmental conditions on the behavioral development of children
(Kahn, Brandt, and Whitaker, 2004; Pachter, Auinger, Palmer, and Weitzman, 2006).
3.4 Results
The results of the tests of non-dominance for the entire sample and for each of the groups are
presented in figures 3.2 through 3.6. Each figure contains boxes that indicate the range where
an effect is found, i.e., where dominance exists. The observed range where each outcome is
defined is shown at the bottom of each figure (horizontal axis). Black and grey boxes indicate
a positive effect at the 5 and 10% level of significance, respectively. A positive effect occurs
whenever the CDF of the treatment group dominates the corresponding CDF of the control
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group (except for the Achenbach Index, in which case a higher value indicates more behavioral
problems and therefore a worse outcome). A negative effect, on the other hand, is indicated
by a white box (solid line) if the rejection occurs at the 5% level, and by a dashed white box
if the rejection is at the 10%. Because it is easier to reject the null hypothesis at the 10%
level of significance, the ranges are larger in comparison with ranges when the null is tested
at the 5% level. The numbers appearing in parentheses next to each box show the proportion
of the population included in the range where the effect occurs. If the number appears in
parentheses, it refers to the effect at the 10% level of significance.
As observed in figure 3.2, the effect of the program on non-cognitive development is positive
throughout the distribution. This is in line with previous studies finding that the program
decreases children’s behavioral problems, but these results show that the ranges where the
null of non-dominance can be rejected cover almost the entire variable’s distribution. At the
5% level of significance, the effect is favorable for more than 90% of the population in the
entire sample and in each of the groups (indicated with a black or grey box).
Figure 3.2: Stochastic dominance results: Achen Index (Behavior problems)
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 show the results for two cognitive indicators. In comparison with
the evidence on non-cognitive development (figure 3.2), the results for short-term memory
ability in Figure 3 are mixed. On the one hand, for the full sample, the effect is positive for
children with lower values of cognitive ability (in black and grey). On the other hand, there
is a negative effect for 17.6% of boys and 23.1% of non-indigenous children with higher values
for cognitive ability (indicated by a white box). Additionally, there is a positive effect for
approximately one-third of the girls in the sample at the 10% level of significance and for 15%
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of the boys at the 5% level of significance. Additionally, the results on short-term memory
emphasize the convenience of the methodology because it allows for the identification of the
part of the distribution in which the effect is present. Here, it is possible to observe positive
effects for boys and non-indigenous children, but only for those scoring low on the test.
Results for visual integration are presented in Figure 3.4. Oportunidades has no positive
effects for the complete sample or for any of the groups. On the contrary, the results show
that the control group outperforms the treatment group for a small fraction of girls (7%)
in a small range at the 10% level of significance. Similarly, approximately one-fifth of non-
indigenous children in control group score better when the test is performed at the 5% level
of significance, whereas the proportion increases to close to 50% when the test is rejected at
the 10% level of significance.
Figure 3.3: Stochastic dominance results: Woodcock-Johnson (short-term memory)
Finally, the results for the two measures of language development are shown in figures 3.5
and 3.6. The CDI is higher for 5% of girls and for 41% of boys enrolled in the program, and
negative effects are observed for 22.5% of boys in the sample. In general, there are no positive
effects of the program for the CDI index when looking at the full sample, whereas negative
effects are observed for 23.1% of the population at the 5% level of significance. Similarly, no
positive effects are observed when looking at the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test in figure
3.6, and the effects are negative for the majority of the population (80.1%), but only at the
10% level of significance. The observation of such effects across groups shows that detrimental
effects appear for girls and indigenous children at the 10% level of significance and that these
effects are lessened because the ranges are smaller in comparison with the results for the
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Figure 3.4: Stochastic dominance results: Woodcock-Johnson (Visual integration)
complete sample.
Figure 3.5: Stochastic dominance results: Communicative Development Inventories (CDI)
3.5 Sensitivity Analysis
The results presented above are in line with previous evidence on non-cognitive development;
however, the results for short-term memory ability are surprising because none of the previous
studies detected effects on this dimension. I argue in this paper that such discrepancies are
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Figure 3.6: Stochastic dominance results: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT)
due to the inability of more traditional methods to detect effects along the distribution.
Nonetheless, such differences could be driven by differences in the composition between the
samples used in these studies and the sample analyzed here. To address this issue, below I
provide the results of three additional analyses using samples that are comparable to those
used in the aforementioned studies. Additionally, I present average and quantile treatment
effects (QTE) to set the benchmark against which the stochastic dominance results are to
be compared. The average effect is extensively reported in impact evaluation studies and is
also the approach followed in previous studies that analyze the effect of the program on child
development. In addition, QTE has been proposed as an alternative to the average approach to
gain insight on effects occurring beyond the mean and, as such, provides a good comparison
with the stochastic dominance approach. The estimator implemented is the unconditional
QTE proposed by Firpo (2007).
The first of these analyses relies on a sample that is very similar to the one used in
Gertler and Fernald (2004). The results, presented in the first part of appendix 3.C, are
comparable to those obtained in the main analysis: children in the program show better
results for non-cognitive ability than children in control group, and the percentages where
dominance occurs are similar to those previously observed. Similarly, the results for short-
term memory ability are positive for children with low cognition and negative for children
with higher values. The similarity between these results and those obtained in the main
analysis presented above reinforces the assumption that differences in the results obtained
with the analysis of distributions are not driven by the composition of the sample, but by the
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methodology. On the other hand, the second analysis focuses on the same sample of children
used by Ozner, Fernald, Manley, and Gertler (2009), and, in line their analysis, the results are
in favor of the program. However, the sample used in this second analysis was not balanced
in terms of observable characteristics (after implementing a PSM), therefore, the possibility
of biased results exists.
In addition, a third analysis addresses the possibility that the results are affected by
the inclusion of children aged two in the sample. In contrast with children aged 3-6, these
children had been exposed to the program for less time to the program by the time the data
were collected in 2003. Therefore, there is a possibility that the observed results are driven,
at least in part, by the inclusion of this group. The third analysis in the appendix shows
the results of the stochastic dominance test using only children aged two in the sample. The
analysis was conducted using the Achenbach Index because information on the other four
outcomes was not collected for two-year-old children. As can be observed, the results do
not substantially differ from the main findings of this paper: children in the program are
consistently better off in terms of non-cognitive skills than children in the control group. The
ranges where dominance occurs are also very similar for all groups, as is the proportion of
children included in these ranges. This finding suggests that results obtained using stochastic
dominance criteria are not affected by the time of exposure for the children in the sample.
Finally, average treatment effects and QTE are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, respectively,
at the bottom part of appendix 3.C. The propensity scores used to generate these results were
the same as those previously used for the stochastic dominance analysis; thus, the same
set of covariates were included in all cases. The analysis of the mean shows that although
all children seem to benefit from the program in terms of non-cognitive development, in
general, no effects on cognition were found. The results only show impacts on the cognitive
skills of indigenous children, namely, on short-term memory skills. However, these results
may undermine the heterogeneity in the effect among children that might occur in this case
because the benefits are not homogenous across families (the amount of the monetary transfer
varies depending on the number of children attending school, for example). The stochastic
dominance approach addresses this problem; however, most evaluation studies addressing the
same issue rely on QTE, another popular methodology that goes beyond the mean effect.
QTE takes into account these concerns by comparing cumulative distributions; however, this
approach differs from the stochastic dominance criterion used in this article in two respects.
First, QTE provide the average difference at a particular percentile, and the test of stochastic
dominance indicates ranges where the CDFs are significantly different. Second, QTE requires
selecting a priori the percentiles at which the effect is to be measured. Although QTE shows
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a broader perspective of the effect of the program along the distribution, some effects at
percentiles not selected could still be ignored, which is not the case with the test of stochastic
dominance. The results for the quantile treatment analysis in table 3.6 show positive effects
on non-cognitive ability, but contrary to the stochastic dominance results, the effect is only
statistically significant for girls and non-indigenous children. Additionally, children in the
lowest quantiles of short-term memory ability have positive values, whereas children in higher
quantiles have negative ones. These results are in line with the stochastic dominance analysis,
but these effects are statistically significant only in a few cases. Note, however, that although
the stochastic dominance approach and QTE are intended for looking at effects along the
distribution, both could lead to different results because the latter requires pre-selecting the
quantiles at which one tests whether the program has an effect, whereas the latter gives
intervals where the difference between both CDFs is statistically significant.
3.6 Discussion
The results indicate that Oportunidades improves early child development in both cognitive
and non-cognitive domains. Virtually all children in the program whose families have been
incorporated into the program for approximately three years show higher values in the index of
non-cognitive development. Likewise, the effect on short-term memory is positive for children
with low cognitive skills, whereas the effect is negative for those with higher levels. Such
differential effects are not observable with more traditional methods that rely on the mean
effect or effects at specific quantiles, as in the case of QTE. In contrast, stochastic dominance
criteria permit the assessment of the effect of the program along the entire distribution. The
combination of stochastic dominance and PSM methods strengthen the results presented here,
given the pre-program differences in the composition of the treatment and control groups that
are found in the sample.
Although the program does not explicitly address skill development, the package of services
–consisting of monetary transfers; in-kind assistance on health, nutrition, and education; and
information provided by the program (e.g., educational workshops on health and nutrition
for mothers)– could improve a child’s readiness to develop these skills. The results on these
domains are well established (Parker, Rubalcava, and Teruel, 2008); however, how the program
affects children’s skill development is less clear. The evidence offered in previous studies
suggests scant effects on cognitive development and some positive results on non-cognitive
development. The results presented here, in contrast, suggest that the scope of these studies
is limited because important effects beyond the mean and for different groups are overlooked.
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For example, Ozner, Fernald, Manley, and Gertler (2009) find no differences between genders
and ethnicities, and Gertler and Fernald (2004) find effects only for girls and not for boys.
More specifically, results on non-cognitive ability are found in ranges that cover a sub-
stantial part of the distribution and for the majority of children in the sample. Additionally,
substantial effects for both boys and girls are observed. These results are not trivial if one ac-
knowledges the importance of the so-called “soft skills” and the role they have for functioning
in daily adult life. As noted by Heckman and Kautz (2012), personality traits (non-cognitive
abilities) are highly predictive of success in life, and contrary to cognitive skills, they remain
throughout life, even if no further investments are made. Therefore, interventions that foster
the development of non-cognitive skills of children should occupy a central role in the design
of anti-poverty interventions.
Regarding the effect of the program on cognition, the results are quiet surprising because
none of the studies mentioned before find effects of the program in any of the outcomes ana-
lyzed in this paper. Unlike these studies, the results offered here suggest that Oportunidades
affects one dimension of cognitive development, namely, short-term memory ability. As men-
tioned by Gertler and Fernald (2004), a child’s short-term memory ability depends more on
factors such as better nutrition and health –which the program most directly supports. In
contrast, other indicators that show no effects and depend more on parental stimuli are in
areas where the program is less involved. Nonetheless, these authors find only a weak mean
effect on short-term memory skill, which illustrates the advantage of the method proposed
here. For example, there are positive effects for one-third of the girls in the sample, at the
10% level of significance. Additionally, the program is favorable for 15% of the boys, but
disadvantageous for another 17% (figure 3.3). Such opposite effects could have been “mixed”
in Gertler and Fernald (2004), and expressed merely as a weak mean effect. Additionally, the
results suggest that the program is effective in helping the most vulnerable children because
those in the lower part of the distribution of short-term memory ability are better off.
Indeed, although effects measured through average and quantile treatment analysis are
consistent with those measured through stochastic dominance criteria, the latter method
leads to more significant results and deepens the analysis within and across groups. A draw-
back of the methodology, however, is the impossibility of translating the results in terms of
magnitudes. The test of stochastic dominance only shows the part of the distribution where
the effect exists and the proportion of the children that are affected by the program. Per-
haps a combination of stochastic dominance criteria with methods more suitable for providing
magnitudes would be more adequate. An additional limitation is the lack of clarity about the
negative results on the higher part of the distribution when looking at short-term memory
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skills. The nature of the data makes clarification on this point difficult, but traditional models
of parental altruism –in which parents invest less in their children when returns are low– can
explain why cognitive skills can decrease as a result of the program (Becker, 1981).
Similarly, more research is needed to unveil the mechanism through which Oportunidades
affects children’s development. Some possible paths have been previously suggested: families
using the monetary transfers to buy more and healthier food, medicines, and goods that could
positively affect children’s well-being (Fernald, Gertler, and Neufeld, 2008). The program
could also have improved children’s development by providing services such as medical and
nutritional attention and information on positive habits. Additionally, parents could have
experienced less stress thanks to these improvements and eventually pay more attention to
and provide better care for their children (Gertler and Fernald, 2004). However, the design
of the evaluation of the program does not allow a disentangling the specific effect of each one
of these domains. A solution to this problem would be the estimation of a structural model.
However, this exercise is beyond the scope of the present analysis.
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Appendices
3.A Characteristics of the households in the sample in 1997
Table 3.2: Characteristics of the households in the sample in 1997. Logistic regression with dependent
variable as 1 if observation belongs to treatment, 0 otherwise.
Variable Coefficient SE z Variable Coefficient SE z
Height mother −0.021 0.009 −2.24 Draft animals 0.17 0.114 1.49
PPVT score mother −0.001 0.002 −0.46 Land ownership 0.531 0.106 5.01
age of child (months) 0.004 0.003 1.09 Blender 0.176 0.133 1.33
Age HH head 0.013 0.007 1.91 Fridge −0.112 0.194 −0.58
Age spouse 0.011 0.007 1.53 Gas stove −0.358 0.146 −2.44
Sex HH head 2.215 0.352 6.3 Gas heater −0.655 0.363 −1.81
Indigenous HH head 0.664 0.274 2.42 Radio 0.592 0.1 5.87
Indigenous spouse −0.256 0.278 −0.92 Hifi 0.351 0.252 1.39
Educ HH head 0.244 0.115 2.13 TV 0.643 0.119 5.41
Educ spouse 0.41 0.118 3.46 Video −0.515 0.345 −1.49
Work HH head −1.085 0.264 −4.11 Wash machine 0.038 0.329 0.11
Work spouse −0.611 0.163 −3.76 Car −1.213 0.468 −2.59
# Children 0-5 years 0.087 0.048 1.81 Truck −0.208 0.285 −0.73
# Children 6-12 years 0.206 0.042 4.91 Guerrero 0.537 0.19 2.83
# Children 16-20 years 0.025 0.074 0.33 Hidalgo 0.945 0.211 4.49
# Children 13-15 years 0.166 0.084 1.96 Michoacán 0.646 0.179 3.6
# Women 20-39 years 0.025 0.12 0.21 Puebla 1.085 0.15 7.21
# Women 40-59 years −0.022 0.156 −0.14 Querétaro −0.131 0.22 −0.6
# Women 60+ years −0.02 0.184 −0.11 San Luis Potosí 0.458 0.154 2.97
# Men 20-39 years −6.777 0.236 −2.87 Missing Age Spouse 4.332 0.716 6.05
# Men 40-59 years −0.367 0.161 −2.27 Missing Indg Hh head −0.421 1.776 −0.24
# Men 60+ years −0.677 0.236 −2.87 Missing Indg Spouse 1.878 1.695 1.11
# Rooms 0.007 0.047 0.15 Missing Work Hh head −3.094 1.669 −1.85
Electricity −0.017 0.115 −0.15 Missing Work Spouse −3.593 1.637 −2.19
Running water land −0.885 0.115 −7.67 Missing water land −1.155 1.735 −0.67
Running water house 0.435 0.209 2.08 Missing water house −0.634 0.824 −0.77
Dirtfloor −0.118 0.119 −0.99 Missing height mother −3.135 1.444 −2.17
Poor quality roof 0.004 0.109 0.04 Missing PPVT score mother 0.225 0.299 0.75
Poor quality walls 0.471 0.127 3.71 Constant −0.787 1.47 −0.53
Number of observations 2, 712 Pseudo R2 0.1951
LR Chi2(57) 712.61 Log Likelihood −1469.78
Prob. > chi2 0
Standard errors adjusted at locality level
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3.B Matching procedure
The matching procedure was carried out in several steps. In a first step, the propensity scores
for each observation were calculated through a logistic regression using the set of covariates
presented in table 3.2. The balancing property of the propensity score was tested using Stata
10; according to this test, the optimal number of blocks was 9. In total, 522 tests were
performed (one test for each one of the 58 covariates in each block) and only in 8 cases the
null hypothesis of the balancing test was rejected.
In a second step, the propensity score matching procedure was implemented within each
of the four groups selected for the analysis and for the entire sample, i.e., the matching
was performed between boys in treatment with boys in control, indigenous in treatment
with indigenous in control, and so forth. The scores are plotted and presented in figure
3.8 below. Note that the ranges of the propensity scores for each group are provided on
the bottom of each figure. Also, a trimming procedure based on the “Max Min” criterion
proposed by Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) was implemented. The resulting trimmed samples
were then used to carry out a Kernel matching based on an Epanechnikov kernel function.
Table 3.3 shows the resulting common supports as well as the number of observations before
and after the trimming procedure. The first two columns contain the original number of
observations while the third and fourth columns show the resulting observations after the
trimming and matching procedures. The rages of the common support ranges are provided in
the fifth column. Additionally, the optimal bandwidth parameter used in the kernel function
is shown in the last column of the table. The parameter was calculated by the formula
α = 1.06 min(σ, ρ1.34) presented in Silverman (page 45-47 1986).
Finally, in order to assess the balance of the covariates used to generate the propensity
score, an additional logistic regression using the matched sample is presented in table 3.4.
As can be observed in the table, only 5 out of 58 covariates are statistically significant.
These results suggest that both groups are very similar in terms of these set of pre-program
characteristics.
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Table 3.3: Propensity scores and number of observations by group
# observations # observations Common Support Optimal bandwidth
in common support
Treatment Control Treatment Control (α parameter)
All 1,087 1,625 1,086 1,509 [0.0448, 0.9847] 0.242
Boys 541 813 541 752 [0.0472, 0.9847] 0.242
Girls 546 812 539 756 [0.0448, 0.9445] 0.239
Indig. 450 374 405 361 [0.0477, 0.8787] 0.22
Non- ind. 635 1,241 634 1,144 [0.0448, 0.9847] 0.23
Table 3.4: Characteristics of the households in the matched sample. Logistic regression with depen-
dent variable as 1 if observation belongs to treatment, 0 otherwise.
Variable Coefficient SE Z Variable Coefficient SE Z
Height mother −0.002 0.01 −0.16 Draft animals 0.117 0.118 0.99
PPVT score mother 0 0.003 0.17 Land ownership 0.041 0.112 0.37
Age of child (months) 0.003 0.004 0.94 Fan 0.035 0.2 0.17
Age HH head 0.009 0.007 1.22 Blender 0.134 0.139 0.96
Age spouse −0.007 0.007 −0.91 Fridge 0.056 0.21 0.27
Sex HH head 0.265 0.363 0.73 Gas stove −0.244 0.155 −1.57
Indigenous HH head 0.181 0.293 0.62 Gas heater −0.322 0.4 −0.81
Indigenous spouse −0.029 0.302 −0.1 Radio 0.087 0.107 0.82
Educ HH head 0.02 0.119 0.17 Hifi 0.116 0.263 0.44
Educ spouse 0.099 0.126 0.78 TV 0.223 0.123 1.82
Work HH head −0.632 0.241 −2.62 Video −0.077 0.356 −0.22
Work spouse −0.185 0.179 −1.03 Wash machine 0.009 0.342 0.03
# Children 0-5 years 0.043 0.05 0.85 Car 0.08 0.434 0.18
# Children 6-12 years 0.019 0.044 0.43 Truck −0.243 0.308 −0.79
# Children 16-20 years 0.015 0.079 0.19 Guerrero 0.297 0.197 1.51
# Children 13-15 years 0.161 0.09 1.79 Hidalgo 0.571 0.206 2.77
# Women 20-39 years 0.034 0.125 0.27 Michoacán 0.131 0.194 0.67
# Women 40-59 years 0.023 0.165 0.14 Puebla 0.154 0.158 0.98
# Women 60+ years 0.11 0.187 0.59 Querétaro −0.016 0.234 −0.07
# Men 20-39 years 0.051 0.116 0.44 San Luis Potosí 0.249 0.166 1.5
# Men 40-59 years −0.123 0.176 −0.7 Missing Age Spouse −0.681 0.891 −0.76
# Men 60+ years −0.012 0.242 −0.05 Missing Indg Hh head 0.453 1.756 0.26
# Rooms −0.012 0.048 −0.26 Missing Indg Spouse 1.017 1.714 0.59
Electricity −0.064 0.124 −0.52 Missing Work Hh head −0.672 1.651 −0.41
Running water land −0.118 0.123 −0.96 Missing Work Spouse −0.068 1.6 −0.04
Running water house 0.049 0.229 0.21 Missing water land 0.854 1.319 0.65
Dirtfloor −0.019 0.126 −0.15 Missing water house 0.106 0.847 0.13
Poor quality roof −0.012 0.115 −0.1 Missing height mother −0.292 1.565 −0.19
Poor quality walls 0.219 0.132 1.66 Missing PPVT score mother 0.034 0.314 0.11
Constant −0.275 1.582 −0.17
Number of observations 2, 595 Pseudo R2 0.021
Wald chi2(58) 67.56 Log Likelihood −1760.94
Standard errors adjusted at locality level
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Figure 3.7: Estimated Propensity Scores by group
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3.C Sensitivity analysis
Analysis #1
Analysis using a sample similar to the one used in Gertler and Fernald (2004). Like in
their analysis, two groups were used to construct the treatment sample: a group enrolled in
1998 (treatment-1998) and a second one incorporated two years later (treatment-2000). Both
groups were compared with the control group in 2003. The following tables show the results
of the test of stochastic dominance for the 5 outcomes described in the article.
Figure 3.8: Stochastic dominance results: Achen Index (Behavior problems)
Figure 3.9: Stochastic dominance results: Woodcock-Johnson (short-term memory)
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Figure 3.10: Stochastic dominance results: Woodcock-Johnson (Visual integration)
Figure 3.11: Stochastic dominance results: Communicative Development Inventories (CDI)
Figure 3.12: Stochastic dominance results: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (PPVT)
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Analysis # 2
Analysis using a similar sample to the one used by Ozner, Fernald, Manley, and Gertler
(2009). The results are presented in the following figure:
Figure 3.13: Stochastic dominance results: Achen Index (Behavior problems)
Analysis # 3
Finally the following figure shows the results for children aged 2 in the sample. The origi-
nal sample contains children aged 2-6 years in 2003. The families of treated children were
incorporated in 2000. Therefore, children between 3 and 6 years old in 2003 were all exposed
to the program 3 years. This is not the case for children aged 2 in 2003 that were exposed
less time. If time of exposure is important, then children in this age-group might respond
differently to the program in comparison with older children. The analysis was carried out
using the Achen Idex (non-cognitive indicator) because this is the only outcome that contains
information for this group, the rest contain information for children older than 3 years old.
Note that the CDI was also collected for children aged 2, however, this analysis is already
presented together with the main results. As can be observed from the graph, the results
do not substantially change: the effect is positive for all groups and in a large part of the
distribution. Moreover, the ranges and the percentages that indicate the proportion of treated
children are very similar. This evidence suggests that the main results including children aged
2 are not affected by the time of exposure of these children.
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Figure 3.14: Stochastic dominance results for children aged 2 years (Achen Index)
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Average and Quantile Treatment Effects
Table 3.5: Average mean effect and descriptive statistics
Mean SD Range Average effect(1) SE(2) t
ALL
Achen Index 18.327 10.108 [0,50] −1.435 0.378 −3.796
Short-term memory 21.372 10.995 [0,54] 0.087 0.536 0.163
Visual integration 10.184 6.72 [0,42] −0.289 0.289 −1
CDI 65.672 28.33 [0,100] 1.65 2.576 0.623
Peabody 14.313 12.113 [0,77] −1.153 0.629 −1.834
Boys
Achen Index 18.804 10.273 [0,50] −0.948 0.711 −1.334
Short-term memory 21.182 11.136 [0,54] −0.259 0.632 −0.411
Visual integration 10.209 6.822 [0,31] −0.428 0.369 −1.16
CDI 64.628 28.986 [0,100] 2.853 3.871 0.737
Peabody 14.743 12.01 [0,77] −0.788 0.663 −1.188
Girls
Achen Index 17.847 9.921 [0,46] −1.963 0.609 −3.222
Short-term memory 21.562 10.851 [0,51] 0.435 0.648 0.671
Visual integration 10.16 6.617 [0,42] −0.157 0.366 −0.428
CDI 66.814 27.599 [1,100] 0.129 3.923 0.033
Peabody 13.89 12.204 [0,73] −1.42 0.875 −1.623
Indigenous
Achen Index 18.687 10.159 [0,46] −1.108 0.672 −1.647
Short-term memory 17.431 10.328 [0,43] 2.078 0.799 2.601
Visual integration 8.637 6.457 [0,33] 0.615 0.492 1.25
CDI 63.5 27.685 [0,100] 3.327 4.894 0.68
Peabody 10.799 8.771 [0,57] −0.064 0.793 −0.081
Non-Indigenous
Achen Index 18.105 10.032 [0,50] −1.784 0.492 −3.624
Short-term memory 23 10.859 [0,54] 0.273 0.601 0.455
Visual integration 10.819 6.721 [0,42] −0.345 0.322 −1.073
CDI 66.453 28.616 [0,100] 0.729 3.96 0.184
Peabody 15.794 12.924 [0,77] −0.594 0.76 −0.782
(1)Estimation using Kernel Matching method; average treatment on the treated reported
(2)Bootstrapped standard errors
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Table 3.6: Quantile treatment effects at selected deciles(1)
q = 0.1 q = 0.2 q = 0.3 q = 0.4 q = 0.5 q = 0.6 q = 0.7 q = 0.8 q = 0.9
All
Achen Index −1 −1 −1 −1 −2∗ −1 −1 −1 −1
Short-term memory 1 1 1 0 −2 −1 0 −1 −1
Visual integration 0 0 −1 0 0 −1 −1 −1 0
CDI 2 4 10 7 6 5 3 0 1
Peabody 0 −1∗ 0 −2∗ −1 −1 −1 −1 −2
Boys
Achen Index −1 −1 0 0 0 0 −1 0 −1
Short-term memory 0 2 0 −1 −2 −1 0 −1 −1
Visual integration 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −2 −1 0 1
CDI 0 9 11 5 6 6 4 1 2
Peabody 0 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 0
Girls
Achen Index −2∗∗ −2∗∗ −2∗∗ −3∗∗∗ −4∗∗∗ −3∗∗∗ −2 −2 −1
Short-term memory 2∗ 2 2 0 −1 −2 −1 0 −1
Visual integration 0 1 0 0 0 0 −1 −1 −2
CDI 4 4 6 10 8 4 3 0 −2∗
Peabody −1∗∗∗ −1 −1 −1 −2 −2 −2 −3 −4
Indigenous
Achen Index −1 0 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 0 0
Short-term memory 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 1
Visual integration 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
CDI 4 1 7 12 12 8 3 −6 −4
Peabody 0 −1 −1 0 −1 −2 −2 −2 1
Non-indigenous
Achen Index −1 −2∗ −1 −2∗∗ −3∗∗∗ −2∗∗ −2 −2 −1
Short-term memory 2 1 1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1 −1∗
Visual integration 0 0 0 0 0 −2∗ −1 −1 0
CDI −1 1 8 3 5 5 4 0 1
Peabody 0 0 −2∗ 0 0 0 −1 0 −2
(1)Bootstrapped standard errors
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.
4 | Did Progresa Reduce Inequality of Op-
portunity for School Re-enrollment?
with Dirk Van de gaer
Abstract:The way school enrollment is distributed over children facing different circum-
stances (like gender, indigenous origin, parental education or place of residence) should be
an important concern in the evaluation of social programs like Progresa. The literature has
shown that Progresa increases average school enrollment for children aged 12 and above, es-
pecially during the transition from primary to secondary school, and some authors found
evidence that the program has larger effects for some groups, for instance for girls than for
boys. This paper finds inspiration in the recent literature on the measurement of inequality
of opportunity to evaluate the effect of the program, taking its effect on inequality of oppor-
tunity in a systematic way into account. Focussing on school re-enrollment opportunities for
each grade attained, our findings are that Progresa improved aggregate opportunities, average
school re-enrollment and reduced inequality of opportunity for school re-enrollment. More-
over, using the Human Opportunity Index, proposed by de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega,
and Chanduvi (2009) de Barros, Vega, and Saavedra (2008), and used extensively in Molinas,
de Barros, Saavedra, and Guigale (2012), or, the Gini Opportunity Aggregator, the decrease
in inequality of opportunity accounts for about 15 to 40 % of the total effect of the program
on aggregate opportunities.
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4.1 Introduction
A key concern in developing countries is the provision of access to basic opportunities for all
(see, e.g., Molinas, de Barros, Saavedra, and Guigale (2012)). One such opportunity is access
to education. When universal access is not achieved, the next best thing is that all children
have equal access at the highest possible level. As powerfully advocated by both economists
and political philosophers (see, e.g. Roemer (1993) Roemer (1998) Fleurbaey (2008) or Cohen
(1989)), a child’s access to education should not be influenced by his circumstances, defined
as characteristics over which he has no control, which include his family background, race,
gender and place of residence. Hence not only the level of children’s opportunities, but also
the way these opportunities are distributed between children with different circumstances is
highly relevant.
Many social interventions, including Progresa, are motivated by the concern to provide
ample opportunities for all. The question whether such social interventions influence both
the level of children’s opportunities and their distribution is key, and has been analyzed in
Chapters 1 and 2. Mexico’s Progresa, in 2002extended in reach and renamed Oportunidades,
and in 2014 changed into Prospera1, aims at expanding children’s educational opportunities.
In fact, the program is explicitly designed to give parents incentives to keep their children
in school by increasing school subsidies when the children are in a higher grade (to make
schooling more attractive compared to child labor) and by providing larger grants for girls
than for boys at ages when otherwise girls are more likely to drop out.
Previous evaluations find positive effects of the program: they identify, for instance, the
effect of the program on average school enrollment of children of a particular age. There
is widespread agreement in the evaluation literature that Progresa increased average school
enrollment, with large effects for children aged 12 and above (see, e.g., Schultz (2004b);
Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005); Todd and Wolpin (2006); Attanasio, Meghir, and
Santiago (2012); Dubois, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2012)). Important conclusions follow from
these studies. Schultz (2004b), on page 22, for instance, reports that: “the impact . . . is to
increase the educational attainment of a cohort of poor youth by 0.66 years of schooling . . .,
for which the youth earn a 12% higher wage per year of schooling over their adult working
lifetimes (age 18-65) based on the 1996 urban wage structure.”
Some studies go further and identify average effects for children having different circum-
stances. Schultz (2004b) and Todd and Wolpin (2006), for instance, find larger positive
treatment effects on school enrollment for girls than for boys. Figueroa (2014) goes beyond
1See also the description of the program in the general introduction of the dissertation
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average treatment effects for different groups and identifies the effect on the entire distribution
of child cognitive and non-cognitive skills for girls, for boys, for children from indigenous and
non-indigenous origin.2 Van de gaer, Vandenbossche, and Figueroa (2014) explicitly focus on
children’s circumstances, measured by the four possible combinations based on whether they
had at least one indigenous parent or not and whether they had at least one parent that com-
pleted primary education or not.3 They establish whether children’s health improves or not,
as a function of their circumstances and their place in the distribution of the health outcome.
While such studies identify which types of children gain from the program and which ones do
not, their non-parametric methodology limits the number of different circumstances they can
consider and they do not provide a systematic assessment of the consequences of the program
on inequality of opportunity.
This paper provides such an assessment. We draw on recent contributions in the liter-
ature on inequality of opportunity that propose to measure the inequality in conterfactual
distributions which only reflect differences in circumstances (see for example, Pistolesi (2009)
and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011))4. As in the previous two chapters, program participation
is taken as a circumstance, because it lies beyond children’s control. In our case, we construct
two conterfactuals: one in case children are treated and one in case they are not. To this
end, we first estimate a logistic regression to obtain the effect of the program on school re-
enrollment for children facing different circumstances. Next, we use this regression to predict
for each child, given his circumstances, the probability of being re-enrolled in school if living
in a household that participates in the program, and the probability in case of living in a
non-participant household. This gives us a vector of predicted re-enrollment probabilities,
with and without the program, that can be used to compare the inequality contained in each
of them.
To determine the effect of the program on inequality of opportunity, we provide, in first
place, results for Generalized Lorenz and Lorenz dominance. Under certain conditions dis-
cussed below, one can unambiguously interpret Generalized Lorenz dominance as an improve-
ment for all opportunity aggregators. Similarly, under certain conditions discussed, one can
unambiguously interpret Lorenz dominance as an improvement for all inequality of opportu-
nity measures. We also want to see how important the effect on inequality of opportunity
is for the total effect on the aggregator. To this end, we use the Human Opportunity Index
(de Barros, Ferreira, Molinas Vega, and Chanduvi, 2009; de Barros, Vega, and Saavedra,
2See Chapter 2.
3See Chapter 1.
4For an overview of this rapidly expanding literature, see Ferreira H.G. and Peragine (2015), Ramos and
Van de gaer (2015) or Roemer and Trannoy (2014).
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2008) and, as an alternative, the Gini Opportunity Aggregator. Both can be decomposed into
changes that are due to changes in average re-enrollment (measuring how many opportuni-
ties for education are provided) and changes in an index that measures the inequality of the
distribution of re-enrollment between children with different circumstances, which therefore
measures changes in inequality of opportunity.
We find that, generally, Progresa leads to a distribution of school re-enrollment probabil-
ities (conditional on circumstances) that both Generalized and Lorenz dominates the distri-
bution of school re-enrollment in the absence of the program. For children that completed
primary school (grade six) the results are particularly strong. Using the Human Opportu-
nity Index or the Gini Opportunity Aggregator, the decrease in inequality of opportunity is
responsible for about 15 to 40 % of the increase in aggregated opportunities.
4.2 Description of Progresa and sample selection
Progresa (Programa de Educación, Salud y Alimentación) was implemented by the Mexican
government in 1997 for poor rural households. Its goal was to alleviate poverty and break
the intergenerational transmission of poverty through the development of human capital. The
program consists of two components. First, households receive cash transfers. Educational
grants are conditional on children’s school enrollment and on regular school attendance (an
attendance rate of 85 per cent is required) and grants for consumption of food are conditional
on regular medical check-ups in health clinics and attendance of health and nutrition talks.
Second, in-kind health benefits and nutritional supplements are provided for children up to
age five, and for pregnant and lactating women. The analysis presented here refers to the
first year after the program began5. The reason, as explained in more detail below, is that
during the first two years of the program, experimental data was available to evaluate the
effects of participation. After 2 years, the group that was randomly selected as a control, was
incorporated in the program, and the experimental design of the program was lost.
Primary education in Mexico consists out of 6 grades, followed by 3 years of secondary
education and 3 years of upper secondary or high school. The educational grants started at
the third grade in primary school, increased through grade levels and ended after secondary
school6. At the secondary level, girls received higher grants than boys – Skoufias (2005) Table
1.1 for the exact amounts. The total monthly monetary payments a household can receive (in
the form of educational grants and grants for food) is capped. Between November 1998 and
5The analysis refers thus to the “immediate” and “delayed” groups described in the General Introduction
of the dissertation and used in the present analysis.
6After 2001, grants were provided until the third grade of high school.
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October 1999, households with school-aged children received per month on average 101 pesos
through food related transfers and 139 through school related transfers. In total, between
November 1998 and October 1999, these transfers represented more than 18 per cent of the
total average value of household consumption in rural areas – Skoufias (2005), Table 1.5.
Based on data from national censuses, highly deprived rural localities with access to a
primary school and a health clinic were identified. In these localities households that expe-
rienced extreme poverty (measured on the basis of household income, characteristics of the
head of household, and variables related to dwelling conditions) were included in the program.
For logistical reasons, not all localities eligible for participating in the program were enrolled
at the same time. A random procedure assigned some localities to receive immediate treat-
ment in November 1997 and monetary payments from May 1998; the others began receiving
treatment in December 20007.
Collecting data to make a rigorous evaluation of Progresa possible was an important
concern of the program designers from the outset, and the delayed incorporation of some
localities was instrumental to obtain these data. The data on children’s education we use were
collected in October 1998, when a first group of localities, hereafter referred as to immediate
treatment group, already received treatment, but not a second groups of localities which
was incorporated later (referred to as delayed treatment group). Data were collected in 320
immediate treatment localities and 186 delayed treatment localities, resulting in our treatment
and control sample, respectively. Hence, we follow much of the literature (see, e.g., Gertler
(2004); Schultz (2004a); Behrman, Sengupta, and Todd (2005); Todd and Wolpin (2006);
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (2012); Dubois, de Janvry, and Sadoulet (2012)) and use
the delayed treatment sample as a control group in order to identify the short-run effects
of the program8. In both treatment and control samples, we only consider the households
that were eligible for the program; thus only the poor households of the selected localities
are considered. In addition, we use baseline data collected in 1997 to obtain some of the
information on children’s background characteristics such as parental education, gender of
the head of the household, as well as dwelling characteristics and demographic composition of
the household. The reason for using the 1997 survey is the lack of background information in
the 1998 sample. A caveat of such a procedure, however, is the difficulty to merge information
from both years for some of the children observed in 1998. Our sample, thus, contains children
whose background information in 1997 could be successfully traced with their information on
7See the Introduction of the dissertation for more details.
8Children that belong to treated households have been receiving treatment only for the last 8 months.
Moreover, the sample is restricted to school-aged children, none of which can have benefited directly from the
nutritional supplements (only given to children up to age 5). Hence the long run effects of the program are
probably larger.
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education from 19989. For these reasons, average results presented in Section 4.4.1 refer to
intend-to-treatment analysis.
Figure 1 below, provides for both immediate and delayed treatment samples, the percent-
age of the children that attained grade 0 to 9 as their highest completed grade and were
re-enrolled two months after the academic year 1998-99 started in August 1998. For grade
0, this means that children did not succeed after attending the first year and were enrolled
again in first grade in October 1998.
Figure 4.1: Re-enrollment rates in October 1998 per grade for immediate and delayed treatment
sample.
Source: Author’s calculation.
School re-enrollment is high across all grades, except for grade 6, which is when primary
education is finished, and grade 9, which is when secondary school is finished. There are clear
differences between the immediate and delayed treatment samples for children that completed
grades 3 to 6. Especially for the latter, re-enrollment in the treatment sample is higher than
in the control sample (delayed treatment).
Two remarks must be made at this point. First, a simple comparison of immediate and de-
layed treatment samples might be misleading if these samples differ in terms of observable or
unobservable characteristics. Suppose, for instance that the immediate treatment sample con-
9Information on education was collected only for children between 6 and 17 years old in 1998. In total, 84%
of these children have also information in 1997.
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tains more children from higher educated parents and that higher educated parents keep their
children longer in school. If this is the case, some of the difference in average re-enrollment
between the initial and delayed treatment samples would be due to this higher frequency of
educated parents in the immediate sample and not only be a consequence of the treatment,
and the causal effect of the program would be unidentified. The consensus is, however, that
the differences between these samples in terms of characteristics are limited (see, Behrman
and Todd (1999)).10 Second, looking at average re-enrollment per grade is not informative
about the effect the program has on the distribution of re-enrollment between children con-
fronted with different circumstances. For example, an increase in the average re-enrollment
rate could result from some children having advantaged circumstances (for instance those with
highly educated parents) seeing their re-enrollment rate increase much more than average, and
those with disadvantaged circumstances (those having poorly educated parents), seeing their
re-enrollment rate decrease. Since the ultimate goal of this paper is to evaluate the effect
of Progresa on inequality of re-enrollment opportunities, we have to look at distributional
effects. The next section describes in detail the procedure we follow to account for the effect
of the program on inequality of opportunity.
4.3 Methodology
4.3.1 Theoretical framework
We have a fixed set N = {1, . . . , n} of children. For each child i we have determined pi,
the probability that he or she re-enrolls given his or her circumstances, where circumstances
are characteristics of the child (or its environment) over which it has no control, such that
we do not want to hold the child responsible for these characteristics. The higher a child’s
pi, the more advantage the child’s circumstances offer11. Therefore, in the literature on the
measurement of inequality of opportunity, pi is considered to measure the value of the child’s
opportunities. The vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ [0, 1]n records the value of the opportunities
of the children in our set N . To evaluate the opportunites of the children, we define an
opportunity aggregator function O : [0, 1]n −→ R.
We impose the following standard properties on this aggregator function. First, O(p)
satisfies anonimity: any permutation of the verctor p yields the same value for the opportunity
10In addition, we test for each grade, the balance of our sample using baseline data collected in 1997. The
results, shown in the Appendix 4.A (Tables A.3–A.5) suggest that there are no substantial differences between
the immediate and the delayed samples.
11This is a measurement statement, not a causal statement. Suppose that children facing some circumstances
are more motivated to re-enroll at school. In that case, the effect of circumstances on their motivation and
thereby on their re-enrollment probability will be attributed to their circumstances.
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aggregator function as the original p. Second, O(p) satisfies non-decreasingness in every
pi: whenever there is one child whose opportunities increase, without decreasing another’s
opportunities, aggregate opportunities do not decrease. Third, O(p) satisfies the weak transfer
principle: increasing the value of opportunities for a child with low opportunities by a given
amount and decreasing the value of opportunities for a child with higher opportunities by the
same amount, without giving the former more opportunities than the latter, cannot decrease
the value of O(p). Let pN be the vector of opportunities in the absence of the program, and pT
the vector of opportunities with the program. We now have the following well-known result
(Shorrocks, 1983).
Proposion 1: for all opportunity aggregator functions O(p) that satisfy anonimity, non-
decreasingness and the weak transfer principle, aggregate opportunities in the vector pT will
not be smaller than in the vector pN if and only if the Generalized Lorenz curve of pT lies
nowhere below the Generalized Lorenz curve for pN .
Generalized Lorenz dominance is a condition under which we can unambiguously compare,
for all opportunity aggregator functions satisfying the three properties, what happens to the
aggregated opportunities of the children. We are, however, also interested in what happens
to the inequality in the distribution of childrens’ opportunities. Define an inequality measure
as a functions I : [0, 1]n −→ R. We impose standard properties on this inequality measure.
First, I(p) satisfies anonimity: any permutation of the vector p yields the same value for the
inequality index as the original p. Second, I(p) satisfies the weak transfer principle: increasing
the value of opportunities for a child with low opportunities by a given amount and decreasing
the value of opportunities for a child with higher opportunities by the same amount, without
giving the former more opportunities than the latter, cannot increase inequality. Third, I(p)
is relative: multiplying all children’s opportunities by the same positive constant does not
affect the value of the inequality measure. We can now use the following standard result
(Foster and Shorrocks, 1988).
Proposition 2: for all inequality of opportunity measures I(p) that satisfy anonimity, the
weak transfer principle and relativity, inequality of opportunity in the vector pT will not be
larger than inequality of opportunity in the vector pN if the Lorenz curve of pT lies nowhere
below the Lorenz curve of pN .
We are also interested to decompose the effect of Progresa on aggregate opportunities into
an effect on average opportunities and an effect on inequality of opportunity. This kind of
question can be analyzed using “abreviated” opportunity aggregator functions (by analogy
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with “abbreviated social welfare functions” - see (Lambert, 2001)). More in particular, by
defining average opportunities as C = (1/n)∑ni=1 pi, we can write abbreviated opportunity
aggregator functions as
O(p) = C [1 − I(p)] . (4.1)
Following the procedure suggested by de Barros, Vega, and Saavedra (2008), the change in
the values of abbreviated opportunity aggregator functions brought about by Progresa can
be decomposed as follows:
O(pT ) − O(pN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔO
= CT (1 − I(pT )) − CN (1 − I(pN ))
= CT (1 − I(pT )) − CN (1 − I(pT )) + CN (1 − I(pT )) − CN (1 − I(pN ))
= (CT − CN )(1 − I(P T ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔC
+CN (I(pN ) − I(pT ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔI
. (4.2)
Equation (4.2) shows how the change in the Opportunity aggregator, ΔO, can be decomposed
in two components: ΔC , the contribution of the change in average school re-enrollment, and
ΔI , the contribution of the change in inequality of opportunity.
The Human Opportunity index, proposed by de Barros, Vega, and Saavedra (2008), takes
as inequality measure the dissimilatiy index
D = 12C
1
n
n∑
i=1
|pi − C|, (4.3)
which equals the percentage of average school re-enrollment that has to be taken from those
with a school re-enrollment above average and given to those with a school re-enrollment
below average, such that everyone, independent of his circumstances, ends up with the grade’s
average school re-enrollment (all pi = C). With the vector pˆ as the vector obtained after
permuting the elements of p such that pˆ1 ≤ pˆ2 ≤ . . . ≤ pˆn and m such that pˆm ≤ C < pˆm+1,
it is easy to show that the opportunity aggregator function corresponding to (4.1) and (4.3),
the value of the Human Opportunity Index, can be written as
H = 1
n
⎡
⎣(2 − m
n
)
m∑
i=1
pˆi + (1 − m
n
)
n∑
i=m+1
pˆi
⎤
⎦ .
This aggregator function is strictly increasing in all pˆi. It also satisfies the weak transfer prin-
ciple, but observe that transfers between children that have lower than average opportunities
or transfers between children that have higher than average opportunites do not affect the
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value of H. It only values transfers from children with above average opportunities to children
with below average opportunities. This might be considered a disadvantage for those who
defend the strong transfer principle, which requires that increasing the value of opportunities
for a child with low opportunities by a given amount and decreasing the value of opportu-
nities for a child with higher opportunities by the same amount, without giving the former
more opportunities than the latter, always decreases inequality. There exist many ways of
constructing an abbreviated opportunity aggregator function satisfying the strong transfer
principle. We propose one, based on the familiar Gini index of inequality,
G = 1 + 1
n
− 2 pˆn + 2pˆn−1 + 3pˆn−2 + ... + npˆ1
n2C
. (4.4)
It is easy to show that the opportunity aggregator function corresponding to (4.1) and (4.4),
the value of the Gini Opportunity Aggregator, can be written as
S = 1
n2
n∑
i=1
(2i − 1)pˆn+1−i,
showing the familiar pattern of weights that are a linearly decreasing function of the rank
order of the pˆi.
4.3.2 Selection of circumstances
In principle, to determine the extent of inequality of opportunity, we need a complete de-
scription of each child’s circumstances. Our data contain a rich set of circumstances thanks
to the information that was collected as part of the evaluation of the program in October
1998 and September 1997. Descriptive statistics of these variables are shown in Table A.1 in
Appendix 4.A. The set of circumstances we used include personal and background character-
istics and are gender, race (indigenous background), parental background (level of education
of the parents), gender of the head of the household, whether his or her spouse lives in the
same home and whether there was a secondary school in the locality where the child lives.
These circumstances have been selected for the following reasons.
It is well established that large disparities still exist in Mexico in terms of access to and
performance at school and part of such disparities are correlated with gender, girls being more
disadvantaged than boys. To capture the effect of gender, we use a dummy indicating whether
the child is a boy or a girl. Similarly, having an indigenous background is traditionally believed
to diminish the possibilities that a child receives education given the social relegation of this
part of the population. Indigenous background is measured by a variable that indicates if
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the child belongs to a family where either the head of the household or the spouse of the
head speaks an indigenous language. Speaking an indigenous language is perhaps the best
indicator for indigenous background since it is not common that non-indigenous people in
Mexico speak an indigenous language.
The effect of parental characteristics on children’s schooling has been widely documented.
Particularly important is the education of the parents. Molinas, de Barros, Saavedra, and
Guigale (2012) show for example that parents’ education is the most important circumstance
to explain school enrollment of children aged 10 to 14 in most Latin American countries,
including Mexico. In our sample, there are few household heads with more than secondary
education (grades 7-9); therefore, educational background of the children is measured by
dummy variables that indicate if the head of the household has no education, some education
(without having completed primary school), or completed at least primary school. The same
variables were constructed for the spouse of the head. Gender of the head of the household and
whether the head and the spouse live in the same household are also indicated by dummies.
The later helps to identify single parent families. The presence of a secondary school in the
locality where the child lives is potentially important, as it could affect the decision of the
child to go to primary or secondary school. Finally, as we have many missing values for some
of the circumstances (see Part (b) of Table A.1) and to be able to use these observations in the
estimation of the effects of the circumstances for which their values are not missing, additional
dummies that indicate the presence of missing values are included as circumstances.
4.3.3 Empirical methodology
We need to estimate first the probability of re-enrollment for the children in the sample. For
each grade obtained before the start of the school year12, we perform a logistic regression
with school re-enrollment as a binary dependent variable (Yi = 1 if child i is enrolled in a
particular grade and Yi = 0 otherwise), the K dimensional vector Xi as circumstances (Xik
is child i’s value for circumstance k) and a dummy treatment variable Ti indicating whether
the child participated in the program (Ti = 1) or not (Ti = 1). We also include interaction
terms between circumstances and the treatment dummy variable. These interaction effects
allow the treatment to have different effects for children with different circumstances (e.g.,
12Interviewees were asked for the last grade obtained in school in October 1998, when the academic year
1998-1999 had already began. Only information on children attending school was collected, therefore, we
observe school re-enrollment.
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girls versus boys or indigenous versus nonindigenous children). The specification is standard:
Prob(Yi = 1) =
exp(β0 +
∑K
k=1 βkXik + γ0Ti +
∑K
k=1 γkTiXik)
1 + exp(β0 +
∑K
k=1 βkXik + γ0Ti +
∑k
k=1 γkTiXik)
. (4.5)
The estimated values of the coefficients β0, β1, ..., βk, and γ0, γ1, ..., γk are used to generate,
for every child, two estimated probabilities: pTi , the predicted probability of re-enrollment if
the child is treated and pNi , the corresponding probability if the child is not treated. Observe
that, if two children, say i and j, have a different predicted probability (pZi 	= pZj , Z= T or
N), this must be due to differences in circumstances. Hence, the inequality in the vector of
predicted probabilities pTi (or pNi ) is entirely due to children having different circumstances,
and is, for that reason, a measure of inequality of opportunity amongst children participating
(not participating) in the program13. For a comparison with other measures, see Ramos and
Van de gaer (2015). Average re-enrollment can be computed easily: with Z=T or N ,
CZ = 1
n
n∑
i=1
pZi . (4.6)
Having obtained the predicted values pNi and pTi , we rearrange them increasingly, into the
vectors pN and pT , respectively. These vectors form the input in our evaluation exercise.
To construct the Generalized Lorenz curves, we define MTd as the value of the coordinate
of the Generalized Lorenz curve in case of being treated and MNd as that in case of not being
treated. The value of these coordinate at each decile d for d = 1, ..., 1014 is given by:
MZd =
d˜(d)∑
i=1
pZi , (4.7)
where Z=T if treated or N otherwise and d˜(d) is the integer that is closest to [n/10] ∗ d.
For each d = 1, ..., 10, the difference between the coordinates of the Generalized Lorenz curve
in case of being treated and not being treated is MDd = MTd − MNd . Similarly, define, for
each decile d = 1, ..., 10, LTd as the value of the coordinate of the Lorenz curve in case of
being treated, LNd as that in case of not being treated and the difference between both as
13This is the basic idea of the ex-ante (direct) approach to the measurement of inequality of opportunity
–see, e.g., Pistolesi (2009) and Ferreira and Gignoux (2011). See also discussion in the General Introduction
of the dissertation
14Given the computational burden that arises with the Bootstrap procedure explained in Appendix 4.B, we
only look at values at each decile
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LDd = LTd − LNd . The value of the coordinates of the Lorenz curve at decile d is given by:
LZd =
1
d˜(d)CZ
d˜(d)∑
i=1
pZi , (4.8)
where Z=T if treated or N otherwise, CZ is the respective value of the average predicted
probability pZi as shown in (4.3.3) and d˜(d) is as above. MDd > 0 for all d implies that
the Generalized Lorenz curve of treated children dominates that of non-treated children, and
therefore, that Progressa increases aggregate opportunities for all aggregator functions satis-
fying anonimity, the transfer principle and non-decreasingness (see Proposition 1). Similarly,
LDd > 0 for all d indicates Lorenz dominance such that Progresa reduces inequality of oppor-
tunity for all inequality indices satisfying anonimity, relativity and the transfer principle (see
Proposition 2).
We can easily compute DT and HT by replacing p by pT in (4.3) and (4.3.1), respectively.
Similarly replacing p by pN results in DN and HN . Following the decomposition procedure
described in (4.2), the difference in the Human Opportunity Index that is due to Progresa
can be decomposed as follows:
HT − HN︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔH
= (CT − CN )(1 − DT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔCH
+CN (DN − DT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔD
,
such that the change in the Human Opportunity Index can be decomposed in two components:
ΔCH , the contribution of the change in average school re-enrollment, and ΔD, the contribution
of the change in inequality of opportunity. After computing GT , ST , GN and SN , following the
decomposition procedure described in (4.2), the difference in the Gini Opportunity Aggregator
can be decomposed similarly:
ST − SN︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔS
= (CT − CN )(1 − GT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔCG
+CN (GN − GT )︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΔG
where we see that the change in the Gini Opportunity Aggregator can be decomposed in two
components: ΔCG , the contribution of the change in average school re-enrollment, and ΔG,
the contribution of the change in inequality of opportunity.
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4.4 Empirical Results
We estimate a logistic regression for each grade, where we estimate the probability that a
child is re-enrolled as a function of his circumstances (the regression coefficients are reported
in Table A.2 in the Appendix). The results suggest that treated children, boys and indigenous
children have a higher probability of re-enrollment. Parental education plays an important
role: living in a household where the head has a higher level of education (a proxy we use
for education of the father) and, especially where the wife of the household head has a higher
level of education (a proxy for maternal education) both correlate with a higher probabil-
ity of school re-enrollment. Living in a locality where a secondary school is present also
correlates positively with school re-enrollment, especially after completion of primary school
(grade 6). The only surprising result is that indigenous children have a higher probability of
re-enrollment, but remember that we control for other features of the household in the estima-
tion, such as the level of education of the household head and his wife. Some of the popular
impression that indigenous children have lower rates of re-enrollment than non-indigenous
children might be due to the fact that they live in households with lower educated parents.
No firm conclusions can be drawn about the interaction effects between treatment and cir-
cumstances: only very few of them are statistically significant15. It is striking, though, that,
when the interaction effects are statistically significant, they usually have the opposite sign
of the direct effect of the circumstance. This suggests that the treatment might compensate
the effect of the circumstance on school re-enrollment, which can be expected to diminish
inequality of opportunity.
4.4.1 Average effect
We use the estimated coefficients to predict for each child the probability of re-enrollment in
case he is treated (pTi ), and in case he is not treated (pNi )16. We compare the average of these
two probabilities per grade group and determine which percentage of the children (would)
gain from receiving Progresa benefits (i.e., for which pTi > pNi ). The results are reported in
Table 1.
The first column (I) gives the grade the children completed before the start of the school
year. The second column (II) gives the sample sizes of the treatment (TS) and the third
15We don’t discuss the coefficients of the missing value dummies, as we only included these dummies to keep
our sample as large as possible –see also final comment in the previous Section.
16In the regressions some variables perfectly predicted school enrollment. They were then left out of the
estimation (see Table A.2). In that case we deleted one of the co-linear variables, resulting in empty cells in
Table A.2. See footnote in the table for further details
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Table 4.1: Samples sizes and average (predicted) re-enrollment rates per grade in 1998
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Sample size Av. Re-enroll. Av.pTi Av.pNi % gains (pt > pn)
Grade TS CS TS CS TS CS TS CS TS ∪ CS
0 2803 1773 0.786 0.774 0.786 0.776 0.780 0.774 0.522
1 2139 1333 0.973 0.947 0.973 0.973 0.947 0.947 0.808
2 2116 1316 0.943 0.920 0.943 0.940 0.923 0.920 0.735
3 2011 1202 0.928 0.889 0.928 0.926 0.890 0.889 0.850
4 1773 1078 0.925 0.880 0.925 0.923 0.884 0.880 0.749
5 1640 979 0.914 0.870 0.914 0.913 0.871 0.870 0.922
6 2555 1519 0.520 0.397 0.520 0.517 0.400 0.397 0.994
7 803 474 0.929 0.930 0.929 0.929 0.929 0.930 0.534
8 645 345 0.912 0.890 0.912 0.912 0.883 0.890 0.758
9 449 254 0.454 0.433 0.454 0.462 0.438 0.433 0.560
Notes: TS(CS) stand for the sample of children that lived in a treatment (control) locality.
TS∪CN indicates that the union of both samples is used. Source: Author’s calculations.
(III) that of the control sample (CS). The fourth and fifth columns show the re-enrollment
rates for these samples; these numbers are the same as those depicted in Figure 1. Columns
(VI)-(IX) give the predicted average probabilities of re-enrollment in case the child receives
treatment (pT ) and in case he does not receive treatment (pN ), for the children in both the
treatment and control sample. The final column, (X), gives the percentage of children for
which the predicted probability in case of treatment is larger than the predicted probability
of enrollment without treatment.
The following observations can be made. First, the numbers in column (IV) and (VI)
are equal, as are the numbers in columns (V) and (IX). This is a result of the estimation
procedure we followed. Second, the average probabilities in case of receiving treatment for
the TS and CS at the one hand (columns VI and VII) and the average probabilities in case
of not receiving treatment for the TS and CS on the other hand (columns VIII and IX),
are very close to each other. This suggests that differences in re-enrollment rates between
the two samples are not due to differences in composition in terms of the circumstances we
incorporated. Third, differences between the average predicted re-enrollment probabilities pˆT
and pˆN for both TS ( column VI versus VIII) and CS (column VII versus IX) are very small
for grades 0 and 7. Except for grade 5, the differences from grade 1 onwards become more
pronounced, and they are particularly large for grade 6, i.e., for those that completed primary
education. This suggests that Progresa induces children to stay in school, especially after
completion of primary education. Finally, the last column confirms that for most children
the predicted probability of re-enrollment is larger when they receive treatment than when
122 4. Did Progresa Reduce Inequality of Opportunity?
they don’t. The percentage that gains is very large for children that completed grades 1 to
6. So, overall, more children seem to gain from the program than loose. Yet, the question
what the program does to the evaluation of aggregated opportunities when inequality of
opportunity is taken into account, or what the program does to inequality of opportunities
remains unanswered so far.
4.4.2 Dominance
We discuss in first place the results for Generalized Lorenz dominance. As the results for
grade 6 are more outspoken and this is the grade where most children drop from school,
we depict in Figure 2 the Generalized Lorenz Curve for this grade only. Results for the
other grades are presented in Appendix 4.C, in Table A.4. As can be observed in Figure
4.2, the curve for treated children lies, for all deciles, above the one for non-treated children,
suggesting that Progresa improves aggregate opportunities for the participants. That is, for
all opportunity aggregator functions satisfying the three properties mentioned in Proposition
1, the distribution of opportunities in case of treatment is unambiguously preferred to the
distribution in the absence of treatment. Furthermore, the difference between both curves is
substantial and statistically significant.
We now use Proposition 2 to look into the effects of the program on inequality of op-
portunity; we compare the Lorenz curve when children are treated and not treated. Again,
the results for grade 6 are more interesting, so we show only results for this grade in Figure
4.3, but the reader can find in Table A.8. (Appendix 4.D) the coordinates for all the grades.
Looking at the figure, it is clear that the Lorenz curve when treated is never below when
not treated. Moreover, at each decile, the difference of the value of the coordinates of the
Lorenz Curve between MTd and MNd is always statistically significant. Hence we can infer that
Progresa reduced inequality of opportunity in grade 6 for all inequality measures satisfying
the three properties mentioned in Proposition 2.
The results for the other grades are, overall also positive. For most grades, the differences
(MDd and LDd ) are always positive, suggesting that the program reduces inequality of oppor-
tunities for those grades too. Clearly, for grades 0, 5 and 7, some values for MDd or LDd are
negative, but these negative differences are small and never statistically significant.
4.4.3 Decomposing the effect
The final step in our analysis is decompose the effect of Progresa on our two selected aggregator
functions, the Human Opportunity Index and the Gini Opportunity Aggregator, into an effect
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Figure 4.2: Generalized Lorenz Curve grade 6
Notes: A solid-black circle (•) indicates the difference between treated and non-treated Generalized
Lorenz curves, at a particular decile, is significant at 1% level of significance, while a white-unfilled
circle (◦) indicates that this difference is significant at 5%.
on average opportunities and inequality of opportunity. In Table 4.2 we report the results for
the Human Opportunity Index.
The first column in the table gives the grade attained before the start of the school year.
Column (II) and (III) give the value of the Human Opportunity Index based on the estimated
probability of re-enrollment when treated (pTi ) and when non-treated (pNi ), respectively. Sim-
ilarly, columns (V) and (VI) show the average re-enrollment rate, and columns (VIII) and
(IX) the dissimilarity index. Column (IV) gives the change in the Human Opportunity Index,
and equals the difference between column (II) and (III). Similarly, columns (VII) and (X) give
the change in the average re-enrollment rate and dissimilarity index and equal the difference
between columns (V) and (VI), and (VIII) and (IX), respectively. Column (XI) gives the
part of the change in the Human Opportunity Index that can be attributed to an increase
in average re-enrollment, and column (XII) that of the of the change that can be attributed
to changes in the dissimilarity index. As the values of all level statistics are determined very
precisely (columns II, III, V, VI, VIII, and IX), we only report whether the differences are
statistically significant (columns IV, VII, IX and XII).
The following conclusions can be drawn. First, the values of the Human Opportunity
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Figure 4.3: Lorenz Curve grade 6
Notes: A solid-black circle (•) indicates the difference between treated and non-treated Lorenz curves,
at a particular decile, is significant at 1% level of significance, while a white-unfilled circle (◦) indicates
that this difference is significant at 5%.
Index are very high for all grades, except for grades 6 and 9, irrespective of whether children
receive treatment or not. Second, there exist gains from treatment in terms of the Human
Opportunity Index for almost all grades, the exceptions being grades 5 and 7, but these
losses are rather small and not statistically significant(column IV). Third, the positive effect
observed in grades 2, 3, 4, and 6, is due to an increase in average re-enrollment (column
VII), and to a decrease in the dissimilarity index (column X). Finally, the contribution of the
decrease in inequality of opportunity, ΔD, to the improvement of the Human Opportunity
Index in those grades in it increased significantly at 5% (i.e., grades 2, 3, 4 and 6), accounts
for between 16% and 32% of the improvement in the value of the Human Opportunity Index.
Table 4.3 reports the results for the Gini Opportunity Aggregator (S), using the same
format as in Table 4.2, but without repeating the results for average re-enrollment, as they
are identical to the ones reported in this table. The results are entirely in line with those
reported in and discussed after Table 2. The only difference is that the effects on the Gini
Opportunity Aggregator are usually slightly larger. Clearly, the results tell the same story:
Progresa not only improved average re-enrollment rates of children, but it also decreased
inequality of opportunity. The effects are statistically significant for grades 2, 3, 4 and 6, and
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Table 4.2: The Human Opportunity Index (all entries multiplied by 100)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X) (XI) (XII)
Human Opp. Index Re-enrollment rate Dissimilarity Index
Grade T N T-N T N T-N T C T-N ΔCH ΔD
0 74.025 73.701 0.324 78.215 77.772 0.444 5.357 5.233 0.123 0.420 -0.096
1 96.472 92.723 3.749 97.319 94.218 3.102 0.871 1.587 -0.715 3.075 0.674
2 92.500 90.163 2.337 94.175 92.235 1.941 1.779 2.246 -0.467 1.906 0.430
** ** **
3 91.388 86.950 4.438 92.733 88.970 3.762 1.450 2.270 -0.821 3.708 0.730
*** *** ** *** **
4 91.273 85.279 5.993 92.433 88.298 4.135 1.255 3.418 -2.163 4.083 1.910
*** *** *** *** ***
5 89.288 89.434 -0.146 91.360 91.043 0.317 2.268 1.768 0.500 0.309 -0.456
6 47.034 34.210 12.824 51.903 39.910 11.992 9.380 14.283 -4.903 10.867 1.957
*** *** *** *** ***
7 91.415 91.645 -0.229 92.899 92.967 -0.067 1.597 1.422 0.175 -0.066 -0.163
8 89.538 86.094 3.445 91.195 88.581 2.614 1.816 2.807 -0.991 2.567 0.878
*
9 41.396 37.393 4.003 45.723 43.656 2.067 9.464 14.347 -4.883 1.871 2.132
Notes: *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Confidence intervals were determined using a
Bootstrap procedure. Source: Author’s calculations.
are especially large for those children that completed primary education (grade 6) and grade
4. The contribution of the decrease in inequality of opportunity, ΔG, to the improvement
of the Gini Opportunity Aggregator in those grades in which it increased significantly at 5%
(i.e., grades 2, 3, 4 and 6), accounts for between 19% and 39% of the improvement in the
value of the Gini Opportunity Aggregator.
4.5 Conclusion
Many social programs aim to improve children’s opportunities, especially for those that, due
to their circumstances, would not get sufficient opportunities. From this perspective, it is
surprising that most program evaluation studies only identify an average treatment effect.
Some studies focus on children with particular circumstances (girls versus boys or indigenous
versus non-indigenous), and identify for which types of children the program works better.
However, so far, no study has tried to obtain an overall assessment of the effect of a social
program like Progresa on the distribution of school re-enrollment between children with dif-
ferent circumstances. This paper is a first attempt to provide an assessment of the effects of
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Table 4.3: The Gini Social Welfare Function (S) (all entries multiplied by 100)
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
Gini Welfare Gini
Grade T N T-N T N T-N ΔCG ΔG
0 72.381 72.062 0.319 7.459 7.341 0.117 0.410 -0.091
1 96.175 92.115 4.059 1.176 2.231 -1.055 3.065 0.994
2 91.957 89.336 2.621 2.355 3.143 -0.787 1.895 0.726
** ** *
3 90.840 86.087 4.752 2.041 3.240 -1.199 3.685 1.067
*** ** *** **
4 90.778 84.121 6.657 1.790 4.730 -2.939 4.061 2.595
*** *** *** ***
5 88.522 88.899 -0.376 3.106 2.355 0.750 0.306 -0.683
6 45.332 32.439 12.892 12.660 18.721 -6.061 10.473 2.419
*** *** *** ***
7 90.934 91.132 -0.1975 2.115 1.974 0.141 -0.065 -0.131
8 88.846 85.097 3.748 2.575 3.932 -1.356 2.546 1.202
*
9 39.687 35.041 4.646 13.201 19.735 -6.534 1.794 2.852
Notes: *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Confidence intervals
were determined using a Bootstrap procedure. Source: Author’s calculations.
Progresa that takes into account its effect on the distribution of children’s opportunities.
To do so, we find inspiration in the recent literature that tries to quantify the extent
to which opportunities are unequally distributed. A child’s probability of being re-enrolled,
conditional on its circumstances is seen a a measure of the opportunities available to the child.
Inequalities in these probabilities are exclusively due to children having different circumstances
and are therefor considered offensive. Hence a social planner that wants to evaluate the
distribution of opportunities should favor a redistribution (i.e., a transfer) of opportunities
from those with higher to those with lower opportunities. The evaluation framework we
develop here incorporates this concern.
We have seen that, overall, the distribution of re-enrollment probabilities conditional on
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circumstances when treated both Generalized Lorenz and Lorenz dominates the distribution
of re-enrollment probabilities when not treated. The former indicates that any social eval-
uator that aggregates children’s opportunities and is inequality averse with respect to the
distribution of opportunities must find that Progresa increases aggregate opportunities. The
latter indicates that, whenever inequality of opportunity is measured by a relative measure,
Progresa decreases inequality of opportunities. Finally, when the Human Opportunity Index
or the Gini Opportunity Aggregator is chosen to aggregate children’s opportunities, the effect
on the reduction in inequality of opportunity by the program accounts for between 15 and 40%
of the effect of the program on the aggregate opportunities. Hence, we found clear evidence
that Progresa not only improved school re-enrollment opportunities on average, but it also
significantly and substantially reduced inequality of school re-enrollment opportunities.
128 Bibliography
Bibliography
Attanasio, O. P., C. Meghir, and A. Santiago (2012): “Education choices in Mexico:
using a structural model and a randomized experiment to evaluate Progresa,” The Review
of Economic Studies, 79, 37–66.
Behrman, J., and P. Todd (1999): “Randomness in the experimental samples of PRO-
GRESA –Education, Health, and Nutrition Program,” International Food Policy Research
Institute.
Behrman, J. R., P. Sengupta, and P. Todd (2005): “Progressing through PROGRESA:
an impact assessment of a school subsidy experiment in rural Mexico,” Economic Develop-
ment and Cultural Change, 54, 237–275.
Cohen, G. A. (1989): “On the currency of egalitarian justice,” Ethics, pp. 906–944.
de Barros, R., F. Ferreira, J. Molinas Vega, and J. Chanduvi (2009): Measuring
Inequality of Opportunities in Latin America and the Caribbean. The World Bank.
de Barros, R. P., J. R. M. Vega, and J. Saavedra (2008): “Measuring inequality of
opportunities for children. Unpublished.,” The World Bank.
Dubois, P., A. de Janvry, and E. Sadoulet (2012): “Effects on school enrollment and
performance of a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico,” Journal of Labor Economics,
30, 555–589.
Ferreira, F. H. G., and J. Gignoux (2011): “The Measurement of Inequality of Op-
portunity: Theory and an Application to Latin America,” Review of Income and Wealth,
forthcoming.
Ferreira H.G., F., and V. Peragine (2015): “Equality of opportunity: Theory and
evidence,” Policy Research Working paper, No 7217. The World Bank. Washington, D.C.
Figueroa, J. L. (2014): “Distributional effects of Oportunidades on early child develop-
ment,” Social Science & Medicine, 113, 42–49.
Fleurbaey, M. (2008): Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare. Oxford University Press.
Foster, J. E., and A. F. Shorrocks (1988): “Inequality and poverty orderings,” European
Economic Review, 32(2), 654–661.
Bibliography 129
Gertler, P. (2004): “Do conditional cash transfers improve child health? Evidence from
PROGRESA’s control randomized experiment,” American Economic Review, pp. 336–341.
Lambert, P. J. (2001): The Distribution and Redistribution of Income: Third edition.
Manchester University Press.
Molinas, J. R., R. P. de Barros, J. Saavedra, and M. Guigale (2012): “Do our chil-
dren have a chance? A Human Opportunity Report for Latin America and the Caribbean,”
The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Pistolesi, N. (2009): “Inequality of opportunity in the land of opportunities, 1968–2001,”
The Journal of Economic Inequality, 7, 411–433.
Ramos, X., and D. Van de gaer (2015): “Approaches to inequality of opportunity: Prin-
ciples, measures, and evidence,” Journal of Economic Surveys.
Roemer, J. (1993): “A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian Planner,”
Philosophy & Public Affairs, 22(2), 146–166.
(1998): Equality of opportunity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA.
Roemer, J. E., and A. Trannoy (2014): Equality of Oppportunitychap. 4, pp. 217–300.
North-Holland.
Schultz, P. (2004a): “School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa
poverty program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74(1), 199–250.
Schultz, T. P. (2004b): “School subsidies for the poor: evaluating the Mexican Progresa
poverty program,” Journal of Development Economics, 74, 199–250.
Shorrocks, A. F. (1983): “Ranking income distributions,” Economica, 50, 3–17.
Skoufias, E. (2005): PROGRESA and its impacts on the welfare of rural households in
Mexico, vol. 139. Intl Food Policy Res Inst.
Todd, P. E., and K. I. Wolpin (2006): “Assessing the impact of a school subsidy program
in Mexico: Using a social experiment to validate a dynamic behavioral model of child
schooling and fertility,” The American Economic Review, pp. 1384–1417.
Van de gaer, D., J. Vandenbossche, and J. L. Figueroa (2014): “Children’s health
opportunities and project evaluation: Mexico’s Oportunidades program,” The World Bank
Economic Review, 28, 282–310.

Appendices
4.A Composition of the sample
Table A.1: Composition of and missing values in treatment and control
samples in percentage
TS NS T∪N
(a)Composition
Gender child (male) 48.01 46.61 47.48
Indigenous background 28.84 30.32 29.4
Gender household head (male) 86.71 87.18 86.89
Household head living with partner 90.72 90.63 90.69
Secondary school in the locality 29.46 28.61 29.14
Household head no education 25.47 26.48 25.85
Household head incomplete primary 45.83 45.45 45.69
Household head at least complete primary 17.26 15.9 16.74
Spouse no education 28 29.98 28.37
Spouse incomplete primary 38.54 36.3 37.69
Spouse at least complete primary 14.4 13.76 14.16
(b) Missing values
Gender child (male) 7.67 8.07 7.82
Indigenous background 14.99 16.25 15.47
Gender household head 5.97 5.59 5.83
Household head living with partner 1.2 0.73 1.02
Secondary school in the locality 0.57 0 0.36
Education of household head 11.44 12.18 11.72
Education of spouse 19.07 20.96 19.79
Notes: TS(NS) stands for the sample of children that lived in a treat-
ment(control) locality; TS∪CN indicates that the union of both samples
is used In part (a), columns 2-4 give the fraction of the children that
have the characteristics mentioned in the first column, as a percentage
of the children in that sample for which data on that characteristic were
reported In part (b), columns 2-4 give the fraction of children for which
the characteristic mentioned in the first column is missing, as a percent-
age of all the children in the sample. Source: Author’s calculations.
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4.B Bootstrap procedure
Step 0: k=1;
Step 1: For each sample of size n, take a random sample of n elements with replacement
and estimate the logistic specification described in Section 4.3.3.
Step 2: for i=1 to n compute the predicted values:
• β′kXTi , the index value if treated;
• β′kXNi , the index value if not treated;
• pTi the probability of enrollment if treated;
• pNi the probability of enrollment if not treated;
Define the coefficient vector associated with circumstances as βc, the one associated with
missing circumstances as βm and the one associated with interactions between circumstances
and treatment as βcm.
Step 3: From step 2, some observations for which one or more coefficients βk predict
perfectly school enrollment were dropped, and therefore the corresponding predicted values
pˆTi and pˆNi are not estimated. For these observations, we replace the estimated predicted
values according to the following criteria:
• If βc or βm perfectly predicts being enrolled in school, replace pTi = pNi = 1. If βc or βm
perfectly predicts not-being enrolled, replace pTi = pNi = 0.
• If βct perfectly predicts being enrolled in school, replace pTi = 1. If βct perfectly predicts
not-being enrolled, replace pNi = 0.
Step 4: Use the values presented in step 3 to compute the following:
(i) All the statistics mentioned in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 in the main text of the paper.
(ii) The Lorenz and Generalized Lorenz coordinates at each decile for each grade
Store the results of (i) and (ii) in the k − th row of a matrix A.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 1-4 3000 times, and each time, store the results in the k − th row
of matrix A so that we end up with matrix A of dimension [3000, B], with B being the total
number of statistics computed in each loop.
Step 6: Use the respective empirical distribution obtained for each statistic to construct
the 99%, 95% and 90% confidence intervals for each of them.
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Step 7: Finally, perform a test for Lorenz and Generalized Lorenz dominance on the basis
of the vectors of ordinates. The test consist in posing the null as “nondominance” of the
treated by the non-treated respective curve, such that, in case of rejection of the null, all that
is left is dominance. To carry out the test, we compute the fraction (f) of jointly positive
values for the difference of the Lorenz and Generalized Lorenz coordinates, and interpret 1−f
as the level of significance to reject the null.
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4.C Generalized Lorenz
Table A.7: Generalized Lorenz coordinates per grade for treatment and controls
Grade in 1998 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decile 1 (T) 268.955 319.307 292.321 276.556 246.252 213.992 145.735 110.059 82.062 20.395
Decile 1 (NT) 268.147 300.111 279.923 255.830 209.624 224.687 98.247 110.520 74.343 14.162
Difference (T-N) 0.809 19.197 12.398 20.725 36.628 -10.696 47.488*** -0.461 7.719* 6.234*
Decile 2 (T) 572.950 650.106 602.475 564.211 500.877 434.210 308.548 222.386 167.658 44.763
Decile 2 (NT) 569.735 612.759 576.386 525.082 438.231 452.578 209.072 223.571 155.427 31.953
Difference (T-N) 3.215 37.347 26.089* 39.129*** 62.646*** -18.368 99.476*** -1.185 12.231* 12.810*
Decile 3 (T) 898.905 985.904 917.421 856.441 759.435 666.126 485.372 338.022 255.626 71.330
Decile 3 (NT) 893.714 932.861 883.294 801.845 674.562 682.248 326.355 340.123 239.466 54.487
Difference (T-N) 5.191 53.043 34.127* 54.595*** 84.873*** -16.123 159.017*** -2.101 16.160* 16.843*
Decile 4 (T) 1,244.863 1,322.397 1,235.532 1,150.133 1,020.969 903.354 667.020 455.793 345.082 99.697
Decile 4 (NT) 1,238.062 1,257.432 1,195.421 1,079.936 920.561 914.076 454.864 458.228 326.202 80.744
Difference (T-N) 6.801 64.965 40.111* 70.197*** 100.408*** -10.722 212.156*** -2.435 18.880* 18.952*
Decile 5 (T) 1,597.925 1,661.827 1,561.993 1,446.290 1,284.304 1,144.231 863.277 574.346 435.030 130.075
Decile 5 (NT) 1,596.589 1,584.112 1,513.322 1,364.062 1,173.895 1150.528 593.631 576.349 414.079 109.423
Difference (T-N) 1.336 77.715 48.671* 82.228*** 110.409*** -6.297 269.647*** -2.002 20.951* 20.652*
Decile 6 (T) 1,967.781 2,002.885 1,891.052 1,747.058 1,550.066 1,386.048 1072.427 695.176 525.995 162.425
Decile 6 (NT) 1,965.117 1,914.730 1,835.031 1,651.149 1,432.000 1389.420 743.475 696.612 503.602 140.237
Difference (T-N) 2.664 88.155 56.021* 95.909*** 118.066*** -3.372 328.951*** -1.435 22.393* 22.188
Decile 7 (T) 2,344.820 2,344.770 2,221.739 2,048.790 1,817.676 1,633.540 1299.446 816.906 618.154 197.340
Decile 7 (NT) 2,340.224 2,247.375 2,159.389 1,942.944 1,694.257 1632.185 917.015 817.978 594.660 176.493
Difference (T-N) 4.596 97.395 62.350* 105.846*** 123.419*** 1.355 382.431*** -1.072 23.494* 20.847
Decile 8 (T) 2,739.024 2,688.985 2,555.567 2,354.094 2,087.232 1,883.024 1543.873 939.507 711.656 234.634
Decile 8 (NT) 2,724.944 2,584.907 2,487.511 2,239.610 1,962.440 1878.256 1121.268 940.219 687.255 215.676
Difference (T-N) 14.080 104.078 68.056* 114.484*** 124.792*** 4.768 422.605*** -0.712 24.401* 18.957
Decile 9 (T) 3,149.050 3,033.391 2,892.280 2,664.757 2,359.131 2135.973 1809.614 1061.914 806.701 274.838
Decile 9 (NT) 3,130.184 2,926.530 2,823.956 2,545.436 2,236.558 2128.589 1351.678 1062.361 781.225 257.085
Difference (T-N) 18.866 106.861 68.324* 119.321*** 122.573*** 7.384 457.936*** -0.447 25.476* 17.753
Decile 10 (T) 3,579.128 3,378.930 3,232.098 2,979.497 2,635.260 2392.714 2114.512 1186.323 902.830 321.432
Decile 10 (NT) 3,558.825 3,271.238 3,165.490 2,858.615 2,517.366 2384.422 1625.953 1187.184 876.949 306.902
Difference (T-N) 20.303 107.692 66.608* 120.882*** 117.894*** 8.292 488.559*** -0.861 25.880* 14.530
Positive treatment effect ** *** ***
(joint test)
Notes: The stars behind the coefficients indicate the difference between treated and
non-treated is statiscally significant. *** (**) [*] means significant at 1 (5) [10] percent.
Level of significance based on Bootstrap confidence intervals. (T) stands for treated while
(NT) for non-treated. A joint test for dominance at the end of the table indicates if the
difference between treated and non-treated is jointly positive for all deciles. Source: Authors’
calculations.
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4.D Lorenz
Table A.8: Lorenz coordinates per grade for treatment and controls
Grade in 1998 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Decile 1 (T) 0.0751 0.0945 0.0904 0.0928 0.0934 0.0894 0.0689 0.0928 0.0917 0.0635
Decile 1 (NT) 0.0753 0.0917 0.0884 0.0895 0.0833 0.0942 0.0604 0.0932 0.0856 0.0462
Difference (T-N) -0.0002 0.0028 0.0020 0.0033 0.0102*** -0.0048 0.0085** -0.0004 0.0062* 0.0173*
Decile 2 (T) 0.1601 0.1924 0.1864 0.1894 0.1901 0.1815 0.1459 0.1875 0.1874 0.1395
Decile 2 (NT) 0.1601 0.1873 0.1821 0.1837 0.1741 0.1898 0.1286 0.1885 0.1789 0.1043
Difference (T-N) 0.0000 0.0051 0.0043 0.0057** 0.0160*** -0.0083 0.0173** -0.0010 0.0085* 0.0352**
Decile 3 (T) 0.2512 0.2918 0.2838 0.2874 0.2882 0.2784 0.2295 0.2849 0.2857 0.2222
Decile 3 (NT) 0.2511 0.2852 0.2790 0.2805 0.2680 0.2861 0.2007 0.2867 0.2756 0.1778
Difference (T-N) 0.0000 0.0066 0.0048 0.0069** 0.0202*** -0.0077 0.0288*** -0.0018 0.0102* 0.0444**
Decile 4 (T) 0.3478 0.3914 0.3823 0.3860 0.3874 0.3775 0.3154 0.3842 0.3857 0.3106
Decile 4 (NT) 0.3479 0.3844 0.3776 0.3778 0.3657 0.3834 0.2798 0.3863 0.3754 0.2635
Difference (T-N) -0.0001 0.0070 0.0046 0.0082** 0.0217*** -0.0058 0.0357*** -0.0021 0.0103* 0.0471**
Decile 5 (T) 0.4465 0.4918 0.4833 0.4854 0.4874 0.4782 0.4083 0.4841 0.4863 0.4053
Decile 5 (NT) 0.4486 0.4843 0.4781 0.4772 0.4663 0.4825 0.3651 0.4858 0.4765 0.3570
Difference (T-N) -0.0022 0.0076 0.0052* 0.0082** 0.0210*** -0.0043 0.0432*** -0.0017 0.0098* 0.0482*
Decile 6 (T) 0.5498 0.5928 0.5851 0.5864 0.5882 0.5793 0.5072 0.5860 0.5880 0.5060
Decile 6 (NT) 0.5522 0.5853 0.5797 0.5776 0.5688 0.5827 0.4573 0.5872 0.5795 0.4576
Difference (T-N) -0.0024 0.0074 0.0054* 0.0088** 0.0194*** -0.0034 0.0499*** -0.0012 0.0084* 0.0484*
Decile 7 (T) 0.6551 0.6939 0.6874 0.6876 0.6898 0.6827 0.6145 0.6886 0.6910 0.6148
Decile 7 (NT) 0.6539 0.6870 0.6822 0.6797 0.6730 0.6845 0.5640 0.6895 0.6843 0.5759
Difference (T-N) 0.0013 0.0069 0.0052** 0.0079** 0.0167*** -0.0018 0.0506*** -0.0009 0.0066* 0.0389*
Decile 8 (T) 0.7653 0.7958 0.7907 0.7901 0.7920 0.7870 0.7301 0.7919 0.7955 0.7310
Decile 8 (NT) 0.7657 0.7902 0.7858 0.7835 0.7796 0.7877 0.6896 0.7925 0.7909 0.7038
Difference (T-N) -0.0004 0.0056 0.0049** 0.0066** 0.0125*** -0.0007 0.0405*** -0.0006 0.0046* 0.0272*
Decile 9 (T) 0.8798 0.8977 0.8949 0.8944 0.8952 0.8927 0.8558 0.8951 0.9017 0.8563
Decile 9 (NT) 0.8796 0.8946 0.8921 0.8904 0.8885 0.8927 0.8313 0.8955 0.8990 0.8389
Difference (T-N) 0.0003 0.0031 0.0028** 0.0039*** 0.0068*** 0.0000 0.0245*** -0.0004 0.0027* 0.0174*
Positive treatment effect (joint test) * *** **
(joint test)
Notes: The stars behind the coefficients indicate the difference between treated and
non-treated is statiscally significant. *** (**) [*] means significant at 1 (5) [10] percent.
Level of significance based on Bootstrap confidence intervals. (T) stands for treated while
(NT) for non-treated. A joint test for dominance at the end of the table indicates if the
difference between treated and non-treated is jointly positive for all deciles. Source: Authors’
calculations.
